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Abstract  
Physiotherapy and Fundamental Ethics engages the field of 
physiotherapy through a critique of its contemporary foundations from 
the perspective of the ethics philosophy of Emmannuel Levinas, in 
order to develop novel approaches to physiotherapy practice. 
Physiotherapy is a well-established healthcare profession, practiced in 
healthcare systems around the world. Despite its success, modern 
healthcare more generally faces a number of significant challenges, 
including increasing financial burdens, an increasingly ageing and 
chronically ill population, ongoing technological innovation, and 
diminishing trust in conventional healthcare. Ways in which 
physiotherapy could respond to these challenges and adapt to future 
needs are being explored. One approach entails a thorough 
reassessment of the profession’s status quo and its subsequent 
development, drawing on hitherto unexamined philosophies, 
methodologies, and practices. This study seeks to contribute to these 
efforts by drawing on a range of traditions that have not yet been 
introduced to the profession, but appear to hold great potential for its 
critical reassessment and development.  
 
Levinas’s fundamental ethics provides the theoretical framework for 
this, beginning with its exposition of the ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings of Western metaphysics and science as 
implicating a violence against the other. This violence consists in 
negating the other and any relation to otherness through a totalizing 
movement, assimilating the other into the categories and capacities of 
the knowing ego, its knowledge, and self. Consonant with researchers 
who consider implications of Levinas’s work to other healthcare 
professions, I argue that Levinassian ethics reveals the theories and 
practices that shape contemporary physiotherapy as inadvertently 
opposing its original therapeutic motives and aspirations. By arguing 
that the other is characterised by a preceding and un-encompassable 
infinity and exteriority, Levinas developed his contrasting conceptions of 
fundamental ethics and the self-in-relation as otherwise than being. 
These provide the theoretical grounds on which I develop a novel 
understanding of the physiotherapist and physiotherapy practice. They 
are developed around the key notions of passivity and accompaniment 
drawn from Levinassian literature and further expanded throughout 
this thesis.  
 
Inasmuch as ethics as passivity and accompaniment questions the very 
possibility of practice without doing violence, I draw on Pierre Hadot’s 
approach to philosophy as a way of life, and the philosophies and 
practices of predominantly Japanese lineages of Zen(-buddhism), 
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Aikido and other martial arts, and the treatment approach, Shiatsu. 
Building on their distinct emphases on physical practice and a 
resonance between them that I elucidate, I argue that they provide 
particularly fertile grounds for the development of otherwise 
physiotherapy practices.  
 
Autoethnography provides the methodological point of departure, as 
this study sets out from my personal involvements in physiotherapy 
and the Japanese philosophical, martial, and therapeutic traditions. 
Autoethnography was adapted in this thesis through a critical 
encounter with Levinas’s and Hadot’s work. This consolidated the 
contrasting and conjunctural encounter of physiotherapy with 
fundamental ethics and other philosophies and practices for 
physiotherapy’s critique and development. Through this 
methodological engagement with Levinas and Hadot, the research 
offers a novel development of autoethnography to the fields of 
qualitative research. Its broad reference-field further indicates 
contributions that inflect across these fields, including other healthcare 
professions underpinned by the same ontology and epistemology. The 
primary aims of this study remain the development of a critical 
perspective that expands on Levinas’s fundamental ethics, and the 
development of novel approaches to physiotherapy on this basis. 
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Chapter One 
Physiotherapy and Fundamental Ethics 
 
For the little humanity that adorns the earth, a relaxation of 
essence to the second degree is needed, in the just war waged 
against war to tremble or shudder at every instant because of 
this very justice. This weakness is needed. This relaxation of 
virility without cowardice is needed for the little cruelty our 
hands repudiate. That is the meaning that should be suggested 
by the formulas repeated in this book concerning the passivity 
more passive still than any passivity (Levinas, 1998b, p. 185). 
 
Introduction 
This study engages the field of physiotherapy through a critique of its 
theories and practices of self and other from the perspective of 
fundamental ethics, and the development of novel approaches to its 
thinking and practice on this otherwise foundation. This twofold 
engagement takes places through a comparative critique of 
contemporary physiotherapy with a range of philosophical, practical, 
and therapeutic traditions that have not as yet been introduced to the 
profession but appear to hold great potential for its further 
development. Most prominently, Emmanuel Levinas’s fundamental 
ethics provides the theoretical framework for this critique and 
development of physiotherapy in its foundations. Pierre Hadot’s 
approach to philosophy as a way of life, as well as my research into and 
practice of Zen (-buddhism), Aikido and a range of other, 
predominantly Japanese, martial arts, and Shiatsu (a Japanese manual 
therapeutic approach) augment the critical perspective drawn from 
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Levinas’s work, and provide a crucial impetus for the development of a 
physiotherapy practice based on fundamental ethics.   
 
What is meant by fundamental ethics and how might it differ from 
ethics in a conventional sense? It should be clear that ethics is already 
‘considered fundamental to the practice of physiotherapy’ as it stands 
today (PBNZ, 2011, p. 4). The Aotearoa New Zealand Physiotherapy 
Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct, for example, is thought to be 
based on ‘commonly agreed … longstanding ethical values and 
professional principles’ that set ‘the standard for ethical decision 
making’ and the ‘expectations for the professional behaviour of 
registered physiotherapists in New Zealand’ with the purpose of 
protecting the health and safety of the New Zealand public’ (PBNZ, 
2011, pp. 3-4). Health and safety define the ethical values to be 
protected and they, as much as the principles and standards formulated 
to ensure them, are understood as something that can be observed, 
defined, understood and conceptualized. A Code of Ethics ensures 
adherence constituted on conscious choice and intention, defining 
action on its basis.  
 
Especially in the context of healthcare, this is additionally evident in 
the fact that the ‘Code should be read in conjunction with relevant … 
policies, procedures, competencies and standards that regulate 
professional practice’ (PBNZ, 2011, p. 5). These describe and define 
what constitutes health, and the knowledge and skills that define and 
are expected from the competent physiotherapy practitioner (PBNZ, 
2015; PNZ, 2012). These descriptions and definitions are applicable to 
all physiotherapists registered in New Zealand, and define 
physiotherapy practice as based on evidence acquired through research 
defining objective knowledge, and common understanding (PBNZ, 
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2011, p. 14). Fundamental ethics explored in relation to physiotherapy 
in this thesis builds on a very different notion of ethics, developed by 
Levinas over the course of his writings.      
 
There are a number of key notions integral to Levinas’s conception of 
fundamental ethics that would be initially useful to define as they will 
be returned to later in the thesis. The initial ones come from Levinas’s 
first major publication, Totality and Infinity (1969), beginning with what 
he refers to as totality, or totalization, a relation to the other in which all 
beings are ‘integrated into a whole’ in such a way that their ‘singularity 
vanishes’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 59). In other words, Levinas argues that if 
the other and my relation to the other could be known and described in 
terms of knowledge, then ‘the individuals would appear as participants 
in the totality: the Other would amount to a second copy of the I—both 
included in the same’ through their assimilation into the categories and 
capacities of knowing ego and its knowledge (Levinas, 1969, p. 121). 
The knowing subject would therefore negate its relation to the other, 
and effectively undo the other by subsuming it into its knowledge, 
rendering it into a part of itself or, more radically speaking, into itself, 
and thus ultimately, the self or same. 
 
One moment when this totalization takes place in the context of 
physiotherapy’s interactions between a therapist and client is in the 
process of assessment and diagnosis of a client for the particular 
ailments they present with. In this process, the client is observed, 
interviewed, and examined according to the physiotherapist’s 
professional knowledge and the diagnostic categories of mainstream 
healthcare and physiotherapy (PNZ, 2012a, p.22). Though other factors 
like the client’s goals are also included in the initial assessment, the 
potential result of an emphasis on using established diagnostic 
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categories may be that a multitude of different clients with slightly or 
seemingly overlapping presentations are all be labeled as, for example, 
suffering from a ‘lumbar sprain(s)’, or more specifically, ‘discogenic low 
back pain’, or in the even more obvious sense in which these labels are 
sometimes used colloquially by therapists, as ‘being a lumbar sprain’ or 
similar. Clients are directly, or indirectly observed (via their condition 
as a defining characteristic of them) from the perspective of 
professional knowledge and diagnostic categories under which they are 
subsumed (via their condition). Though clients certainly also play a role 
in this process and the shaping of the client-practitioner relationship, 
from this perspective, it is primarily the professional physiotherapist 
who has this knowledge and the capacity to identify, or label them as 
suffering from one or another condition, as well as their path to 
recovery according to the equally overarching category of health that 
governs mainstream healthcare and physiotherapy.  
 
In radical distinction to this subsumption of otherness to the self-same, 
Levinas argues that ‘the relation with the Other breaks the ceiling of 
the totality’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 171). This ‘breach of totality’ indicated in 
the title of the first chapter of Totality and Infinity does not result from a 
kind of ‘insufficiency of the I’ that could be reduced through an 
increasing of its capacities, but rather ‘Infinity does not permit itself to 
be integrated’ into the categories and capacities of the knowing ego, 
but presents the non-encompassable ‘Infinity of the Other’ (Levinas, 
1969, p. 80). To distinguish how radically different this infinity of the 
other is even from the very idea of infinity, which, as an idea, is still 
encompassed by the cognitive capacities of the knowing ego, Levinas 
further describes it as an ‘infinity overflowing its idea and therefore 
separated from the I inhabited by this idea’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 53). 
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It is this relation to the infinitely other that Levinas refers to as 
fundamental, something that precedes the possibility of knowledge and 
knowing, ‘prior to every initiative, to all imperialism of the same’, and 
prior even to a self defined by consciousness and knowing (Levinas, 
1969, p. 38-39). Particularly pertinent to the search for an otherwise 
practice, to say that the self is in a relation to the other that is not and 
cannot be described in terms of being and knowledge is not a negation 
of the self. Rather, as I discuss in Chapter Four, it presents ‘a defense of 
subjectivity’ that is radically different from knowledge and being 
(Levinas, 1969, p. 26), and can and does, in this sense, relate to the 
other in a manner radically otherwise than being and otherwise than 
knowledge (Levinas, 1998b). 
 
Having studied Levinas’s work before and alongside my professional 
involvement in physiotherapy, I have found my experience and practice 
of physiotherapy to be increasingly troubled through the encounter 
with his work, as well as the other philosophical, practical, and 
therapeutic traditions I have been involved in. Through his incisive 
critique of the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of 
Western metaphysics, defining its science and humanism, Levinas’s 
work in particular appeared to stand in direct opposition to my 
professional practice of physiotherapy. In Chapter Three I discuss a 
particularly incisive instance from my clinical practice in which an 
opposition developed in the way I thought of and approached my 
clients. This happened, for example, with and through my professional 
knowledge using predesigned assessment sheets and protocols, as well 
as best practice guidelines and techniques to be applied to the 
condition identified, and defined as pathological. It was also in 
opposition to my understanding of myself as the one holding the 
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knowledge relevant to a therapeutic relation, and my clients as those 
lacking it. 
 
At its heart, Levinas’s argument regarding ontology and epistemology, 
which he identifies as theories as much as practices, is that the 
subsumption of the other into the self via physiotherapeutic categories 
and capacities constitutes a severe violence against the other insofar as 
the act of subsuming the other diminishes their otherness. Again, this 
violence consists in an iniquitous reduction of the other and the other’s 
otherness in a movement of totalization, as if this knowing self were 
able to encompass and know the other, as totality, in and through its 
egoistic knowledge, a reducing of ‘the Other to a concept of 
thematization, objectivation or idealization’ (Zeillinger, 2009, p. 102). 
Levinas further argued that this epistemological undoing of the other 
justifies and lays the foundation for the disregard, if not annihilation, of 
the other in the most vile and final of ways. 
 
Arguing that this is not only a violent approach to the other, but 
impossible due to the other’s infinite otherness that forever escapes all 
knowledge and understanding, I have found Levinas’s work to 
profoundly disrupt my daily clinical practice as a physiotherapist. In its 
most extreme, it made me unsure how, if at all, I could use my hands to 
help my clients, or use the skills and knowledge I had acquired in 
training, or even simply put pen to paper as I try to consolidate my 
understanding of them and the conditions they presented with. In other 
words, the entirety of my self-understanding as a physiotherapist, and 
the premise of my entire client relationships appeared to be built on the 
basis that I had knowledge about their conditions and by inference, 
about them. It also inferred skills I could use to help improve their 
health. Yet precisely this knowledge and these skills now seemed to be 
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exposed as inadvertently, yet potentially intensely harmful insofar as 
they were diminishing my client’s otherness.  
 
By arguing that the other can never be fully known, characterised by an 
infinity and exteriority that cannot be encompassed in terms of 
consciousness, being, capacity or epistemology, Levinas developed his 
notion of ethics as the relation to the other that precedes knowledge 
and being, and is hence, more fundamental to them. It is Levinas’s 
conception of fundamental ethics, equally developed throughout the 
course of his career, and most prominently his two major publications 
Totality and Infinity (Levinas 1969), and Otherwise than being, or beyond 
Essence (Levinas, 1998b), that provides the theoretical grounds on 
which I develop a novel understanding and practice of physiotherapy in 
this thesis. This is particularly developed through an understanding of 
the physiotherapist on the basis of ethical subjectivity, or the self-in-
relation as described by Levinas and, from there, a different 
physiotherapy.  
 
This otherwise understanding of the self and a physiotherapy practice—
not based ontology and epistemology—are constituted on the key 
notions of passivity and accompaniment that are developed in the thesis. 
Passivity is a central term extensively featured and discussed in 
Levinas’s writings and secondary literature. Accompaniment was 
developed in the work of Levinas’s main English translator, Alphonso 
Lingis, though it is not foregrounded in Lingis’s work to the extent that 
I deploy this notion in my thesis (Lingis, 1994).  
 
While Levinas’s work is central to the critique and development of 
physiotherapy, his fundamental ethics leaves the reader or practitioner 
within an impasse, similar to the one I encountered in practice. How 
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does one practice without doing this ‘very subtle brutality’ he describes 
(Zeillinger, 2009, p. 103)? It is particularly at this point that the work of 
Pierre Hadot, as well as the philosophies and practices of Zen, the 
martial arts, and Shiatsu are of import to this thesis. Although I 
frequently draw on them to expound on Levinas’s critique of ontology 
and epistemology, and his understanding of fundamental ethics, it is a 
resonance between them that makes it possible to conceive of an 
otherwise practice of physiotherapy. The resonance is allusive and this 
thesis aims to elucidate this. Where Levinas’s ethics, in a sense, refuses 
the possibility of conversion to practice, I draw on the distinct 
emphases on practice that pervade these other traditions to explore a 
range of possibilities for a traverse from ethics to practice that would be 
meaningful to physiotherapy. 
 
In this introductory chapter, I begin with a brief overview of when and 
where I came to be involved in the various philosophies and practices in 
focus here. It is through their progressive encounter that I found my 
thinking and practice of physiotherapy to be troubled. Equally, 
potential resolutions seemed to be implied. I then situate this study in 
the broader context of research and development in physiotherapy, to 
initially define what constitutes contemporary physiotherapy, and why 
a critical, comparative engagement with Levinas’s fundamental ethics, 
Hadot’s philosophy as a way of life, and the philosophies and practices 
of Zen, Shiatsu, and the (Japanese) martial arts is pertinent and timely. 
I then introduce the methodological approach of the study, and 
conclude this chapter with an overview of the thesis as a whole. 
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Background 
From September 1999 to August 2002 I undertook my undergraduate 
training in physiotherapy in Frankfurt, Germany. Prior to my entry into 
this course, I had been studying philosophy for two semesters, and 
continued this course after completing my physiotherapy training. I had 
also been involved in Aikido and a range of other martial arts, as well as 
zazen (meditation in the Zen-Buddhist tradition), and continue these 
practices today. The issues motivating this thesis thus began some 20 
years ago and included an interest in different definitions of health and 
sickness, mind and body, theory and practice, and what it means to be 
helpful, or practice therapeutically. In pursuing some of these issues, I 
enrolled in a course for shiatsu practitioners because I wanted to 
experience a recognisable therapeutic practice that overlapped with the 
Asian traditions I was involved in. On gaining my physiotherapy 
qualification, I took up a position in private physiotherapy practice and 
continued my academic studies in philosophy.  
 
As customary in the world of health professional education, I began 
attending continuing professional development courses, eventually 
enrolling in a Master of Health Science (Musculoskeletal Physiotherapy) 
program at the Auckland University of Technology in New Zealand in 
2009. Here I began to explore qualitative healthcare research in much 
more detail, and with it, the possibility of undertaking a far more 
rigorous comparative critique of physiotherapy practised in 
combination with a range of Asian and occidental practices and 
philosophies. Building on a precursory master dissertation exploring 
the feasibility of autoethnography as a methodological point of 
departure for this study, I have focused on how it might be possible to 
open contemporary physiotherapy to a range of philosophical, 
practical, and therapeutic traditions that have not yet been introduced 
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to the profession, but appear to hold great potential for extending and 
developing physiotherapy into the future (Maric, 2011).  These 
approaches are Emmanuel Levinas’s fundamental ethics, Pierre Hadot’s 
work on philosophy as a way of life, and a broad cross-section of Asian 
philosophies and practices, ranging from Zen to Japanese martial arts 
and Shiatsu. 
Extant developments in contemporary physiotherapy 
Over the course of its history, physiotherapy has developed into a well-
established and highly regarded healthcare profession, practiced in 
both public and private sectors in healthcare systems around the world. 
Today, the World Confederation for Physical Therapy (WCPT) is ‘the 
sole international voice for physical therapy’, represents ‘more than 
350,000 physical therapists worldwide through its 112 member 
organisations’ (WCPT, 2016b). In New Zealand, just over 4,000 
registered physiotherapists hold Annual Practicing Certificates (Stokes, 
Dixon, & Nana, 2014), and while private practice has been identified as 
the largest employment sector for physiotherapists in New Zealand 
today, the profession is well-established in the country’s healthcare 
system, with many practitioners also working in the public health 
sector (Reid & Larmer, 2007).  
 
Despite its successes however, physiotherapy now faces a number of 
significant challenges, including an increasingly ageing and chronically 
ill population, that requires a different kind and quantity of healthcare 
to meet its needs (Broom, 2013, p. 14; Deusinger, Crowner, Burlis, & 
Stith, 2014; Nicholls & Larmer, 2005); the increasing financial burden 
on orthodox healthcare systems; challenges to traditional power 
structures and calls for greater democratisation of healthcare delivery; 
ongoing technological innovation (Broom, 2013, pp. 13-14; Nicholls, 
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Reid, & Larmer, 2009, p. 109); changes to accessibility, regulation, pay 
and reward across all healthcare professions; diminishing trust in 
conventional healthcare and a concomitant increasing interest in 
alternative and complementary healthcare experiences (Australian 
Physiotherapy Association/APA, 2013; McLeay, 2013; Stokes, Dixon, & 
Nana, 2014). 
 
Rather than perceiving these challenges as a hindrance, it has been 
argued that this time of change is a time of great opportunity for the 
future development of novel approaches to healthcare and 
physiotherapy research, theory and practice. Consequently, researchers 
have begun to identify ways in which physiotherapy could respond to 
these challenges. Thus far, these have included moves toward 
interprofessional and collaborative practice (Deusinger et al., 2014, p. 
58; Stotter, 2013a, 2013b); tertiary education and curriculum reform 
(Broberg et al., 2003; Caeiro, Cruz, & Pereira, 2014; Higgs, Hunt, Higgs, 
& Neubauer, 1999; Verheyden, 2011); and the development of new 
approaches to healthcare delivery (APA, 2013, pp. 3-4; Gibson & 
Martin, 2003; Nicholls & Larmer, 2005; Nicholls, Reid, & Larmer, 2009; 
Reid & Larmer, 2007).  
 
Many of these new approaches are underpinned by a developing 
understanding of historical discourses informing physiotherapy’s 
present tensions (Brauchle, 1971; Korobov, 2005; Kumar, 2010; Nicholls 
& Cheek, 2006; Nicholls & Holmes, 2012; Ottoson, 2011; Repschläger, 
2011; Schöler, 2005; Terlouw, 2006).  Studies have explored 
physiotherapy’s positivistic, biomedical foundations and the rise of 
evidence-based medicine (Gibson & Martin, 2003; B. Grant & Giddings, 
2002; Nicholls, 2009a). Research has also begun to better understand 
some of the paradigmatic, yet often taken-for-granted, assumptions 
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that determine the profession’s self-understanding and therapeutic 
agency; its ways of knowledge production, and the types of knowledge 
that these can produce; the techniques that these have ultimately led 
to; as well as the environments in which they are delivered (Jorgensen, 
2000; Nicholls & Gibson, 2010; Noronen & Wikström-Grotell, 1999; 
Wikström-Grotell & Eriksson, 2012). 
 
Despite its undeniable benefits and successes however, it has been 
argued that the foundations and subsequent approaches to 
contemporary healthcare have also brought unintended consequences. 
Perceived as containing ‘something profoundly disrespectful of human 
personhood’ (Broom, 2013, p. 12), some have argued that the inherent 
exclusivity and marginalisation of theories and practices that do not fit 
with orthodox healthcare are preventing the further development of 
professions like physiotherapy (Greenhalgh, Howick, & Maskrey, 2014; 
Holmes & Gagnon, 2008; Holmes, Murray, Perron, & Rail, 2006; Miles, 
Loughlin, & Polychronis, 2008; Nicholls & Holmes, 2012). In direct 
response to this, a number of critical researchers are drawing 
increasingly on other, largely un-examined philosophies, to develop 
novel foundations for physiotherapy, and theories and practices built 
upon these (Eisenberg, 2012; Gibson, 2016; Nicholls et al., 2016). 
 
As these approaches gain greater attention, greater use is being made of 
novel research approaches, particularly within the qualitative domain. 
Already well-established in other healthcare professions like nursing, 
psychotherapy, and occupational therapy, it has been pointed out that 
qualitative research, and the variety of paradigms subsumed under this 
term, are still not commonly ‘discussed as an alternative source of valid 
evidence, but [are] instead relegated to the ‘lesser’ status of non-
experimental research’ in the physiotherapy profession (Gibson & 
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Martin, 2003, p. 353). This under-representation however, has been 
argued to weaken the profession in an area that could give it greater 
scope, variety and responsiveness in the future (Gibson & Martin, 2003; 
Nicholls, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; WCPT, 2017, Research). 
 
Many researchers are now arguing that much more work needs to be 
done to strengthen this new field of engagement (A. Grant, 2005; 
Johnson & Waterfield, 2004; Wiart & Burwasch, 2007). Reflecting this 
call, researchers have begun exploring various questions and 
methodological, theoretical and philosophies issues that may have been 
explored by other professions in the past, but are novel to 
physiotherapy. For example, studies have included phenomenological 
investigations influenced by the writings of Martin Heidegger and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Greenfield & Jensen, 2010); perspectives on 
the body and physiotherapy in the rehabilitation of people suffering 
from undefined pain (Rosberg, 2000); critical approaches to 
physiotherapy professional identities underpinned by the work of 
Jürgen Habermas (Hammond, Cross, & Moore, 2010); physiotherapists' 
practice knowledge, and the development of more sustainable, 
emancipatory approaches (Trede, 2012); examinations of ‘socially 
ingrained notions of normality and disability … reflected in 
rehabilitation practices’ for children with cerebral palsy, using the 
writings of Pierre Bourdieu (Gibson & Teachman, 2012); and 
postmodern discourse analyses of power and discipline in 
physiotherapy drawing on the work of Michel Foucault (Eisenberg, 
2012; Nicholls, 2008;  Praestegaard, Gard, & Glasdam, 2015).  
 
There are, of course, many more examples of philosophies and 
qualitative research methodologies, like phenomenography, bricolage, 
grounded theory, and more, being developed by physiotherapy 
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researchers (Afrell & Rudebeck, 2010; Allen, 2007; Jorgensen, 2000; 
Kidd, Bond, & Bell, 2011; Shaw, 2012). The critical point here, however, 
is that the growing interest in novel philosophies, methodologies, 
related theories and practices, offers a possibility for physiotherapy to 
be better equipped for the challenges and opportunities that lay ahead. 
The promise of these novel approaches is that they may facilitate the 
comparative review, critique and, in some cases, adoption of extant 
assumptions, theories, and practices, and through this, make possible 
the development of novel physiotherapy theories and practices based 
on these hitherto unexplored perspectives and research methodologies.  
The philosophical and practical                             
traditions informing this study 
At its heart, this study contributes to the growing field of qualitative 
research in physiotherapy, specifically drawing on a range of 
philosophical, practical, and therapeutic traditions, which I argue hold 
great potential for the profession, but are essentially unexamined in 
physiotherapy research to date. The thesis develops a methodological 
approach that is not yet widely known or implement in physiotherapy, 
or in healthcare research more generally. This is introduced in a later 
section of this chapter and then discussed in detail in Chapter Two. 
 
Beginning with the work of Emmanuel Levinas, the central theme of 
Levinas’s writings concerns ‘the relationship to the other human’ (Field 
& Levinas, 1993, emphasis added). Born in 1906 in Kaunas, Lithuania, 
Levinas went on to study philosophy in Strasbourg, France in 1924, 
before continuing his studies under the famous phenomenologists 
Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger in Germany, both of which 
would take a central place in the development of his future method and 
thought. He spent the last two years of WWII imprisoned in a German 
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military camp, alongside his French military unit, and following his 
release, learned of the death of much of his family at the hands of the 
Nazis. Understandably, these experiences became a major influence on 
the focus of his philosophical work in subsequent years. After returning 
to France and being reunited with his wife and daughter, Levinas began 
formalising his thinking and writing around the relationship between 
self and other, until his death in 1995 (Bergo, 2007; Critchley & 
Bernasconi, 2002; Hutchens, 2004; Malka, 2006; von Wolzogen, 2005). 
In essence, Levinas set out to explore whether, as Dostoyevsky put it, 
‘evil is the normal condition of people’ or not (Dostoyevsky, 2001, p. 
284).  
 
Through a critique and further development of Husserl’s 
phenomenological method, and in stark opposition to Heidegger’s 
analysis of existence or ‘being’, Levinas’s entire body of work, including 
his two seminal works Totality and Infinity (TI) and Otherwise than Being, 
or beyond Essence (OB), culminated in the description of ethics as the 
fundamental relation to the other that precedes knowledge and being 
(Levinas 1969; Levinas, 1998b). His extensive writings have been drawn 
on by a wide range of philosophers and theorists in recent years 
(Critchley, 2007; Derrida, 1960, 1978; Diprose, 2002; Hofmeyr, 2009; 
Peperzak, 1991; Ronell, 2004).  His works provide support for a 
fundamentally reconstructed notion of ethics, and his writings continue 
to inspire studies in a ‘number of fields outside of philosophy such as 
theology, Jewish studies, literature and cultural theory, psychotherapy, 
sociology, political theory, international relations theory and critical 
legal theory’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. iii). 
 
Although almost entirely unexplored in physiotherapy, a small number 
of researchers have begun introducing Levinas’s thinking into the 
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healthcare domain, arguing that it: ‘captures the ethical core and 
central values of health care’ (Nortvedt, 2003, p. 25). They argue that it 
offers a fundamental review and critique of the relation between clients 
and healthcare professionals that, in turn, provides the foundation for 
all medical and therapeutic practices (Armstrong, 1999; Burcher, 2011; 
Clifton-Soderstrom, 2003; Naef, 2006; Surbone, 2005). And on the basis 
of this critique, some are calling for an exploration of ways in which it 
might be possible to integrate a Levinassian sensibility into healthcare 
theory and practice (Broom, 2013). This thesis aims to build on this 
body of research on Levinas and healthcare in its critique of 
contemporary physiotherapy in the context of Levinassian ethics and 
its exploration of a potential traverse from ethics to practice. 
 
As with Levinas, the work of Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) was deeply 
influenced by a range of significant life experiences. Originally trained 
as a catholic priest and receiving priesthood at the early age of 22, 
Hadot left the church in 1952 because he believed it to be predicated on 
the belief that ‘it is especially by supernatural means that one can 
modify one’s way of conducting oneself’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 26). He 
subsequently ‘undertook training as a philologist and historian’ and in 
the methodology of the history of philosophy (Hadot, 2009, p. 30). This 
methodological training ultimately led him to research and discover a 
more this-worldly approach to the transformation of ‘the practitioner’s 
way of looking at the world and consequently his or her way of being’ in 
the philosophical schools of ancient Greece and Rome (Chase, 2010a, p. 
2).  
 
Hadot’s interest lay in the way ancient philosophy had been principally 
intended as a way of life, that is, aimed at learning ‘a type of know-how; 
to develop a habitus’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 274), ‘that engages the whole of 
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[one’s] existence’ (Hadot, 1995, p. 230). Philosophy was not intended as 
a purely theoretical and professional field of engagement, abstracted 
from a philosopher’s personal life, but deeply intertwined with life 
through the inclusion and emphasis on philosophical practices that 
required the philosopher’s full mind and bodily investment. His 
consequent concern was to highlight a range of philosophical exercises 
that were characeristic of the ways of life proposed by the ancient 
philosophical schools (Hadot, 1995, p. 79). 
 
Hadot’s work remains relatively unknown even in the world of academic 
philosophy, despite him holding ‘the most prestigious academic 
position in France’ for some time, and having Michel Foucault as his 
most famous interlocutor and student (Chase, 2010a, p. 2). Of particular 
interest to healthcare, Hadot considered the philosophical way of life as 
being motivated by a desire ‘to ease misery, suffering, and sickness’ in 
oneself and others alike (Hadot, 2009, p. 173). Yet, his work is almost 
entirely unknown in the healthcare professions, with only few attempts 
being made to explore its potential to inform therapeutic practices 
(Banicki, 2014; O’Grady, 2013; Vitale, 2012a, 2012b).  
 
In this thesis I draw on Hadot’s work in a number of ways that are 
particularly relevant to this study and physiotherapy today. His view of 
philosophy, science and nature serves to augment the primarily 
Levinassian critique of physiotherapy with regard to separation of the 
personal and professional, theory and practice, mind and body, and its 
name-giving understanding of phusis (Hadot, 2006, p. 314). Hadot’s 
emphasis is on a close intertwining of philosophy and life, theory and 
practice. The way his argument in this regard is situated within his own 
comparative, historico-philological method provides the principal 
framework for the methodological approach taken in this study, 
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discussed in Chapter Two. That is, the comparative approach derived 
from his work, in conjunction with autoethnography, allows for the 
focussed questioning of the relation between the personal and the 
professional in physiotherapy, and the exploration of a possibility for 
their otherwise rapprochement.  
 
It is particularly in this applied sense—resulting from his emphasis on 
practice—that Hadot’s work provides a fertile ground for not only 
methodological, but also therapeutic practice. Hadot’s philosophical 
practice provides possible considerations for expansions to 
physiotherapy practice that have not yet been considered by the 
profession, yet might provide distinct pathways to resolving some of 
the critical issues raised in its regard. By pointing out differences, but 
also similarities to a Levinassian understanding of fundamental ethics, I 
especially discuss and argue that they present possibilities for an 
otherwise physiotherapy practice on this basis. 
 
Hadot’s engagement with philosophical and practical traditions draws 
him close to the Asian traditions in focus in this thesis, given that all of 
these are either implicitly underpinned by the notion of a way of life, 
or, as in the case of Aikido (from Japanese do: way, or way of life), 
explicitly allude to it by name (Stevens, 2011; Ueshiba, 1988). It is 
important to note here that throughout the thesis I will refer to the 
various Asian martial arts and practices under my gaze as Budo unless I 
refer to one of them individually.  This is a necessary shorthand, given 
that in the Japanese traditional martial arts alone, there are ‘more than 
700 schools that scholars have identified’, next to a large number of 
modern styles, schools and branches like Judo, Karate, Aikido, and 
others (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 9). These terms are therefore 
somewhat inaccurate but necessary in the interest of brevity.   
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To date, the martial arts have ‘largely (and undeservedly) been 
discounted as a serious field of academic inquiry’ (Bennett, 2012, p. 
287), though recent years are showing a gradual change in this situation 
(Bennett, 2014; Benesch, 2014; Bowman, 2017; Mullis, 2016). In 
healthcare research, particularly the martial art of Tai Chi and related, 
overtly health-oriented practices have gained considerable attention 
over recent years. Closely related to physiotherapy, many of these 
studies focus on the potential benefits of Tai Chi (or Taiji) for fall 
prevention and improving strength, gait, and balance in the elderly, or 
the exploration of other physiological processes that underlie it and 
could contribute to its therapeutic benefits (Lin, Hwang, Chang, & 
Wolf, 2006; Woo, Hong, Lau, & Lynn, 2007; Wayne & Fuerst, 2013). 
 
This is far less the case in relation to Aikido and some of the other 
martial arts in focus here, though there are studies exploring Aikido in 
relation to mental health and psychotherapy (Faggianelli & Lukoff, 
2006; Macarie & Roberts, 2013). Outside of this, Aikido is also used to 
inform tertiary education models and teaching practice, design 
practice, and other fields (Bradford, 2011; Chew, 1995; Mroczkowski, 
2009; Noy, 2015; Ritscher, 2006). Yet, while it is being explored how, 
for example, physiotherapeutic methods can support martial art 
training and rehabilitation (Boguszewski, 2015), what is not researched 
thus far, is how the philosophies underpinning the martial arts could be 
used to critique and reimage the theoretical foundations and ethics of 
physiotherapy. 
 
Especially where the philosophical foundations of the Asian martial arts 
are concerned it is important to examine them in close conjunction 
with the philosophies that have influenced them from very early on, 
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most prominently Confucianism, Daoism, Shinto, and many different 
Buddhist schools including Zen. It is also from these that the martial 
arts draw their reinterpretation as therapeutic practices, and the more 
general conception of them as ways of life that is common to all of 
these traditions (Antoni, 2012; Deshimaru & Leonard, 1991; Friday & 
Humitake, 1997; Mason, 2002). The focus of this study is primarily on 
Japanese Zen traditions to elucidate Levinas’s fundamental ethics with 
contrasting positions, but also to further expand on such ethics by 
building on especially pertinent convergences (Deshimaru, 2012; 
Okumura, 2012; Uchiyama, Okumura, Leighton, 1997; Suzuki, 1988; 
Tenbreul, 2011). 
 
Beyond their relation to the critical perspective developed in this thesis, 
these convergences are, as with Hadot’s work, important where the 
innovation of physiotherapy practices based on fundamental ethics is in 
question. Concepts such as mindfulness found today in psychology, 
psychotherapy and related healthcare professions already draw some of 
their influence from Zen and other Buddhist traditions (Didonna, 2009; 
Doran, 2014; Herbert & Forman, 2011; Krägeloh, 2013; Siegel, 2010). In 
recent years, mindfulness research has also begun to appear in the 
physiotherapy literature and appears to show an increasing trend 
(Dufour et al., 2014; O’Sullivan, 2012; Pike, 2008). Yet, as with the 
martial arts, to date, there are no studies drawing on the more 
fundamental assumptions of Zen and related traditions to review and 
further develop the philosophical and practical foundations of 
physiotherapy. The distinct difference of Levinas and Hadot to these 
Asian traditions and the importance of drawing on them lies in their 
resonating with fundamental ethics and their placing a distinct 
emphasis on physical practice. They are crucial to a conversion of 
fundamental ethics to physical therapy practice. 
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The last of the approaches examined in this thesis, Shiatsu, presents a 
ready source in this regard due to its more overt overlaps with 
occidental manual therapies. It perhaps bridges a divide between 
orthodox, Western healthcare and Asian healing traditions, by 
integrating Western understandings of anatomy, physiology, 
psychology and science, to varying degrees, into its curricula (Köchling-
Dietrich, 2014; Masunaga & Ohashi, 1977). Despite these intersections, 
there is only a very small number of academic studies involving Shiatsu, 
and none drawing on it for new critical developments in physiotherapy 
theory and practice (Kleinau, 2016; Robinson, Lorenc, & Liao, 2011; 
Sedlin, 2013). Due to its close relations to the Asian martial and 
philosophical traditions in focus here, it aligns with Hadot’s conception 
of philosophy as a way of life, as well as the expanded understanding of 
fundamental ethics developed in this study (Beresford-Cooke, 2003; 
Endo, 2008; Kishi & Whieldon, 2011; Masunaga & Ohashi, 1977; 
Namikoshi, 1981). This makes it especially pertinent, where not only 
the development of physical practices of fundamental ethics is in 
question, but physical therapies of passivity and accompaniment. 
From fundamental ethics to physiotherapy 
Given the dearth of existing research examining the possibility of an 
otherwise physiotherapy, this thesis draws on Levinas’s fundamental 
ethics, Hadot’s work on philosophy as a practice and way of life, and my 
research and practice of a range of Asian philosophical, martial, and 
therapeutic traditions for two closely intertwined aims:  
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v To develop, substantiate, and evaluate a critical perspective 
building on Levinas’s notion of fundamental ethics, initially 
applied to contemporary physiotherapy and its theories and 
practices of self and other.  
 
v To develop, substantiate, and evaluate novel physiotherapy 
practices based on an expanded understanding of fundamental 
ethics, resulting from the conjunction of Levinas’s work with the 
other philosophical and practical traditions in focus here. 
 
My thesis is that it is both possible and indispensable for contemporary 
physiotherapy to reconsider its prevalent theories and practices from 
the perspective of fundamental ethics. This enables a more elemental 
alignment with its original, ethical motivation and aspiration of being 
therapeutic, that is, helpful to ‘anyone affected by an injury, disability or 
health condition’, rather than harmful in the sense of ‘totalizing’ 
introduced here and further discussed throughout the thesis (PNZ, 
2017). Such reconsideration draws on philosophical and practical 
traditions to develop possible pathways for a rapprochement of the 
profession’s original ethical foundations in daily clinical practice and 
beyond. This opens to the realisation that conventional theories and 
practices on the basis of which physiotherapist’s approach their clients 
are contrary to fundamental ethics, inadvertently enacting severe 
violence against others. Thus such reconsideration and realisation are 
motivated by the belief ‘that there must be another way; something 
more to healing practice than that which they have received either by 
training, through personal experience, or by edict of institutional or 
professional scopes of practice’ (Broom, 2013, pp. 11-12).  
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At a personal level, the thesis is grounded in a sense of unease with 
regard to the current state of physiotherapy, and a sense that the 
profession can contribute to the lives and health of its recipients and 
practitioners in a way that is more open and supportive of their 
fundamental, infinite otherness, diversity, and ongoing diversification. 
This personal motivation and the critique and further development of 
physiotherapy it underpins, also echoes and is closely aligned with the 
work of other physiotherapist seeking to reconsider the profession’s 
theoretical foundations, and expand its practices and models for 
delivery. In light of present and future challenges facing physiotherapy 
and the healthcare professions more generally, these researchers have 
indicated three arenas of engagement that are particularly pertinent to 
better equip the profession for the future: (i) the critical review of 
physiotherapy’s underpinning theories and practices, (ii) the 
integration and further development of novel approaches to research, 
and (iii) the development of novel approaches to physiotherapy based 
on a consideration of hitherto unexplored perspectives and practices. 
By attempting to address its two key aims, it is my hope that this thesis 
contributes to each of these three fields.    
 
Against this background, the overarching questions of the thesis are: 
  
v What is fundamental ethics?  
v Why does it warrant, if not necessitate, a revision of 
contemporary physiotherapy in its theories and practices of self 
and other?  
v How can such an ethics provide the foundation for an otherwise 
physiotherapy, and  
v What constitutes this physiotherapy in theory and practice? 
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Methodological approach 
To arrive at answers to these questions and achieve the thesis aims I 
have used the qualitative research methodology of autoethnography as 
my point of departure. Though I adapted autoethnography by drawing 
from my philosophical and practical sources, most ostensibly the works 
of Hadot and Levinas. Autoethnography is initially characterised by an 
overt inclusion of the researcher (auto-) into ethnographic research. It 
amplifies the emic or insider’s perspective in which the researcher 
studying a given culture (ethno-) does not merely enter into ‘the field’ 
to gain an insider’s perspective for the purpose and duration of a 
research project (-graphy) but is recognised as already a member of, or 
insider in it (Anderson, 2006; Ellis & Bochner, 2002; Holman, 2005). 
Autoethnography presented itself as particularly pertinent to this 
project, which sets out from a personal vantage point characterised by 
my involvements in physiotherapy and a range of other philosophical, 
therapeutic, and practical traditions and their communities of practice 
over the last two decades. 
 
As a methodology that can be underpinned by a variety of philosophies 
and theoretical frameworks, autoethnography is already a diverse field. 
It incorporates a range of interpretive, analytical, critical narrative and 
creative expressive perspectives or approaches applied within a wide 
variety of fields (Atkinson, 2006; Ballard, 2009; Ellis & Bochner, 2000; 
Wilkes, 2009). Its overarching emphasis on a researcher’s involvement 
in research—leading at times to a focus on the researcher—has been a 
source of criticism with regard to this methodology.  
 
There are two such criticisms, the first of these being that 
autoethnography risks losing its significance to others where it is overly 
or even exclusively focussed on the researcher (Anderson, 2006; 
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Atkinson, 2006; Delamont, 2007; Ings, 2013). The second general 
criticism is that the greater emphasis on the researcher’s relation to the 
research object, process, findings, and representation gives way to the 
proliferation of individualised methodologies that are consequently, 
difficult, if not impossible to evaluate scientifically (Atkinson, 1997; 
Delamont, 2007; Tolich, 2010). It has thus been argued that criteria for 
rigour and methodological standardisation are needed to ensure that 
autoethnographic studies are sufficiently meaningful to others, and 
their scientific validity can be ascertained (Bochner, 2000; Chang, 2008; 
Tolich, 2010). 
 
Contrary to this, particularly those taking a postmodern approach to 
autoethnography have argued that the high degree of diversity opened 
by a greater focus on the researcher’s self, is in fact a strength that could 
be lost through such modes of regulation and standardisation (Denzin, 
2006; Ellis, Adams, & Bochner, 2010; Adams & Holman Jones, 2008; 
Spry, 2011). This counterargument aligns with the premise underlying 
qualitative research more generally. That is, overly rigid regulations and 
standardisations inhibit the possibility to use and adapt research 
methodologies to questions that can either not be examined, or not be 
examined as well using extant methodologies (B. Grant & Giddings, 
2002; Nicholls, 2009a).  
 
More specifically, the strength of emphasising the self in 
autoethnography lies precisely in its challenge and questioning of the 
conventional distinction between researcher and researched, the 
personal and the professional, the self and the other (Adams & Holman 
Jones, 2008; Gannon, 2006; Holman Jones, 2005; Spry, 2011). 
Autoethnography thus aligns with Hadot’s questioning of these 
boundaries in philosophy by further problematising and bringing them 
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into focus methodologically. This, in turn, provides two exemplary areas 
that not only facilitate the questioning of boundaries between the 
personal and professional in physiotherapy, but also the development of 
a novel understanding and practice of them. As there is little research 
drawing on Hadot’s work to inform autoethnography, I primarily draw 
on his own writings about methods and methodology and related 
secondary literature to develop potential avenues for their more 
concrete conjunction (Hadot, 1995, p. 47-77; 2002, 271-281; Rizvi, 2012; 
Sharpe, 2011). 
 
By additionally challenging conventional ways of doing research and 
producing knowledge in a way ‘that is always and necessarily about 
others’ through this shift in focus toward the self, other and their 
relation, autoethnography further presents itself as particularly 
pertinent to a study of ethics (Dauphinee, 2010, p. 817). There are a 
number of studies relating a Levinassian understanding of fundamental 
ethics to inform autoethnography as a methodology, and to amplify its 
challenge to a conventional understanding of ethics (Dauphinee, 2010; 
Poulos, 2012; Roth, 2009; Wilkes, 2009). Explored less in these studies is 
the extent to which Levinas’s work also lends itself to a radical 
questioning of autoethnography. As I discuss the conjunction of 
autoethnography with fundamental ethics and Hadot’s method and 
understanding of philosophy in the following chapter, I also introduce 
some of the difficulties arising from its encounter with fundamental 
ethics. I revisit them in the conclusion to the thesis to discern how it has 
or has not succeeded to account for them.  
 
For reasons similar to the thesis drawing on Asian philosophies and 
practices to critique and develop novel approaches to physical therapy, 
postmodern perspectives of autoethnography are also crucial to this 
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study for their radical questioning of boundaries between self and other. 
This boundary questioning extends to considerations of an integration 
of physical experience and practice as a means for academic inquiry and 
representation (Barbour, 2011; Denzin, 2006; Spry, 2005, 2011). In 
autoethnography facilitating a depth examination of self and other 
through the integration of the body, it provides methodological support 
for a hands-on approach to practice that resonates with the Asian 
philosophical, martial, and therapeutic traditions.  
 
Notwithstanding these possibilities, thus far, autoethnography has 
been largely underutilised in contemporary physiotherapy and 
healthcare more generally. To date, its most common application in 
healthcare is as a form of research of ‘illness experiences’, narrated 
from ‘within’ by those with direct experience of illness or injury 
(Brooks, 2010; Chang, 2016; Neville-Jan, 2003, 2004; Poulos, 2010; 
Richards, 2008). The use of autoethnography as a means to explore 
people’s experiences of being healthcare practitioners is far less 
common, though it is gaining some traction in discussions of reflective 
practice and workplace learning in physiotherapy (Clouder, 2000a, 
2000b; Donaghy & Morss, 2000; Patton, Higgs, & Smith, 2012). In this 
context, it is primarily explored as a practice to facilitate practitioners’ 
adherence to established theories and practices, rather than their 
questioning and further development. 
 
This thesis aims to do precisely this in its additional integration of 
autoethnography as a methodology that further facilitates the critique 
and development of contemporary physiotherapy and its theories and 
practices of self and other by drawing on a range of philosophies and 
practices that both appear to hold great potential for this purpose, and 
have taken a central place in my personal life. The conjunction of 
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autoethnography with fundamental ethics and Hadot’s approach to the 
study of philosophy as a way of life additionally facilitated the 
development of two related areas needing to be addressed in this thesis 
to achieve its aims. These are a: 
 
v The comparative critique of contemporary physiotherapy and its 
theories and practices of self, other, and their relation, from the 
perspective of fundamental ethics, which is, in turn, developed 
through this engagement. 
 
v The comparative, critical exploration of contemporary 
physiotherapy, Levinassian ethics, Hadot’s philosophy as a way 
of life, and the philosophies and practices from Zen, Aikido, 
Shiatsu, and other, related Asian traditions to develop an 
otherwise approach to physiotherapy theory and practice. 
 
The methodological approach implemented in this study underscores 
the contributions it aspires to make to the field of physiotherapy, and 
contributing a novel approach to research yet unexplored in the 
profession. Through its engaging autoethnography with the work of 
Levinas and Hadot, it offers a development within autoethnography to 
the fields of qualitative research. Its comparative engagement across a 
broad reference-field consisting of philosophical, practical, therapeutic, 
and methodological traditions also indicates a contribution that inflects 
across these fields that I come back to in the conclusion of the thesis.  
 
The thesis’s primary aims however remain, firstly, the development of a 
critical perspective that expands on Levinas’s notion of fundamental 
ethics and reveals the theories and practices that shape contemporary 
physiotherapy as inadvertently violent toward the other. This essential 
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violence is incongruent with physiotherapy’s underlying, ethical 
motives and aspirations. Secondly, the thesis aims to develop novel 
approaches to physiotherapy, based on this fundamental ethics, that 
present concrete pathways for a renewed rapprochement with its 
original, ethical foundations in daily clinical practice and beyond. As 
one of many healthcare professions predominantly shaped by the same 
biomedical model and its underpinning ontology and epistemology, 
these contributions could be meaningful to other healthcare 
professions, practitioners and even policy makers interested seeking to 
realign current and future healthcare with its fundamental, ethical 
motives and aspirations. 
Scope and framework of the thesis 
Fundamental ethics in practice 
This thesis is faced with a number of challenges that further limit its 
scope and framework. One of these is the difficulty to formulate 
specific, novel practices in any prescriptive sense, or even just provide 
practical examples of an ‘otherwise’ physiotherapy on the basis of a 
fundamental ethics developed from Levinas’s work. Throughout the 
thesis, this problem is ‘unpacked’ parallel to the elaboration of 
Levinassian ethics and the discussion of the possibility or impossibility 
for it as foundation for a corresponding practice of physiotherapy.  
 
This difficulty is a consequence of Levinas ‘locating’ ethics before, 
beyond, or otherwise than being and knowledge of beings. This 
fundamental location of ethics as pre-ontological and pre-
epistemological has two related, yet seemingly irreconcilable, 
implications that I address throughout the thesis. The first is that ethics 
is always already taking place, or always already in practise, prior to any 
knowledge of, consent to, or conscious effort in its regard. From this 
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perspective, what is at stake is not so much whether Levinassian ethics 
can function as a foundation for physiotherapy practice. Rather, it is 
gaining an understanding of how it is always already in practise, both 
outside and within the context of physiotherapy as it is today. This 
recognition and acknowledgment of the fundamental practice of ethics, 
as well as ethics as fundamental physical therapy is explored in Chapter 
Four of the thesis. 
 
The second implication of its pre-ontological and pre-epistemological 
‘location’ is precisely that ethics can not be converted into theory and 
practice, or cognition and capacity. This antecedence of ethics makes it 
not only fundamentally other than being and knowledge of beings, but 
also doing. It cannot be conceived ‘actively, as an initiative’, and cannot 
be converted ‘into an active initiative or into one’s own virtue’ (Lingis, 
1998, p. xxiii, xxxi). 
 
These two implications lie at the heart of any attempt to practise 
Levinassian ethics and have inspired much debate with regard to the 
practical significance of his work (Lingis, 2009; Zeillinger, 2009). In 
resolving issues arising from the latter, I draw on other philosophies 
and practices in an attempt at a partial resolution. Whatever 
‘resolution’ one might find, it is never more than a flawed effort in 
approximating something in thought, writing, and practice that does not 
belong to that order: an attempt at ‘dealing with the trap of 
contradicting oneself by expressing that which, in fact, permanently 
withdraws from any direct identification’ (Zeilinger, 2009, p. 99). 
Strictly speaking, ethical practice is undone whenever it is known and 
described, or said and done. And yet, Levinas recognised that we live in 
a discursive condition. That is, we operate in a world of beings, 
knowledge and language that we cannot escape. Attempting to 
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approximate an ethical practice, as well as some sort of description of it 
is thus one of the few things we can, if not must, do. I try to 
circumscribe a range of ethical practices, or practical exemplars in 
Chapters Three and Five whilst trying to keep them as unprescriptive as 
possible.  
Beyond fundamental ethics 
Another closely related challenge arises from the notion that Levinas’s 
fundamental ethics appears to be exclusive to the dyadic relation of self 
and other. Yet Levinas also recognised that we are always already in 
relation to multiple others. Toward the end of Otherwise than Being, 
Levinas introduces this problem with the notion of the Third, or third 
party (Levinas, 1998, p. 157). Already ‘in the proximity of the other … 
all the others than the other obsess me’, and crucially, in this obsession  
‘all the others’ equally and simultaneously call for ethics, and make 
ethics a question of justice (Levinas, 1998, p. 158).  
 
Due to the simultaneity of the relation to the Third and the call for 
justice, it has rightly been argued that ethics cannot be separated from 
politics in such a way that one can be discussed, or even developed 
without simultaneously thinking the other (Fagan, 2009). For the 
present study, this implies that a physiotherapy practice based on 
fundamental ethics cannot be fully developed without accounting for 
the society, community, or plurality of others with whom we are equally 
always already in relation. For physiotherapy, this includes the social, 
professional, institutional, and legal contexts of the profession and its 
practices. Yet while I have spent considerable time researching this 
question of justice and the Third throughout the course of this study, I 
ultimately found it too extensive to be included in the final format of 
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the present study. It is to be further developed in future research and 
publication. 
 
This presents a limitation to the findings of the present thesis that I am 
only able to revisit and reconcile in the concluding chapter. Yet it 
should be clear that, in doing so, I follow the tendency to ascribe a 
certain (conceptual) primacy to ethics in the dyadic relation between 
self and other, over ethics in relation to the Third, or politics (Fagan, 
2009). To account for questions raised by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, etc., 
it is necessary to clarify who these multiple ‘others’ are with whom we 
are simultaneously always already in relation. Equally, we need to 
determine who they are not. And finally, how it might be possible to act 
justly toward them all, to practise ethics in the broader context of a 
community of others, of society, and the political? 
 
Levinas’s response to the first point remains a contentious issue due to 
distinct moments in his work when he explcitly or implicitly exhibits a 
preference or priority for the human over other sentient beings, men 
over women, and one race of humans over another (Calarco, 2010; Caro, 
2009; Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002; Derrida, 1960; Guenther, 2009). 
Siding with the general thrust of these criticism, I do not consider these 
moments in his work to be consistent with his own exposition of 
fundamental ethics. Thankfully, there are also contrasting comments to 
be found in his work that infer a different, more open and consistent 
understanding of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, etc. as ‘all and everything’ 
(Lingis, 1998, p. xxxi). This broader understanding also more closely 
aligns with Asian or Eastern philosophical understandings of the 
‘others’ for whom we are responsible. I draw on these other traditions 
and highlight them at several points in the thesis. I also draw on the 
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etymological heritage of physiotherapy as a profession concerned with 
the natural, from Greek physis, “nature”.          
 
To respond to the first point in this manner amplifies the difficulty in 
considering a transition from ethics to politics as it dramatically 
broadens the community of others that call for ethics. Building on the 
argument that a partial conversion from ethics to practice is possible, I 
argue that this ‘partial conversion’ also already hints at an otherwise 
community and politics that similarly approximates ethics in an 
ongoing interplay with it. Once again, certain pointers in this direction 
can also be found in Levinas’s work, as well as the other philosophies 
and practices I draw on. These ‘hints’ provide a tentative outlook 
toward a response—or responsibility—regarding the relevance of a 
physical therapy of fundamental ethics to the broader, social, 
professional, and clinical realities of the profession today. 
 
On the basis that ‘my relationship with the other as neighbor gives 
meaning to my relations with all others’, considering ethic’s relation to 
politics parallels approaches to a therapeutic practice of fundamental 
ethics (Levinas, 1998b, p. 159). Levinas writes that the entry of the 
Third party is also ‘the birth of the question of … justice … comparison, 
coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematization, 
the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the intellect’ 
(Levinas, 1998b, p. 157). In other words, the Third calls for justice, 
knowledge, comparison, and politics in the name of ethics. This ‘call’ is 
an expression of attempts to approximate ethics in political practice; 
and the call reiterates the inherent inability to ever fully reach this aim. 
With regard to an ‘otherwise’ community, this highlights that ‘politics 
left to itself bears a tyranny within itself’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 300). It is 
thus necessary to ensure that ‘justice and politics … serve ethics’, that 
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‘ethics … must regulate the political order’ (Nortvedt, 2003, p. 30). Yet 
to do so, one must first clarify the meaning of ethics and it is this that I 
have focused on within the thesis. 
Goodness and the good 
Despite my search for indications of resonance between Levinas’s 
thought and other philosophies and practices I draw on, there are also 
substantial differences between them that perhaps makes them 
irreconcilable with one another. Throughout the thesis, I discuss a 
range of such differences with a tendency to resolve them by favouring 
one of the positions and engaging a critique of the other from this 
perspective. One example is Levinas’s controversial, narrow preference 
for particular others, previously mentioned. 
 
A further contentious issue as evidence of a fundamental 
irreconcilability between Levinassian ethics and the other philosophies 
deployed in the thesis, are definitions or stances with regard to 
goodness and the good. Throughout the thesis, I discuss goodness in a 
sense akin to ethical action, or practice, though encompassing various 
permutations of practice, from the radically passive to a more 
normative understanding of ‘active’. In Chapter Four, I discuss the 
fundamental goodness of the other in calling forth the self, the 
goodness it calls for, the fundamental goodness provided by the self, 
and its fundamental relation to professionalism and physical therapy. 
In Chapter Five I build on Levinas’s notion of ‘little acts of goodness’ to 
conceive of ways in which goodness can be practiced in a more active 
manner, beyond fundamental passivity.         
 
Consideration of ‘goodness’ has to rest upon an understanding of what 
is the good, such that it can be enacted. There is further limitation to 
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the thesis findings insofar as I have not explicitly engaged in a 
comprehensive discussion of ‘the good’ using this notion and a range of 
related, thematic and cultural terms from within Levinas’s work and 
other, contrasting philosophies in view here. My primary reason for this 
omission is because I have felt them to be too culturally loaded to avoid 
preconceptions that might come with them in the reading of the final 
form of the thesis, yet their more explicit and in-depth discussion 
certainly also presents scope for further research and publication, as 
well as why their particular cultural connotations might present a 
challenge for them to be discussed explicitly in a thesis on and in 
physiotherapy.  
 
That being said, I have discussed the potential irreconcilability of 
philosophical understandings of the good in various places across the 
thesis in a somewhat implicit manner. Specifically, this happens where 
I introduce ancient occidental and oriental views on identification with, 
identity of, or oneness with the universe, as a Greater Whole, as the 
ultimate good and goal of practice. This appears in the section on 
‘Letting go of self’, toward the end of Chapter Three. Such a notion of 
oneness is irreconcilable with Levinassian ethics and its fundamental 
opposition to, and critique of self-identification as a violence effected 
through the assimilatory movement of thematization: ‘the anarchy of 
the Infinite’, prior to and outside of being, time, and knowledge, ‘resists 
the univocity of an originary or a principle’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 156). 
 
This juxtaposition and critique of the good as univocity is reiterated 
when discussing ‘relation’ and ‘causation’ in the section ‘Distance and 
causation’ in Chapter Four. The Levinassian ‘good’ is applied to the 
development of a novel theory of professionalism and the ‘physical 
therapist’. It is also revisited once more in the final chapter of the 
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thesis, in a (self-)critique of autoethnography and its inherent and 
possibly amplified tendency toward self-identification as its final 
outcome. Such identification coincides with the still dominant 
academic search for universal, generalizable knowledge. In contrast to 
this, I side with Levinas’s relational and pluralist notion of goodness 
and the good, and argue for a corelative theory and practice of 
autoethnography and physiotherapy.          
 
This study does not engage in the development of a reconciliatory, 
unified theory and practice of physical therapies that amalgamates 
Levinassian ethics with a range of other, possibly irreconcilable, 
philosophies and practices. Levinas’s ethics is my critical perspective, 
particularly with regard to the decisive understanding of goodness and 
the good that keeps with its pluralist orientation. And yet, I also allude 
to the fact that a different reading of the unitary definition of the good 
underlying both oriental and occidental traditions might be much 
closer to a pluralist notion after all.  
Positivism, biomedicine, physical therapy and physiotherapy 
With this introductory chapter, I interchange the terms physiotherapy, 
physical therapy, physiotherapist, physical therapist. This flexible use 
terms is a deliberate attempt at loosening the grip of their common 
usage and understanding as referring to the profession or its 
therapeutic practices. This hopefully functions as a preparatory 
measure to a second step, in which additional and ‘otherwise’ 
understandings of these terms are developed. This is especially the case 
with Chapters Four through Six. 
 
Something similar presents itself with regard to the terms ‘positivism’, 
‘biomedicine’, and ‘evidence-based practice’. My initial use of these 
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terms in Chapter Three is based on extensive research by others in this 
field who identified these notions as grounded on the same ontology 
and epistemology (Gibson, 2003; Grant & Giddings, 2002; Holmes et al., 
2006; Miles, Loughlin, & Polychronis, 2008; Nicholls, 2009a). Though I 
provide characteristics of this ground, highlighted by these researchers, 
I have avoided needless repetition or expansion on this literature 
concerning positivism and biomedicine. Rather, I focus on drawing 
parallels to such critique from a Levinassian perspective, addressing the 
work of Pierre Hadot and Georges Canguilhem.   
 
From this perspective, attempts at merging biomedical diagnostic and 
therapeutic approaches with aspects of Buddhism, or positivist with 
qualitative approaches as in mixed-methods research, are ultimately 
unable to escape their epistemological legacies (Giddings & Grant, 
2007, p. 54). That is, they are based on the assumption that phenomena 
are characterised by positive traits, elements that can be identified and 
known by a self-as-ego that has a rational relation to the world. That is, 
a self acts via its cognition and capacity to accumulate knowledge. 
Mixing methods thus functions more along the lines of a ‘trojan horse’, 
where inclusion of other philosophies or practices effects a 
‘neutralizing [of] the oppositional potential of other paradigms and 
methodologies that more commonly use qualitative methods’ (Giddings 
& Grant, 2007, p. 59). What is at stake here from a Levinassian 
perspective is thus a ‘wholly otherwise’ physiotherapy research, theory, 
and practice (Levinas, 1960). It is such a fundamentally different 
understanding of and approach to biomedicine that I seek to develop 
throughout the thesis. 
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A Trojan horse after all? 
One final concern, developed particularly in Chapter Three requires 
comment. I there reference interest in Buddhism and related practices 
such as Yoga, now increasingly implicated in Western healthcare 
systems. These place special emphasis on the necessity for the self to 
continually work on itself to achieve a healthier life, a self-disciplining 
of one’s self. Such practices now seem to be a “good fit” for the 
neoliberal transformation of healthcare systems, away from universal 
welfare provisions to individuated responsibility of an entrepreneurial 
self.  
 
This issue has been critiqued particularly in the field of health 
behaviour change, where ‘the emphasis’ in research and practice has 
been placed ‘on models that explain behavior as individually driven and 
cognitively motivated’ (Horrocks & Johnson, 2014, p. 175). Yet despite 
this emphasis, it has been noted that there is a ‘lack of evidence for 
much behavioral health promotion’ that stands in contrast to much 
greater ‘evidence that supports the value of action on the social and 
economic determinants of health’ (Baum & Fisher, 2014, p. 221). 
According to the latter, it is these determinants that are argued for as 
requiring major ‘therapeutic’ intervention. The relative lack of  
attention to them is attributed to the fact that present healthcare is 
based on a ‘neoliberal ideology [that] encourages a particular kind of 
individual entrepreneurial enterprise whereby what were previously 
deemed to be the state’s responsibilities have been devolved to 
responsible, rational individuals’ as a means to divest in healthcare 
(Henderson, 2010; Horrocks & Johnson, 2014, p. 175). 
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Overview of the thesis 
In Chapter Two, I discuss the methodological approach adopted in the 
study through a conjunction of autoethnography and a range of 
approaches drawn from the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Pierre 
Hadot. I outline the methodological principles developed that 
underpinned the study, beginning with objectivity and relevance as the 
first imperatives derived and adapted from Hadot’s work. I then provide 
an account of the subject field and texts utilised throughout the study, 
and set out the various methods used. I examine some of the key 
concepts drawn from physiotherapy, Levinassian philosophy, Hadot’s 
work, and the philosophies and practices of Zen, Budo, and Shiatsu, 
before discussing how these notions contribute to a comparative 
critique of some of the central tenets of contemporary physiotherapy. 
Drawing again primarily on Hadot, I discuss practice as the final 
methodological imperative of the study. As such, practice anchors the 
aim and conduct of the thesis, but also introduces a particular challenge 
to the conduct of the study itself: an issue I explore in some length and 
return to in Chapter Six for a final evaluation.      
 
Chapter Three presents the first of the chapters primarily focussed on 
the comparative critique and the further development of physiotherapy 
theory and practice that comprises the core of this study. The chapter 
begins with an exploration of the foundations of contemporary 
physiotherapy, looking at how these shape the profession’s ontological 
and epistemological presuppositions.  This critique is primarily 
informed by a Levinassian perspective, through which I propose a 
momentary, inward reorientation of physiotherapy practice and 
research. This critique opens the possibility of a  broadening of 
conventional understandings of professional practice and the 
physiotherapy practitioner through the inclusion of a specific 
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conception of self-practice. The final section of the chapter explores a 
range of self-practices that are, as yet, largely unfamiliar to 
physiotherapy. I draw these practices primarily from the traditions of 
Zen, Budo, Shiatsu, and ancient Greek and Roman philosophy as per 
Hadot. These are united with a Levinassian ethics and particularly 
notions of passivity. I close the chapter by proposing the idea of the 
therapist as passivity.    
 
In Chapter Four I extend this notion of the therapist as passivity, 
beginning with an exploration of how notions of passivity affect our 
understandings of the self, the other, and their relation, and consider 
how they might provide a foundation for physiotherapy different from 
its contemporary, ontological and epistemological basis. Specifically, 
this entails a fundamental revision of what it means to be a 
professional, the role of the physical with particular regard to the 
professional therapist, and the fundamental physical therapy provided 
to the other. Building on this revision, I introduce the notion of 
accompaniment, and suggest it as the obverse side of passivity, and 
thereby, a further fundamental characteristic of the self as passivity, 
that more overtly highlights the significance of the self thus understood 
to a reimagining and further development of physiotherapy theory and 
practice.  
 
In Chapter Five, I build on the understanding of the self and its relation 
to the other developed in the preceding chapter to develop a range of 
corresponding physical therapy practices. I begin by considering how 
practices of passivity might be understood and implemented as physical 
therapies. I then discuss the importance of physicality in the 
therapeutic relation with the other, before turning toward the 
development of a range of physical therapies of accompaniment. In the 
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chapter, I develop the physical therapies of accompaniment primarily 
with regard to the therapeutic relation between a singular client and 
therapist, but close the chapter by highlighting how the notions and 
practices of passivity and accompaniment might provide a foundation 
for the further development of physiotherapy as a whole.    
 
In the final, concluding chapter, I bring together the various findings of 
the study and review the study’s aims, strengths and limitations. I 
suggest that the study makes a range of original contributions to 
physiotherapy, and its broader philosophical, therapeutic, practical, 
and methodological reference-fields. In conjunction with these, I also 
briefly consider how the approach to physical therapy developed in this 
study might be further extended to the larger clinical, educational, and 
professional environment of physiotherapy. I also discuss related areas 
of future research. Finally, I also review the methodological challenges 
presented through the conjunction of autoethnography with the work 
of Hadot and Levinas. I specifically consider how this highlights a 
crucial, further limitation of the study, as well as a way in which the 
thesis might nonetheless have managed to account for it. 
In summary 
In this introduction, I have outlined the personal circumstances leading 
to this study, and where these sit within the current bodies of work 
concerning physiotherapy practice and research on the one hand, and 
its broader philosophical, theoretical, and practical reference-fields on 
the other. Following an extrapolation of the aims and questions of the 
study, I have provided an initial overview of its methodology, as well as 
its overall structure of the chapters. In the following chapter I turn to 
the more detailed discussion of the methodological approaches taken to 
develop, substantiate and evaluate contemporary physiotherapy, 
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drawing on Levinassian ethics, Hadot’s work on philosophy as a way of 
life, and a broad cross-section of philosophies and practices from Zen, a 
range of Japanese martial arts, Shiatsu, and related traditions.  
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Chapter Two 
Self and Other in Theory and Practice 
 
The philosophical school thus corresponds, above all, to the 
choice of a certain way of life and existential option which 
demands from the individual a total change of lifestyle, a 
conversion of one’s entire being, and ultimately a certain desire 
to be and to live in a certain way. This existential option in turn, 
implies a certain vision of the world, and the task of 
philosophical discourse will therefore be to reveal and rationally 
justify this existential option, as well as this representation of the 
world (Hadot, 2002, p. 3). 
 
This is to say that philosophical discourses cannot be considered 
realities which exist in and for themselves, so that their structure 
could be studied independently of the philosopher who developed 
them (Hadot, 2002, p. 6). 
 
Introduction 
In the present chapter, I focus on the methodological approach taken in 
this study to develop contemporary physiotherapy theory and practice 
by drawing on a variety of hitherto unexplored philosophical and 
practical sources. The qualitative research methodology of 
autoethnography provided the methodological point of departure for 
this purpose. Expanding on its introduction in Chapter One, I now 
explore and discuss a range of issues concerning my adaptation of 
autoethnography to the context of the present study. I outline the way 
in which it has supported my inquiry into contemporary physiotherapy 
and my other philosophico-practical sources, and discuss how I have 
used it to draw and develop the specific notions and practices that 
provide the focus of the present study. My reason for denoting 
autoethnography as a methodological point of departure results from 
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the particular possibilities, but also difficulties that presented 
themselves in its meeting and convergence with especially Hadot’s 
method and understanding of philosophy and Levinas’s fundamental 
ethics.  
 
Being a research methodology rather than a philosophy in itself, 
autoethnography can be variably underpinned by different 
philosophical and theoretical frameworks. As common in qualitative 
research in general, the exact choice of underpinning philosophy and 
theoretical framework depends on the specific question of a given 
study, and in autoethnography decidedly overtly, also on the 
researcher’s personal and professional opinions, values and prior 
knowledge. Given that I consider the other sources I am drawing on 
here as personally and professionally meaningful, if not formative, I 
have explored their potential as partial philosophical and theoretical 
frameworks for my application of autoethnography from very early on, 
beginning with a precursory exploration inquiring into the feasibility of 
such a conjunction (Maric, 2011). With this chapter, I draw on notions 
and practices from my other philosophical and practical sources that I 
found particularly pertinent or amenable to a conjunction with 
autoethnography to discern its functioning as the point of departure for 
this study, and my adaptation and expansion of the methodology and 
its methods. 
Preparation 
Philosophy, aims, and methodology  
In the general outline provided in Chapter One, I introduced 
autoethnography as essentially a variant of ethnographic research in its 
function as a methodology for the study of one or more cultures (ethno) 
from the researcher’s own experience and perspective as belonging to 
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this culture. In ethnographic research and the social sciences in 
general, a culture is broadly defined by the values, beliefs, attitudes, 
goals, behavioural patterns, languages, symbols, objects, patterns of 
organisation, theories, and practices that are shared by a group of 
people and bind them together (Bryman, 2012, pp. 32-34; Gerber & 
Macionis, 2010, pp. 59-65; Nicholls, 2009c, p. 588). The primary culture 
at the focus of the present study, and of which I have been a 
professional member for nearly two decades, is physiotherapy. It is the 
theories and practices of physiotherapy that I seek to study and, where 
feasible, broaden and develop.  
 
In addition to my experience of physiotherapy, I aim to study and 
develop the profession by drawing on my experience, study, and 
practice of a range of other cultures, and their theories and practices in 
turn, that I have also been a member of for various amounts of time, 
ranging from six to twenty years. These include the cultures or 
traditions of Aikido, Budo, or more broadly, martial arts, as well as the 
cultures of Zen and Shiatsu. Building on the definition of culture 
defined by a set of theories and practices, I am also referring to the 
theories and practices of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy as 
described by Pierre Hadot, and the philosophical theories and practices 
of Emmanuel Levinas, as cultures or traditions.  
 
Due to these personal engagements, as well as the fact that none of 
these cultures have had little if any bearing on the professional theories 
and practices of physiotherapy, I am drawing on a range of personal 
experiences, theories and practices to study, and potentially broaden 
the professional theories and practices of physiotherapy. While the 
personal is often marginalised in scientific research and physiotherapy 
alike, autoethnography makes the researcher’s personal involvement, 
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experience, theories and practices its distinct, methodological strength 
and starting point. The exact ways in which the personal is used as such 
in autoethnography can differ depending on the respective paradigm 
used to underpin the methodology.  
 
In analytic studies, for example, the personal involvement of the 
researcher is used as an amplification of the traditional ‘emic 
perspective’ that provides an even better view into a culture of interest 
and an additional level for its phenomenological and sociological 
analysis (Anderson, 2006; Delamont, 2007; Holt, 2008; Sparkes, 2000). 
Similarly, in interpretative, phenomenological autoethnographic 
studies, it has been implemented as a means to study the lived 
experience of individual and social phenomena from a deeply personal 
perspective (Ballard, 2009; Bochner, 2000). Somewhat implicit to these 
approaches, especially in the debate and development of 
autoethnography in the context of critical and postmodern research, 
are the intricate relation and blurry boundaries between the researcher 
and the researched, the personal and professional, self and other (Ellis 
& Bochner, 1996; Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Adams & Holman Jones, 2008; 
Denzin, 2006; Wilkes, 2009). The increasing acknowledgement of a 
researcher’s role in autoethnographic research thus enables anything 
from a partial inclusion to an exclusive focus on the researcher as the 
subject-object of research.  
 
Regardless of the extent of this inclusion, the fact that 
autoethnography takes place at the juncture between the personal and 
professional, self and other, necessarily touching on either and their 
relation to each other, makes it particularly suitable for a study that 
engages these boundaries and explores their potential broadening. For 
the same reason, autoethnography emphasises that the study of a 
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culture and its theories and practices must include a study of how 
members of a given culture understand themselves and others, and how 
they relate to them in theory and practice (Holman Jones, 2005).  
 
More broadly speaking, it emphasises a study of theories and practices 
of the self, the other, and their relation. Wherever a broadening, or 
reformation of existing theories and practices and the development of 
novel ones is in question, such an effort must be prefixed by review and 
critical analysis of the status quo to justify alteration. In a general 
sense, the methodological support that autoethnography provides for 
the present thesis can thus be summarised as underscoring the central 
arenas of its inquiry and comparative engagement. These are:  
 
v The distinguishing and elucidation of the theories and practices 
that underpin and shape contemporary physiotherapy and its 
understanding and practice of self, other, and their relation;  
v Their critical analysis and juxtaposition with other theories and 
practices concerning the self, other, and their relation; 
v The potential, resulting modification and transformation of 
existing physiotherapy theories and practices, and by extension, 
ourselves, our understanding of others, and our relation to them 
in physiotherapy practice.  
 
Questioning ourselves 
There is emphasis given in these aims to a questioning of our selves 
that further introduces key themes in the work of Pierre Hadot. Based 
on his analysis of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, Hadot argued 
for a consonant revival of philosophy in these terms, as a method for 
‘questioning ourselves, because we have the feeling that we are not 
what we ought to be’. On this basis, such questioning becomes a means 
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for the ‘transformation of one's perception’ of the world, and the 
subsequent modification of ‘one’s way of conducting oneself’ (Hadot, 
2009, p. 96, 26). Levinas similarly described ‘the relationship to the 
other’ as ‘the grand mystery’ and one of his favourite themes (Levinas 
& Field, 1993). His inquiry into the self, the other, and their relation 
invokes a radical critique, questioning and overturning of the 
understanding of subjectivity across a broad range of ancient and 
modern philosophies, and the theories and practices they underpin, 
enable and justify. Finally, I argue that ‘to study’, and ultimately 
transform ‘the self’, the other, and their relation is also a central 
concern of Zen-Buddhism, Budo, and Shiatsu, albeit each in their own 
way and further distinction to the methods and methodologies 
described by Levinas and Hadot (Okumura, 2012, p. 27).  
 
Thus, what is critical to note here is that the aims and foci of these 
philosophies and practices overlap with those of autoethnography and 
its present application to physiotherapy, despite differences in their 
approaches. For this reason I began to explore the feasibility of 
autoethnography as a methodological approach for the present purpose 
in a precursory study (Maric, 2011). In this study, I specifically focussed 
on the potential use of theories and practices drawn from Zen, Budo, 
Shiatsu, Levinas’s work, and Hadot’s exploration of ancient philosophy 
to underpin or augment my approach to autoethnography and research 
methods. Throughout the present chapter, I discuss how I have applied 
these fields to augment my methods and use of autoethnography as a 
methodology to study, critique, and transform the self, the other, and 
their relation in contemporary physiotherapy theory and practice. I 
revisit some of the challenges brought about by their conjunction in the 
final chapter of the thesis. 
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Rules and tools on the research path 
Building on his critique that ‘the scholastic teaching of philosophy, and 
especially of the history of philosophy … has always had a tendency to 
emphasise the theoretical, abstract, and conceptual’, Hadot argued that 
it is particularly ‘important to insist on a few methodological 
imperatives’ where the study and further development of practice is 
concerned (Hadot, 2002, p. 274). Given that this thesis aims at the study 
and further development of physiotherapy, but the focus on theory is 
ultimately aimed at a transformation of practice, Hadot’s imperatives 
provide guidance for the methodology of the present study. Because his 
imperatives are intimately related to a variety of steps that need to be 
taken over the course of such research directed at practice, and each 
step further correspond to a range of methods that need to be used to 
take it, I discuss the rules and tools of this path in relation to their 
corresponding step.      
 
That research follows a certain path, and that this path (from Greek: 
hodos) should follow (from Greek: meta) a certain logic (from Greek: 
logos) and set of rules, entail the use of corresponding methods, and all 
of these should be describable (also from Greek: logos) is also the 
original, etymological meaning and fundamental assumption 
underpinning the notion of methodology, and scientific inquiry as a 
whole (Harper, 2017i, 2017j). Methodology is accordingly defined as the 
approach, rules, and principles that define and guide the research 
process and the methods used along the way to achieve its aim (Grant 
& Giddings, 2002, p. 12; Crotty, 1998, p. 2-8; Hammell, 2006, p. 167; 
Nicholls, 2009c, pp. 587, 589). Methods, in turn, are generally referred 
to as the specific ‘practical means’ or tools used and required by a 
specific methodology (Grant & Giddings, p. 12). Although seemingly 
separate and somewhat unspecific due to their practical functionality, 
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their etymological heritage hints at their intimate, underlying relation 
to the research path and its various steps, thus providing further 
support for their discussion along the way. 
 
Among these rules are also some that are specifically set to ensure that 
an approach not only achieves its aims but can be trusted to have done 
so. Although these are often discussed somewhat separately, as a 
specific group of rules concerned with scientific rigour, they 
nonetheless either correspond to or themselves amount to, distinct 
steps and methods along the same methodological path. Due to this 
and the fact that this distinction is not made in Hadot’s methodological 
imperatives, I discuss the rules and methods concerning rigour in 
conjunction with all other rules and methods in relation to their 
respective steps. Hadot’s methodological imperatives are not the 
primary source for the formulation of the methodological process, 
rules, and methods of this study. They rather resonate with, support, 
and add to a methodological framework assembled by drawing on a 
variety of elements from qualitative research in general, 
autoethnography in particular, and my other philosophical and 
practical sources. I therefore discuss and juxtapose all of these with 
regard to the development and implementation of my methodological 
approach.  
Objectivity: Beginning with the personal 
Affirming that ‘scientific rigour is the goal’, Hadot argued that ‘the first 
task … above all’ for those wishing to understand ancient philosophy as 
much as any other scholarly subject is ‘objectivity’ (Hadot, 2009, pp. 66-
67). To avoid what he variously referred to as ‘nonsense’, ‘creative 
mistakes’, ‘bad exegesis, mistranslation … faulty understanding … 
arbitrary systematisation’, amalgamation, and misappropriation, he 
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further asserted that ‘the requirement of objectivity must never 
disappear’ (Hadot, 1995, p. 71; Hadot, 2009, p. 74). The belief in 
objectivity and the existence of ‘a single objective reality’ that is 
independent of all subjective experience and interpretation has been 
one of the most defining features of science (Nicholls, 2009a, p. 527). 
It’s procedures for observation, identification, and analysis constitute 
the primary focus of the scientific method (B. Grant & Giddings, 2002, 
p. 13). Hadot’s call for objectivity is therefore by no means novel or 
different, but merely perpetuates a longstanding approach and belief in 
‘objective facts’ that has dominated science for several centuries 
(Hadot, 2009, p. 66).  
 
He appears to stand in opposition to autoethnography as a 
methodology that recognises, ‘acknowledges and accommodates 
subjectivity’ and ‘the innumerable ways personal experience influences 
the research process’ (Ellis, Adams, Bochner, 2010, p. 2). Though 
further reading and critical analysis of his work reveal a less categorical 
dismissal of subjectivity and even proximity to autoethnography in the 
present sense. In part, this is related to his further understanding of 
objectivity and ‘self-detachment’, especially in their juxtaposition and 
critical analysis within contexts of related notions from my others 
sources (Hadot, 2009, p. 67). The methodological imperatives required 
to ensure objectivity in the study of ancient (and modern) theories and 
practices provide a less complicated example for the peculiar relation of 
objectivity and subjectivity in Hadot’s work. Although I am adapting 
them for the present purpose, I argue that they are nonetheless 
meaningful to an indispensable element of autoethnography and its 
early stages as a research methodology.  
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A historical dimension 
Due to his focus on the study of theories and practices of ancient 
philosophy, Hadot argued that ‘the primary quality of … a philosopher, 
is to have historical sense’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 74). There are two ways in 
which the methodological imperative to account for the history of 
theories and practices has shaped the present thesis. In understanding 
history in the broader sense implied in Hadot’s list of conditions, the 
first meaning of this imperative is that the critical study of any theory 
and practice, and its juxtaposition with another has to begin with an 
account of their wider past and present contexts. In most cases, I have 
engaged such critical contexts where I am introducing specific theories, 
practices, or aspects of them. One of Hadot’s most central arguments, 
reflected in his list, is that the wider historical and social context of any 
philosophy, theory, or practice is inseparable from the people—their 
personal histories—who develop, practice, and advance it. Thus 
understood, rigour and objectivity do not require the outright dismissal 
and exclusion of subjectivity, but rather, require that a study includes 
and even begins with the personal and social, or self and its culture.   
 
All of the philosophies and practices drawn upon in the present study 
exemplify the close relationship between a particular philosopher, his 
philosophy, and its aims, theories, practices, methodology, and 
methods. This is the second historical dimension. Following the first 
methodological imperative developed here, it would have therefore, 
strictly speaking, been more accurate to prefix at least some 
consideration of Levinas’s personal and professional life, and its wider 
context prior to an abstraction of his philosophical aims, and the aim of 
philosophy according to him more generally speaking. 
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Levinas repeatedly mentioned that both his life and work were 
‘dominated by the presentiment and the memory of the Nazi horror’ 
(Levinas, 1990, p. 291). Having lost many of his family members, been a 
prisoner of war for some time himself, and having to witness the cruelty 
inflicted during these times ultimately motivated his exploration of the 
relationship between self and other, and more specifically, whether 
‘evil is the normal condition of people’ or not (Dostoyevsky, 2011, p. 
284). His upbringing, personal inclinations, interests, professional 
career, and a variety of factors further contributed to shaping his path 
and determined the particular theories and practices that formed and 
informed his research. Described by Levinas himself in a collection of 
interviews and other publications, all of these details provide further 
evidence for the complex and inseparable relationship between him, his 
life, and his philosophy (Levinas, 1990, p. 291; Levinas & Nemo, 1985; 
Robbins, 2001). 
 
Similarly, Hadot’s philosophical research was initially motivated by a 
critique of a surnaturalism that he argued to pervade the beliefs and 
practices of the Church (Hadot, 2009, p. 26). This was later amplified by 
a consonant critique of the overly theoretical focus and ‘purely formal 
path’ of academic philosophy through which it had ‘progressively 
distanced itself from the concrete life of humans’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 56). 
Various social, personal, and professional circumstances of his life then 
further directed and informed his search for a more balanced 
understanding and practice of philosophy that he likewise described in 
a variety of interviews and publications.  
 
The same methodological imperative that necessitates the 
acknowledgement and study of the personal and professional life of 
Hadot and Levinas as a means to understand the motivations and 
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trajectory of their philosophies and practices also underpins the early 
exposition of elements from my personal history that I believe to have 
led or contributed to my embarking on the course of the present study. 
There are a few additional personal circumstances and experiences that 
I draw on in relation to specific theories and practices throughout the 
present study. In the context of its methodology and methods, this is 
illustrated in the way in which my personal and professional life have 
led to this study and the formulation of its aims. Given that Hadot’s and 
Levinas’s critiques of academic philosophy and concerns about human 
relations also resonated with some of my personal experiences and 
intuitions, it is also an additional element underlying my drawing on 
Levinas and Hadot to consolidate these aims and develop a 
corresponding methodology. 
 
Acknowledgement and critical reflection on the researcher and the 
researcher’s relation to all parts of research are widely considered an 
essential characteristic of quality, and criterion for rigour in 
autoethnography. In many ways, the issues concerning rigour in 
autoethnography present a culmination of the debate between 
scientific rigour, validity and reliability as they are understood in 
positivist, quantitative research, and the development of 
corresponding, yet alternative concepts and tools suitable to qualitative 
research (Bochner, 2000; Collinson & Hockey, 2005; Denzin, 2006; 
Emdin & Lehner, 2006; Gingrich- Philbrook, 2005; Koro-Ljungberg, 
2010; Quicke, 2010; Sparkes, 2000). The continuously increasing variety 
of approaches encompassed by the term qualitative research drives the 
development of ever new concepts and criteria in this regard. Broadly 
speaking, these are either additions or adaptations of the relatively 
well-known notion of ‘trustworthiness’ and its criteria of ‘credibility, 
confirmability, dependability and transferability’ that have been 
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promoted and proposed as a general guideline for qualitative research 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Tuckett, 2005).   
 
Hadot’s notion of objectivity and the methodological imperatives 
required for its establishment most closely resonate with the concept of 
credibility and a range of corresponding criteria developed in its more 
specific adaptation to autoethnography. Variously defined and referred 
to as clarity, honesty, verisimilitude, or veracity, I argue that the 
overarching tenor nonetheless matches the general intention of 
credibility. That is, their aim is to openly expose and increase the 
visibility and transparency of an author’s intentions and theories to 
establish authorial veracity (Ballard, 2009; Begg, 2011; Bryman, 2012, 
410; Clough, 2000; Ellis, 2000; Holt, 2008; Nicholls, 2009c).  
Relevance: Correlating personal and professional concerns 
To define objectivity thus understood as ‘the first task … above all’ is 
not entirely accurate, given that what is necessary to make the broader 
personal and social context of a theory or practice visible, is that one 
has specified a field of interest, research aims and objectives, and has 
actually set out to study them (Hadot, 2009, p. 67). In quantitative and 
qualitative research studies alike, it is widely understood that this 
happens in the process of one’s professional study and practice of a 
certain field. This eventually leads to a recognition of certain problems 
and challenges, and the subsequent review of existing research 
literature in the broader arena, to ascertain and narrow down the ‘gap’ 
that justifies further study and a general relevance to the theories and 
practices of one’s respective profession.  
 
In a much broader sense, however, relevance is possibly the most 
defining methodological imperative of academic research, irrespective 
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of the exact approach taken, and is intimately related to objectivity, 
philosophically, methodologically, and methodically. From the very 
beginning, by definition, a research projection must have a ‘clearly 
stated thesis question; rationale and significance’, and final proof for 
this is to be given in a discussion of the significance of what has been 
found as a result of pursuing these goals (AUT, 2017, p. 70). Even where 
it is relegated to the beginning and end of a study, relevance to others 
ultimately frames the project as a whole and requires that all of its parts 
provide evidence of this particular kind of relation more or less 
explicitly. 
 
In the context of the present study, this meant that correlating, 
comparing and contrasting personal with professional, or cultural 
experiences, concerns, theories, and practices was not only part of its 
preparation phase, but a task throughout all stages of the project. This 
meant I would continuously have to consider the personal and 
professional in conjunction with one another and shuttle back and forth 
between them. If my personal story entailed a personal review of 
physiotherapy as a member of the profession, the literature review 
marked the first time, place, but also method for correlating and 
comparing my personal experiences and concerns regarding the 
profession, with those of other professionals (Bryman, 2009, p. 99). For 
reasons outlined in what follows, the review of literature continued to 
play a central role as a method to correlate, compare and contrast 
personal and professional theories and practices throughout the 
remaining stages of the project, rather than being confined to its 
beginning and the purpose of identifying a gap and justifying its aims.  
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Description  
Having formulated the aims and foci of my study, identified a suitable 
methodological point of departure for achieving them, and ascertained 
that they correspond to broader professional concerns and a ‘gap’ in its 
existing literature, it was time to begin treading along the emerging 
path. In ethnographic research, the phase that follows the initial 
preparation is referred to as fieldwork and is often considered ‘almost 
synonymous with ethnography’ (Whitehead, 2005, p. 3). It is defined as 
a time and ‘form of inquiry that requires … the total immersion of the 
researcher in the field’, or culture of interest ‘for an extended period of 
time’ (Whitehead, 2005, p3). During fieldwork, ethnographers gather 
descriptive information about a culture, its wider contexts, social 
settings, or specific phenomena, events, behaviours, experiences, 
individuals, theories and practices (Bryman, 2009, p. 447; Ellis, Adams, 
Bochner, 2010; Reeves, 2008; Sangasubana, 2011). The most widely-
known and established fieldwork methods are participation, 
observation, interviewing, and writing field notes based on these 
(Anderson, 2006; Atkinson, et al., 2003; Duncan, 2004; Ryang, 2000; 
Taber, 2010; Whitehead, 2005). 
 
The general tenets of fieldwork and the basic methods used for it are 
common to a wide variety of other qualitative research approaches. 
Most approaches to autoethnography similarly include at least some 
amount of taking ‘field notes’ and producing ‘thick descriptions of 
personal and interpersonal experience’ as part of their process and final 
product (Ellis, Adams, Bochner, 2010). In addition to these basic 
methods, autoethnographers continue to develop further fieldwork 
methods to match their particular fields of interest, research questions, 
philosophies and theories. In line with these, they also develop novel 
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ways to understand and practice fieldwork and other aspects of the 
research process. 
 
Given that autoethnography’s fundamental inclination is an emphasis 
on including and acknowledging the researcher’s involvement in all 
parts of research, I have found it increasingly difficult to speak of 
fieldwork, immersion or incubation, in relation to any phase of the 
present study (Barbour, 2011, p. 87). Building on the imperative of 
objectivity as discussed with Hadot and science research protocols, the 
researcher’s prior and ongoing immersion in one or more cultures is the 
very premise of autoethnography, and not simply a phase of it. 
Precisely this becomes the problem of narrowing down the field such 
that autoethnography is able to distinguish the personal, professional, 
and scientific. 
Mapping the field and its tools 
To nonetheless make an attempt at narrowing down the field and 
define the tools I might be using, I collated notes and produced 
descriptions of my various cultures of interest, based on my prior and 
ongoing involvement in them. More specifically, I set out from the 
characteristic, retrospective method of autoethnography that consists 
of writing about ‘moments perceived to have significantly impacted the 
trajectory of a person’s life’ and ‘stem from, or are made possible by, 
being part of a culture and/or by possessing a particular cultural 
identity’ (Ellis, Adams, Bochner, 2010). Because I had a vivid memory of 
a relatively small number of past experiences of physiotherapy that I 
perceived to be pivotal to my professional development leading up to 
this study, it was relatively simple to note and collate these into a single 
word document saved on my computer. Further, following relatively 
standard academic protocols and ethics guidelines, and matching 
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suggestions proposed for autoethnography, these accounts gradually 
reduced in size as I excluded personal names and other elements that 
would make it possible to identify others mentioned in them (Tolich, 
2010; Morse, 2002; Chang, 2008).  
 
Another factor delimiting the description of physiotherapy for the 
purpose of the present study was the peculiar situation of my 
participation in physiotherapy during my postgraduate studies. Due to 
regulations concerning overseas practitioners, I had not gained 
registration under the ‘General Scope of Practice’ with the 
Physiotherapy Board of New Zealand until as late October 2014, 
following an almost 5-year long period of working through and towards 
registration (PBNZ, 2017). Apart from a few exceptions involving 
clinical work, being registered under the ‘Limited Scope of Practice’ up 
to that point focused the majority of my experience and practice of 
physiotherapy to its postgraduate study at AUT University Auckland, 
which included some supervised clinical practice in its early stages, and 
some teaching and research assistance later on (PBNZ, 2017).  
 
My participation in physiotherapy thus increasingly focussed on the 
study of its theories and practices via its written literature, documents, 
and texts more broadly speaking. The lengthy process of applying for 
full professional registration initially drew forms, policies, and websites 
into my focus that were either directly related to my application in New 
Zealand, and from there, gradually branched out to similar materials 
from international sources. Pertinent examples consequently included 
the websites of the Physiotherapy Board of New Zealand 
(http://physioboard.org.nz/) and Physiotherapy New Zealand and the 
majority of forms and documents provided through these 
(http://physiotherapy.org.nz/); specific policies like the HPCA Act that 
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‘provides a framework for the regulation of health practitioners’ (New 
Zealand Ministry of Health/MOH, 2015), and the Health and Disability 
Commissioner Act 1994 and Code of Rights (Health and Disability 
Commissioner/HDC, 2009); and the website of the World Confederation 
of Physical Therapy and the various guidelines, policy statements, and 
other documents, including those specifically addressing registration 
and certification (http://www.wcpt.org/). Reading and working through 
these inadvertently turned into an in-depth study of the definition and 
boundaries of contemporary physiotherapy theory and practice. This 
led to a further branching out from information provided by 
professional and legislative authorities, to related material from other 
professional organisations, and a wide sweep of research publications, 
physiotherapy textbooks, and material from my first one-and-a-half 
years of coursework based postgraduate studies at AUT University.  
A review of literature 
Literature on research paradigms and methodologies became an 
increasing focus throughout this process. This provided me with further 
information about the philosophical, theoretical, and practical 
framework underpinning physiotherapy and its approach to clinical and 
scientific practice, and education. It also provided me with information 
on a wide variety of other philosophies and related, qualitative research 
paradigms (Bryman, 2012; Giddings & Smythe, 2010; Grant & Giddings, 
2002; Crotty, 1998; Miles, Loughlin, & Polychronis, 2008; Nicholls, 
2009a). I began collating notes into separate documents, beginning 
with their broad distinctions into interpretive, critical, and postmodern 
approaches.  
  
Given their primarily written format, the philosophies and practices of 
Levinas and Hadot further continued the shift in focus toward 
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‘literature based participation’ that had inadvertently accompanied my 
current involvement in physiotherapy. Levinas’s extensive oeuvre 
makes it virtually impossible to describe, let alone analyse it in any 
singular piece of writing. However, Derrida’s famous comparison of 
Levinas’s thinking to ‘a wave on a beach, always the same wave 
returning and repeating its movement with deeper insistence’ provides 
some consolation to this problem (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p.6). 
Following this implication that Levinas’s work revolves around a 
principal recurring theme, I mainly focused on his two major 
publications, Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence as primary sources for his theories and practices (Levinas, 1969, 
1998b). Due to the depth and complexity of his central theme and the 
language he used and developed, I additionally turned to sections from 
other works of his, and a range of secondary literature to generate and 
elucidate my notes (Bernasconi & Critchley, 1991; Critchley & 
Bernasconi, 2002; Derrida, 1960, 1978; Levinas, 1990, 1996, 1998a; 
Levinas & Nemo, 1985; Lingis, 1994, 1998; Robbins, 2001; von 
Wolzogen, 2005).  
 
Two groups of literature related to Levinas provided further resources 
particularly relevant to my overarching aims: firstly, a growing number 
of publications drawing on Levinas’s work to inform a variety of 
healthcare related theories and practices (Broom, 2013; Burcher, 2011; 
Clifton-Soderstrom, 2003; Naef, 2006; Nortvedt, 2003, 2008; Surbone, 
2005; Tiemersma, 1987). A second group comprised a small number of 
publications exploring overlaps and differences between Levinas and 
Asian theories and practices (Kalmanson, 2010; Kalmanson, Garrett, & 
Mattice, 2013; Ronell, 2004; Wu, 2014). Following the methodological 
imperative of objectivity as discussed above, a final group of literature 
provided at least some insight into the relationship between his 
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philosophy and his life (Chinnery, 2010; Levinas, 1990, p. 291; Malka, 
2006). 
 
My reading of Hadot focussed on three of his major books, one article, 
and an interview collection as primary literature sources (Hadot, 1995, 
2002, 2006, 2009; Hadot, Simmons, & Marshall, 2005). Secondary 
literature included the introductions to the latter books, as well as 
sections from other books, journal articles, blogposts, and publications 
that make no specific reference to his work, but appeared to resonate 
with it strongly (Bakewell, 2010; Chase, 2010a, 2010b; Chase, Clark, & 
McGhee, 2013; Critchley, 2008; Davidson, 1997; Irrera, 2010; Lamb, 
2011; Sharpe, 2011). These provided sufficient background to Hadot’s 
theories, practices, and personal and philosophical life that I could 
collate in separate document next to my related personal notes. 
 
Participation in Shiatsu and Zen during my doctoral studies also 
increasingly gravitated towards literature study as a result of a range of 
circumstances. To date, only a small number of academic studies 
involving Shiatsu have been published (Kleinau, 2016; Long, 2008; 
Robinson, Lorenc, & Liao, 2011; Sedlin, 2013). To produce a similarly 
comprehensive, descriptive document for Shiatsu, I thus turned to a 
range of books in English and German, as well as websites, journals, 
newsletters and articles published by professional Shiatsu organizations 
worldwide (Beresford-Cooke, 2003; Kawada & Karcher, 2009; Kishi & 
Whieldon, 2011; Masunaga & Ohashi, 1977; McClelland, 2011). As a 
member of the German Shiatsu Society (www.shiatsu-gsd.de) and the 
Shiatsu Practitioners of Aotearoa New Zealand (SPAANZ, 
www.shiatsu.org.nz), I particularly drew on resources provided by or 
accessible through these organisations.  
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Finally, several opportunities for hands-on Shiatsu practice also 
presented themselves despite all constraints and allowed me to add a 
few current, personal notes to those on past experiences and current 
readings. Particularly thanks to joining the SPAANZ I was able to meet 
with fellow practitioners at two of the association’s yearly conferences, 
attend a weekend workshop under the supervision of one of NZ’s senior 
instructors, and receive and exchange treatments on several other 
occasions. Outside of this, I have also led an introductory evening 
workshop in Shiatsu, next to occasional opportunities to provide 
Shiatsu treatments to private clients.  
 
Having been an active member of a German Zen association, I took 
notes on personal experiences, reflections, and intuitions gained from 
past study and practice. Following my arrival in New Zealand, I made a 
number of visits to local Zen communities to attend regular sittings, 
introductory workshops, a weekend retreat, and a few public lectures by 
various Zen and other Buddhist teachers. Unfortunately, a combination 
of factors steadily increased the time between these occasions, 
paralleled at home due to challenges to persist with solitary practice. 
While this has enabled additional notes based on current participation 
in core practices, the latter developments further shift the economy 
towards literature study as a predominant mode of participation during 
this project.   
 
Thus, to further complement my personal notes and descriptions, I 
drew on historical and modern texts concerning Zen and, somewhat 
more broadly, Buddhist traditions. Loosely focused on the particular 
lineage in which I have been a member for the longest time, I included 
ancient sutras, treatises, texts and commentaries, small-scale 
publications from a variety of groups, publicly available print and 
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electronic books, podcasts, and audiobooks (Chadwick, 1999; 
Deshimaru, 2012; Okumura, 2012; Uchiyama, Okumura, Leighton, 
1997; Suzuki, 1988; Tenbreul, 2011). I also reviewed academic literature 
drawing on Zen and Buddhist theories and practices to explore issues 
related to healthcare, research, and related matters (Adam, 2006; Bentz 
& Shapiro, 1998; Gaskins, 1999; Krägeloh, 2013). 
 
Academic literature on a variety of martial arts, their history, potential 
contributions to modern healthcare, scientific research and other fields 
similarly informed my thinking (Bradford, 2011; Chew, 1995; 
Faggianelli & Lukoff, 2006; Lin, Hwang, Chang, & Wolf, 2006; Macarie 
& Roberts, 2013; Mroczkowski, 2009; Noy, 2015; Ritscher, 2006; Wayne 
& Fuerst, 2013; Woo, Hong, Lau, & Lynn, 2007). This was either during 
early stages of the study where it served the identification of a 
corresponding gap in inquiry alongside general support for an attempt 
to fill it. Or it was during later stages of the study in relation to specific 
emerging issues, rather than the initial description of the respective 
traditions. For the latter purpose, I yet again focussed on literature 
from within those traditions. 
 
Largely due to Aikido being a modern martial art, most literature 
consisted of modern publications, which, in turn, cover a variety of 
aspects from history to philosophy, theory and practice, as well as the 
lives of its practitioners (Amdur, 2009, 2014; Burdy & Orban, 2013; 
Friday & Humitake, 1997; Stevens, 2011; Ueshiba, 1988). Especially in 
the martial arts, recent times have also seen an explosion of a wide 
variety of audiovisual and other publication formats. While I have 
engaged these both prior to and during this study, their volume 
discouraged me from reflecting and drawing on them as explicit 
sources. Due to complex relations between martial traditions and 
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various spiritual traditions, I also turned to additional readings more 
specifically touching on Shinto, Shugendo, and Daoism (Antoni, 2012; 
Deshimaru & Leonard, 1991; Friday & Humitake, 1997; Mason, 2002). 
 
My concerns with using literature as means of immersion and source of 
information for various practice descriptions was alleviated in the 
context of the martial arts. Compared to other literature fields I have 
mentioned, this was the field in which I managed to sustain extensive 
physical immersion, without legal, regulatory, or other constraints. This 
comprised regular weekly practice sessions in a variety of arts and 
group settings, starting up and coordinating a small training group as 
its instructor, and organising, teaching, and attending a variety of 
weekend and weekly seminars across NZ, Europe, and Asia.  
 
These concerns originated from an issue that is central to the martial 
arts, Zen, and Shiatsu alike, and raised a range of methodological 
questions from the very beginning. Specifically, it is their long history 
of emphasising personal, physical practice and experience, over the 
writing and study of written documents as a means for gaining and 
conveying insight. Time and time again, it is reiterated that ‘one must 
first train the body’ (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 11), and therewith 
begin a lifelong effort of primarily studying and ‘expressing one’s truth 
with one’s whole body and mind instead of thinking’ (Chadwick, 1999, 
p. 323).  
 
Consequently, there are methodological questions raised by this: How 
could I use my personal, physical practice as a resource for the initial 
description of a given culture and its experience, but also as a method 
for their further analysis, and the final presentation of my findings? It 
was ultimately due to these questions that I turned towards 
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autoethnography and especially postmodern approaches to it. These 
not only matched the focus of exploring the self, the other, and their 
relation, but advocated and exemplified a variety of approaches for the 
integration of personal, physical, or embodied experience as a central 
method for gathering information, as well as its further analysis and 
final presentation (Adams & Holman Jones, 2008; Barbour, 2011; Ellis, 
Adams, & Bochner, 2010; Spry, 2006, 2011).  
 
Especially during the early stages of my study the inclusion of personal, 
physical practice and experience as sources of information seemed to 
blur the boundaries between the personal, professional, and scientific 
even further. What resolved at least part of this problem, somewhat 
paradoxically, was that I converted my physical practice and experience 
into written notes via theoretical reflection, abstraction, and summary, 
as a way to describe and further reflect on it for the purpose of this 
study. My notes varied in genre and extent and could be written on 
whatever I had available at the time. As is common in most 
ethnographic research, they encompassed mental notes, brief, jotted 
notes, and much more detailed notes (Bryman, 2012, p. 450; 
Sangasubana, 2011, pp. 569-570). Where I was drawing on existing 
written literature, they also included copies of text passages, quotes, 
and summaries of larger sections. But whatever the initial medium, I 
would eventually word process and file them, collating my working 
materials on the various practice fields. 
 
Following interpretive approaches to ethnography and 
autoethnography, arrival at thick descriptions can be thought of as the 
end of a research project, and the latter term is equally used in 
reference to their final product (Bryman, 2012, p. 451). Through 
illustration and illumination, these descriptions are thought to help 
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insiders (cultural members) and outsiders (cultural strangers) gain 
insight, understanding, and familiarise themselves with cultures, or 
facets of them that they might not have noticed otherwise (Jorgenson, 
2002). On this basis, they are also thought to provide readers with the 
necessary information for further analysis, including ‘the creation of 
general statements about a culture’ and ‘judgments about’ the 
significance and ‘transferability of findings’ to other areas that might 
interest them (Bryman, 2012, pp. 392, 717; Nicholls, 2009b, p. 643). 
 
It has been argued that thick descriptions are themselves a product of at 
least some of analysis. First hints providing evidence for this can be 
found in the fact that they differ from raw field notes and constitute 
continuous, running ‘texts … that can be read’ as such, rather than 
disparate collections of singular clippings (Nicholls, 2009b, p. 643). At a 
minimum, such texts are ‘created by’ pulling together and ‘discerning 
patterns … evidenced by field notes, interviews’ (Ellis, Adams, Bochner, 
2010). At the same time, it would be difficult to argue that analysis is 
the distinguishing factor between fieldnotes and thick descriptions, if 
the former are not only ‘based on … observations’, but are also 
‘summaries’ that specify key dimensions of whatever is observed’ and 
include ‘the researcher’s reflections on them’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 447).  
 
Thus, although my initial collections of notes relating to culture, 
tradition, or philosophy, were not running texts as such, I have thought 
of them as documents containing thick descriptions. From the very 
beginning then, my review of literature, and immersion and description 
of physiotherapy was accompanied by a layer of interpretation that I 
discuss in the following section. In the first instance, this interpretation 
is defined by a range of criteria regarding the choice and filing of 
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particular notes and a closely related group of themes emerging at this 
early stage. 
Interpretation 
According to Hadot, fulfilling the imperative of objectivity in relation to 
the study of ancient philosophical texts is necessary to make an 
‘adequate and objective judgment: this is what was said’ (Hadot, 200, p. 
68). He further argued that ‘there is always added to the effort of 
objectivity a supplement, a surplus, which’ consists in subsequently 
making ‘a judgement of value: this has significance for my life’ (Hadot, 
200, p. 68). Especially due to the way that Hadot specified how 
something that was said should be significant, he acknowledged that 
‘we are in a certain sense implicated in the interpretation’ at this stage 
in such a way that ‘this time, one can speak of a return to subjectivity’ 
(Hadot, 200, p. 68).    
 
In a general sense, Levinas’s frequently quoted statement ‘traduire, c’est 
trahir’, to translate is to betray, closely resonates with the argument 
that all interpretation is subjective (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 
19; Lingis, 1998, p. xxxviii). Levinas’s interest, argument and use of the 
terms translation and betrayal are more specifically related to the 
methodological problematic raised by his work. If his admiration and 
reference to Rosenzweig can be used as a means to elucidate certain 
theories and practices, then the following quote by Rosenzweig 
provides some pertinent insights into the basic ideas underlying 
Levinas’s specific adaptation, and further support for the present 
argument concerning the practice of interpretation:   
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Translating means serving two masters. It follows that no one 
can do it. But it follows also that it is, like everything that no one 
can do in theory, everyone’s task in practice. Everyone must 
translate, and everyone does. When we speak, we translate from 
our intention into the understanding we expect from the other … 
When we hear, we translate words that sound in our ears into 
our understanding – or, more concretely, into the language of 
our mouth … our individual speech (Rosenzweig, 1994, p. 47). 
 
That the ethnographer’s background, expectations, and subjectivity 
play a role in the interpretation of texts has been widely discussed and 
acknowledged in scientific literature. Largely corresponding to 
Rosenzweig’s perspective, the critical point being acknowledged is that 
interpretation already is integral to all parts of fieldwork. That is, it is 
‘generally agreed that what we ‘see’ when we conduct research is 
conditioned by many factors’ including our prior knowledge, personal 
dispositions, and scientific interests. These factors are equally ‘likely to 
influence what is or is not recorded’ (Bryman, 2012, pp. 451, 574). Thus, 
it is not only the case that interpretation is subjective but also an 
integral part of the research process from the very beginning.  
A judgment of value 
I have sought to gather comprehensive information to increase the 
likelihood of collating accurate descriptions of my respective cultures 
and ‘maintain a fairly open mind so that the element of flexibility is not 
eroded’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 450). Yet already my initial literature review 
and subsequent collections of notes were orientated toward my 
research questions and aims, with this orientation constituting a first 
layer of subjective involvement and interpretation. That is, I was 
continuously making an initial ‘judgement of value’ based on what I 
believed to have significance for my research (Hadot, 2009, p. 68). 
 
   70 
In the first instance, this meant that I was filing notes into documents 
in relation to the specific elements of my research. Each document thus 
had a range of relatively generic sections collating notes corresponding 
to my research questions, aims, foci, and methodological imperatives 
established so far. In summary, these were sections on: 
 
v my personal experiences of physiotherapy, Levinassian 
philosophy, Shiatsu, Aikido and other martial arts, Zen, and 
Hadot’s work 
v cultural (or culture-specific) theories and practices related to 
these 
v the personal, social, and historical context of physiotherapy, and 
the other traditions in focus here  
v other defining, characteristic, or underpinning theories and 
practices 
v theories and practices regarding the self, the other, and their 
relation 
v theories and practices regarding their respective practice 
environments 
v theories and practices that could be of value to their mutual 
comparison and critique 
v theories and practices that could be of value to the broadening 
and further development of physiotherapy, autoethnography, 
and the other theories and practices in focus here 
v theories and practices that initially did not seem to be related to 
either of these areas, but could prove to be following further 
analysis.  
 
This constituted an initial coding process developed from my primary 
material. Having put the broad framework provided by these generic 
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sections in place, I then began filing my notes in more specific sub-
sections subjacent to the latter. Given that I was engaging well-
established cultures, traditions and philosophies, where possible I 
initially titled these secondary sections according to the specific or 
technical terms and expressions used for their respective theories, 
practices, concepts, and other themes. In most cases, I then added brief 
notes or quotes underneath these titles that I perceived to illustrate 
them particularly well, or would define the meaning of each of these 
titles in a fairly concise way.  
 
Throughout the study, I have struggled with a definitive use of terms 
such as practices, theories, notions, themes, concepts, or categories. As 
is common in many qualitative research approaches, such labels help 
provide an initial overview of general features, themes, concepts, and 
broad categories, native to sources (Bryman, 2012, p. 568; Charmaz, 
1983, p. 186; Nicholls, 2009b; Whitehead, 2005, pp. 16-17). However, 
three issues grew from my later analyses that contributed to ongoing 
struggles with these terms: firstly, the way that they are commonly 
used in qualitative research often implies a hierarchical order that 
seemed overly artificial; secondly, virtually all of these terms are 
incompatible with the most central notions from Levinas’s work, and 
some of my other sources that I discuss in subsequent chapters; and 
finally, particularly Hadot argued and advocated for a convergence of 
theory and practice, thus making it difficult to ever speak of one or 
another in overly definitive terms as if they were distinct.  
 
This being said, I have not been able to find any other, more 
satisfactory, terms and thus finally, decided to use them very loosely 
and interchangeably to counteract these issues as best as possible. This 
allows for an easy transition to a further list of some of the initial 
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concepts, notions, themes, and categories that appeared to be of value 
to the study, and helped me further ‘label, separate, compile, and 
organize’ my early, extensive descriptive collections of notes (Charmaz, 
1983, p. 186). I have already introduced some of these in the 
introduction to the thesis and will also be exploring more of them in 
detail in subsequent chapters, and further commenting on some in later 
sections of the present chapter. Thus, I will only present some of them 
in a summary list here, and add a few, brief comments to them to 
illustrate some of the ways in which I have made my initial judgments 
of their value to the study. Finally, I present the terms that I have used 
as titles for some of my secondary sections in italics to distinguish them 
from the latter. This may be considered as the developing of emergent 
key themes in a process of secondary coding: 
 
v To begin with then, Levinas would frequently use the terms 
totalization, or thematization in reference to what he considered 
to be a fundamental evil or violence that ‘occurs whenever I limit 
the other to a set of rational categories’ (Beavers, 1990, p. 3).  
v Already implicit in the latter quote, Levinas perceived this 
violence to originate in the theories and practices of ontology, 
epistemology that have defined and dominated ‘the philosophical 
tradition from Parmenides to Heidegger’ and have been the focus 
of his critique (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 16). According to 
Levinas, ontology and epistemology thus understood exhibit a 
‘relation to otherness’ that consists in ‘suppressing or reducing 
all forms of otherness by transmuting them into the same’ 
(Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 16). 
v To appreciate his critique more fully, it was thus necessary to 
clarify his understanding of otherness, the same, the ontological-
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epistemological relation, and a range of terms closely related to 
the latter, including being, knowledge, and knowing. 
v Although he critiqued Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology 
as equally belonging to this tradition, Levinas referred to his 
method as a phenomenological reduction, that enabled him to 
explore the limits of knowledge, but in this limit, also ‘a 
forgotten experience from which it lives’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 28).    
v This forgotten experience was what Levinas referred to as ethics, 
the fundamental, or ethical relation, which he argued to be 
‘otherwise than knowledge’ and continued to explore throughout 
his work (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 11). 
v Levinas developed a wide range of terms in reference to 
pertinent elements of the ethical relation, including a notion of 
ethical subjectivity that is characterised by passivity and 
‘responsibility for the other’, and differs from ‘the ego’, or same 
(Levinas, 1998b, pp. 119, 135).  
v On the other side of that relation then was what Levinas referred 
to as otherness, the other, and sometimes capital Other, who 
presents himself to the self as a face, in the face-to-face-relation, 
in a way that exceeds ‘the idea of the other in me’ (Levinas, 1969, 
p. 50).    
v Further, because the other presents himself in an excess of 
knowledge, ‘comes from the exterior and brings me more than I 
contain’, the other also brings a teaching (Levinas, 1969, p. 51); 
v And finally, never comes alone, but is always already in the 
company of a ‘third party… another neighbour’ or simply, the 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and so forth, and this Third ‘introduces a 
contradiction… the birth of the question’ of justice, politics, and 
coexistence (Levinas, 1998b, p. 157). 
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v Hadot’s critique of philosophy was more specifically directed at 
academic or scholastic philosophy and its longstanding ‘tendency 
to emphasise the theoretical, abstract, and conceptual’ (Hadot, 
2002, p. 274). 
v Using his historico-philological method and methodological 
imperatives Hadot turned toward ancient philosophy in search of 
an alternative, most notably, Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, and 
Epicureanism. 
v Though not exclusively limited to these, it was there that he 
found the notion of Philosophy as a Way of Life in reference to an 
approach to philosophy that emphasised the close relation 
between theory and practice rather than discarding the latter in 
favour of the former (Hadot, 1995). 
v The introduction of this notion made it necessary for me to 
clarify what Hadot meant by daily, or everyday life in general, and 
a Way of Life more specifically (Hadot, 2009, pp. 101-102; 2002, 
p. 38); 
v and in close conjunction with the latter also the practices, or 
exercises characteristic of (ancient) philosophy as a way of life; as 
well as the schools and teachers that developed them and differed 
from the early sophists, that is, the ‘professional teachers’ who 
taught knowledge and argumentative skills geared at political 
success in exchange for payment and invented a system of 
‘education in an artificial environment’ in ancient Athens 
(Hadot, 2002, p. 13). 
 
v ‘The concept of michi, … path’, or Way of Life, ‘both defined and 
unified … Japanese art and religion’ from medieval times 
onward. Merging ‘implications drawn from a worldview common 
to Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism’ it was widely adopted 
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as a central concept underpinning ‘activities of all sorts – from 
games and sports to fine arts, from practical endeavours to 
religious practice’ (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 16). Having 
maintained this central place, it equally underpins Zen, Aikido, 
and Shiatsu and numerous other Japanese martial, spiritual, and 
healing traditions until today. 
v As in the case of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy however, 
there is a wide variety of schools and lineages across and within 
each of these traditions. 
v Despite significant overlaps, there is consequently also a wide 
variety of differences between these as each of them has their 
own interpretation of the ultimate goal, and have developed 
their own, characteristic theories and practices that comprise 
their respective ways, and reflect their respective influences, as 
for example in the case of Zen-Shiatsu. 
v As a therapeutic tradition, Shiatsu is most overtly related to 
physiotherapy given its focus on manual therapy, or touch as its 
primary therapeutic practice (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011; 
McClelland, 2011). 
v Further due to its explicitly therapeutic focus, it is also most 
overtly related to certain understandings of health, sickness, and 
their relation to the body, as well as other aspects of human 
existence related to these. But even though they might be more 
implicit, corresponding definitions are also extant in Zen-
Buddhism, Aikido, and other spiritual and martial traditions.  
 
v Definitions of health, sickness, and related terms also play a 
pivotal role in physiotherapy and contribute to the definition of 
its aims, and the development of corresponding theories and 
practices. 
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v Clearly reflected in its name, physiotherapy also revolves around 
specific understandings of the physical, or physio-, and therapy, 
that are fundamental to its self-understanding (i.e. professional 
identity) as a (healthcare) profession. 
v The physiotherapy profession has become particularly closely 
associated with the medical profession and adopted its 
underpinning philosophy (ontology, and epistemology) and scientific 
method.   
v Although it is a central part of it, the practice of physiotherapy is 
not confined to clinical practice’ but ‘encompasses all roles that 
a physiotherapist may assume such as patient/client care, health 
management, research, policy making, educating and consulting, 
wherever there may be an issue of public health and safety’ 
(PBNZ, 2017). Consequently, physiotherapy also ascribes to 
particular theories and practices pertaining to clinical practice, 
professional education, policy making, and more, and all of these 
are critical to professional identity, organisation, boundaries, and 
similar aspects. 
 
Without attempting to be exhaustive, this list reflects the growing array 
of sections and subsections that began to amass in my early collections 
of notes as I continued to thematise my study and practice of 
physiotherapy, Shiatsu, and the other disciplinary arenas of this study. 
Further, while these terms provided me with a rough framework to 
organise my notes, I still had to ascertain that they were not only 
valuable for the present project, but also adequate. And finally, even 
with their value and adequacy established, my original list was still far 
too extensive to be included as a whole. 
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A judgment of adequacy 
In many ways, my ability to make a judgement regarding the value of 
certain notes and themes was based on a judgment of adequacy that I 
had made before in a somewhat taken-for-granted fashion. Simply put, 
this was the judgement that the various texts and documents I would be 
drawing on were, in fact, an adequate source of information. That is, my 
basic assumption was that they could provide me with adequate 
information about the theories and practices of physiotherapy, 
Levinassian philosophy, or other fields, rather than merely my own 
theories, practices, and relation to them.  
 
As implied in Hadot’s statement from which I am drawing this notion, 
the question of adequacy is intimately related to the question of 
objectivity in the common sense of the term. In the present context, it 
concerns a judgment that I needed to make in order to establish 
whether a certain term, concept, or theme adequately reflected what 
was meant, or done, whether ‘this is’ actually ‘what was said’ by an 
author or culture (Hadot, 2009, p. 68). Ultimately, the same question is 
also at the center of the question or ‘crisis of representation’ that has 
been debated in the context of ethnographic research (Bryman, 2012, p. 
544; Flaherty, Denzin, Manning, & Snow, 2002). Lying at the heart of 
autoethnography, it raises the question as to whether and how our 
observations, notes, and descriptions can adequately represent others, 
and even ourselves at all.  
  
Rather than trying to prefix an exhaustive discussion at this point, I will 
take a practical approach here, and revisit it in relation to specific 
themes and decisions I have made with regard to it over the course of 
the study. In relation to my use of written documents as a central 
source of information, and written notes as my primary method for its 
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description, for example, I began my research following a widespread 
assumption in qualitative research. This is that written texts do provide 
adequate insights into cultural realities, including their histories, 
identities, theories and practices, and can be used for further 
interpretation and analysis (Bryman, 2012, pp. 554-556; Ellis, Adams, 
Bochner, 2010; Nicholls, 2009c, pp. 12-13; Whitehead, 2005). 
 
One argument that has been made against this assumption, is that 
documents do not provide ‘transparent representations’ of social 
reality, but rather create, or belong to a separate ‘documentary reality’ 
(Atkinson and Coffey, 2011, p. 79; in Bryman, 2009, p. 554-555). Rather 
than using this to dismiss the use of documents altogether, Atkinson 
and Coffey have argued for certain measures that should be taken if 
documents are used as a means to gain understanding of a culture. 
Overlapping with Hadot’s imperative of objectivity, the first of these is 
that ‘documents should be examined’ in relation to ‘the context in 
which they were produced … their implied readership’ and ‘distinctive 
purposes’ (Atkinson & Coffey, 2011, in Bryman, 2012, pp. 554-556).  
 
Given that I sought to acknowledge the wider context of my various 
cultures, traditions, and philosophical sources and their written texts, 
and precisely because these are related to the former via their 
intentions and audiences, I began my research by considering them as 
both part and product of a culture that enables some form of insight 
into its history, identity, theories and practices (Nicholls, 2009b, pp. 
642-643). Further, I was also using past and present personal 
experience, physical practice and, in the context of these, conversations 
with others as additional sources of information. Thus, I was also 
implicitly accommodating Atkinson and Coffey’s second measure, by 
using additional materials to supplement the use of written literature 
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for description, interpretation and analysis (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011, 
in Bryman, 2012, pp. 554-556). 
 
To some extent, this second measure is inherently accommodated, and 
the arguments against the use of written texts somewhat mitigated by 
adopting the modern use of the term text in reference to pictures, 
music, events, behaviours, practices, and ‘anything, in fact, that carries 
cultural significance’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 717; Nicholls, 2009b, p. 643). I 
have found this broader understanding to be further supported in the 
preference of physical over theoretical study and practice in Zen, Budo, 
and Shiatsu; and the use of physical practice and experience advocated 
in postmodern approaches to autoethnography. Irrespective of the 
exact definition of the term text, my initial use of a variety of sources 
provided diverse perspectives that helped me to establish the value and 
adequacy of my initial notes and the labels I used to organise them.  
 
Closely related to these particularly theoretical reflections, writing 
experiments and conversations with teachers, friends, colleagues and 
supervisors provided me with the means ‘to ensure that’ my initial 
notes, ideas, and understandings regarding a theory, practice, or 
concept were adequately representative of these, and ‘reasonably based 
on the data’ I had accumulated (Nicholls, 2009b, p. 644). Still remaining 
relatively close to my raw notes, my first writing experiments took a 
variety of forms ranging from paragraphs, sections, and several pages of 
writing primarily shared with my supervisors, to blog posts on the 
website of my martial arts group, and even a self-published book on 
some of my thoughts on training and teaching martial arts at the time 
(Maric, 2014). Through sharing my thoughts and observations with 
others and reaching back out into the communities from which I had 
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drawn my notes, I received feedback and was thus able to discuss and 
reflect even further (Spry, 2011, pp. 128-134).  
 
As a result of this process, I was able to identify inconsistencies and 
gaps in my understanding, notes, section titles and thematic labels. I 
then returned to physiotherapy, Zen, Levinassian philosophy and the 
other fields to account for these by more specifically focusing my study 
and practice (Whitehead, 2005, p. 18). Where warranted, this led to me 
adding further notes, sections with titles corresponding to new 
concepts, and in some cases the beginning of a process of re-coding and 
re-thematising some of the concepts and sections, and regrouping the 
notes within them. In this way, the process of interpretation was a 
crucial part of my exploration, in that it began testing its most 
fundamental assumptions: that the cultures and philosophies I had 
personally been immersed in were of value to the critique and further 
development of physiotherapy theory and practice; and my initial 
descriptions and understanding of them and contemporary 
physiotherapy were sufficiently adequate for this purpose.  
Comparison & critique 
At this point, this list of key themes was still relatively general and 
rather extensive, thus making it necessary to continue refining it. The 
following questions were particularly important for this purpose:  
 
v Which theories and practices of Zen, Shiatsu, Budo, ancient and 
Levinassian philosophy, could be especially valuable to the 
further development of contemporary physiotherapy? 
v To which of its theories and practices in particular? 
v And how? 
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Generally this would be approached in a comparative analysis aimed at 
narrowing and refining essential thematic interpretations. On the one 
hand, comparative method is intrinsic to a wide variety of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches (Bryman, 2012; Ellis, Adams, Bochner, 2010; 
Grant & Giddings, 2002; Sangasubana, 2011). It is also implicit in any 
literature review, and inherent to autoethnography, for example, 
wherever personal and cultural experience are correlated and compared 
to cultural experience using literature or other methods (Ellis, Adams, 
Bochner, 2010). It is similarly implicit in critical inquiry and critical 
autoethnography, given that the necessary basis of critique is the 
comparison of one situation, phenomenon, theory, practice, and value, 
with another (Denzin, Lincoln, & Smith, 2008; Grant & Giddings, 2002; 
Nicholls, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Quicke, 2010). Émile Durkheim, one of 
the founders of modern sociology, even argued that ‘the comparative 
method’, and by extension, ‘comparative sociology is not a special 
branch of sociology; it is sociology itself’ (Durkheim, 1982, pp. 147, 
157).  
 
Levinas was highly critical of the major assumptions underpinning the 
comparative method, and the sociology, anthropology, and ethnology 
of Durkheim, Lévi-Strauss, and others (Levy, 2006; Strhan, 2016). 
Because his critique was based on his entire philosophy and relates to 
the overall methodological problem presented by it, I will defer 
commentary to subsequent chapters of this thesis where his philosophy 
is discussed in detail. Despite all of his criticisms however, there are 
several observations that can be made about his work that justify the 
use of comparison as a research method, beginning with the fact that he 
also argued that comparison is nonetheless necessary and inevitable 
despite all of its risks and shortcomings (Levinas, 1998b, p. 157).  
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A similar situation presents itself with Hadot, who for a long time 
considered himself ‘reticent’ and even ‘hostile to comparative 
philosophy’ and ‘comparativism’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 144; 2002, p. 278). His 
primary reason, not entirely unrelated to the reasons raised by Levinas, 
was somewhat more simplistic: ‘it could cause confusions and arbitrary 
connections’, which would thus not be objective and adequate, but 
subjective (Hadot, 2002, p. 278). Notwithstanding these concerns, 
Hadot’s work also provides support for the use of comparative methods 
in a variety of ways, and he admitted to having gradually changed his 
mind during later stages of his career (Hadot, 2009, p. 144). His 
eventual change of heart was a result of him observing ‘undeniable’ and 
‘troubling analogies between the philosophical attitudes of antiquity 
and those of the Orient’. This led him to argue that Oriental 
philosophies could ‘perhaps give us a better understanding’ and were in 
some cases ‘more enlightening than anything that can be found in 
Greek thought’. They could furthermore ‘just as’ or even more 
‘effectively inspire and guide philosophical practice’, because they have 
survived as active traditions until today (Hadot, 2009, p. 144; 2002, pp. 
277-279). 
 
Thus, Hadot’s work not only provides support for the use of 
comparative methods in general, but even a comparative approach to 
and with ancient Greek and Asian philosophies and practices. A 
growing range of studies drawing on Levinas’s work across a variety of 
fields similarly supports a comparative approach to and with his work in 
general. It has in fact been argued that Levinassian philosophy might be 
especially ‘well suited to engage philosophical worldviews that have 
developed outside of the Western orbit’ precisely because it is ‘critically 
situated’ with regard to it (Kalmanson, Garrett & Mattice, 2013, p.2). 
Due to this critical kinship and a range of thematic analogies, it has also 
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been argued that the comparative study of Levinas and Asian thought 
might ‘offer a fresh perspective … to explore or even expand on the 
Levinassian ethical project’ (Kalmanson & Mattice, p. 2), including 
‘what aspects of his overall project can be questioned and reformulated 
through his encounter with other philosophical traditions’ (Kalmanson, 
2010, pp. 205-206). 
Comparison   
Based on my research and reflections on the possibilities and 
challenges of comparative methods, I broadly looked for anything that 
appeared to be a correlation, whether terminological, theoretical, or 
practical, regardless of how obvious or implicit it seemed to be. These 
included: 
  
v overlaps, similarities, analogies, and commonalities; 
v contrasts, differences, and contradictions;  
v any repetitions, or regular patterns;  
v outliers that did not seem to correlate to anything else in any 
way.  
 
Terms put in italics in the above lists of interpretative themes on pages 
72–76 already represent some of the labels, themes, and terms that I 
not only found to be potentially valuable, but valuable because they 
seemed to overlap, contradict, build on each other, or present complete 
outliers when compared to the rest. In the process of separating and 
regrouping my notes in this way, I also began engaging in ways to 
explore and reflect on my initial intuitions regarding the similarities 
and differences between theories, and practices. As with my earlier 
writing, I once again took these back to others as a way to prevent 
insulation, gain external feedback, and be prompted to continue 
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reflecting on my first explorations in this area (Ings, 2013, p. 6; Jacobs, 
2008, p. 160; Spry, 2011, pp. 128-134).  
 
Conversations with my supervisors presented contrasting perspectives 
that challenged my thinking and writing, indicating theoretical and 
methodological inconsistencies, gaps, or alternatives, and potential 
pathways for solving problems encountered along the way. I thus had to 
revisit my writing and notes, and return to my studies and practice to 
make further, ‘select observations’ and take new notes specifically 
relevant to the issue at hand (Bryman, 2012, p. 420; Whitehead, 2005, p. 
18; Bryman, 2009, p. 420).  The back-and-forth processes between 
writing, discussion, and reflection was crucial to evaluate that 
correlations I made were sensible and ‘reasonably based’ on the 
material I had gathered (Nicholls, 2009b, p. 644). Given that my study 
was largely based on having observed and intuited many of these 
correlations in advance, this was established relatively quickly, 
providing reassurance that what I had collated so far provided a solid 
foundation for further exploration.  
Critique 
These reflections on the use of comparison as a research method, and 
particularly its potential benefits, established my writing focus at this 
point. Broadly speaking, I needed to define instances where comparison 
of theories and practices ‘perhaps gives us a better understanding’ of 
them (Hadot, 2002, p. 277). As is common in qualitative research, this is 
initially in the sense of gaining a more comprehensive understanding of 
a given phenomenon under study (Reeves, 2008, p. 2). Drawing on a 
variety of sources gave me: a deeper perspective on ontology and 
epistemology in general; how they have been construed in mainstream 
philosophy; the various positions that have been argued for by different 
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philosophers; their place in qualitative, healthcare research; Levinas’s 
understanding of ontology and epistemology; and the ontological and 
epistemological positions underpinning Zen.  
 
That it is possible and beneficial to engage in a comparative critique of 
the ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning 
mainstream healthcare from a Levinassian perspective has already been 
argued by a growing number of researchers in other healthcare 
professions (Broom, 2013; Burcher, 2011; Clifton-Soderstrom, 2003; 
Naef, 2006; Nortvedt, 2003, 2008; Surbone, 2005; Tiemersma, 1987). 
The particular importance of this comparative engagement and my 
reason for placing it at the beginning of Chapter Three, lies in the fact 
that these assumptions shape and lay the foundation for all further 
healthcare, and physiotherapy theories and practices. As this shaping 
role is especially visible in relation to the definition of physiotherapy’s 
aims and associated parameters, specifically, health and sickness, I 
contrast these with alternative conceptions of health, sickness, and 
healthcare aims as I develop my argument.  
 
This critique of ontology and epistemology has also been a major factor 
‘for reducing the vast amount of’ material I had gathered up to this 
point and making decisions about which additional theories and 
practices to include (Bryman, 2012, p. 577). That is, such fundamental 
critique revolves around the same general healthcare issues for 
physiotherapy theories and practices, establishing the pervasiveness 
and influence of its fundamental assumptions across other areas. Hence 
the need for this critique before moving on to the exploration of 
genuine potential alternatives. 
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Rather than being limited to a specific domain, this also provides the 
foundation for critique of theories and practices developed with respect 
to other domains. In Chapter Four, for example, I engage the same 
critical perspective in comparing current notions of professionalism, 
professional identity and physical therapy with alternative conceptions. 
In the process of doing so, I also apply this same critical perspective to 
contrast those alternative conceptions against one another and the 
alternative theories and practices I develop as a result.  
Subjectivity & eclecticism 
Effectively, this critical perspective was one such theory in itself, as 
much as its application was methodical practice. Thus, a concurrent 
function of my comparative writing was to explore which aspects of a 
theory or practice could be extended or reformulated through 
‘encounter with other philosophical traditions’ (Kalmanson, 2010, p. 
206). This is equally true for the critical perspective developed in 
Chapter Three and refined over subsequent chapters.  
 
In the context of qualitative healthcare research, ‘the generation of 
theory’ and ‘the refinement of theoretical categories’ are considered 
‘the ultimate aim’, and are meant to provide theoretical explanation 
and understanding of a relevant social or medical problem or 
phenomenon as a result of research (Bryman, 2012, pp. 419, 570; 
Nicholls, 2009a, p. 531). In critical inquiry more specifically, this theory 
is thought ‘to illuminate social structures and their oppressive effects in 
order to raise her/his own and the research subjects’ (Grant & Giddings, 
2002, p. 19). Depending on the approach taken by the researcher, this 
knowledge is either thought to raise awareness of these problems, 
inspire change, or even provide additional concrete theoretical and 
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practice ideas for change itself (Nicholls, 2009a, p. 530; Grant & 
Giddings, 2002, p. 19).  
 
In the present study, I aim to explore and develop both a novel critical 
perspective, and a range of concrete theoretical and practical 
alternatives. Because I did not begin this study with a readily 
formulated critical perspective, but this perspective was the result of 
extensive comparative engagement, it did not make sense for me to 
speak of critique as a separate activity from this development, nor 
distinct from the comparative process. Rather, it was precisely through 
this process that I was gradually able to develop my critical, clinical, 
scientific and educational theories and practices alike. That is, by 
continuously revising and rewriting my material, continuing discussion 
with supervisors, further study and practice, and ongoing theoretical 
reflections, I was gradually able to refine my developing theories and 
practices and add nuance and structure to my writing about them 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 559; Nichols, 2009b, p.644; Whitehead, 2005, p. 17). 
 
As is common in qualitative research, I developed a large portion of my 
critical and clinical theories and practices by combining one or more 
from my various sources into a kind of ‘amalgam’, using or adapting 
existing labels to refer to them, and dismissing others (Bryman, 2012, p. 
569-570; Nicholls et al., 2016). Hadot referred to this approach as 
eclecticism and argued that it ‘is potentially of great importance in the 
contemporary world’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 102). Finding support for it in the 
work of Henry David Thoreau and other philosophers, Hadot described 
eclecticism as consisting in ‘choosing what seems to be the best 
solution each time’ regardless of the philosophy, tradition, or culture it 
comes from (Hadot, 2005, p. 232; 2009, p. 103). Yet Hadot was aware 
that it is ‘often rather poorly viewed by philosophers because it might 
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result in an overly subjective, if not relativist, ‘anything goes’ approach 
to science and philosophy, as has been argued against Paul 
Feyerabend’s critique of epistemology (Hacking, 2010, p. xii; Hadot, 
2009, pp. 102-103).  
 
To understand why Hadot did not consider this objection to apply to his 
own work, it is necessary to recall that he only thought eclecticism to be 
important in the context of that ‘supplement, or surplus’ that is added 
to the effort of objectivity’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 68). In other words, it is the 
establishment of objectivity that prevents ‘arbitrary systematisation’, 
amalgamation, misappropriation and other ‘creative mistakes’ (Hadot, 
1995, pp. 71-77; 2009, p. 74). Though once established, amalgamation 
and systematisation are not only possible, but even desirable. Following 
Hadot, it is precisely in this way that, ‘at its best, comparative research 
opens up a space for creative contributions to larger … conversations’ 
as noted by Kalmanson and Mattice (2013) in relation to the 
comparative study of Levinas and Asian thought (p. 1). This meant that 
the final choice I made with regard to the theories and practices that I 
focused on and combined was based on: their relation to my personal 
experience, study, and practice; having established their relevance to 
my research question and aims; and in a second, overlapping 
movement, determined the adequacy and value of my initial 
descriptions and understanding of them as well as my critical and 
comparative engagement with them.  
 
At this point, it was especially important to consider ‘negative cases’ 
that would ‘defy early theorising’ and help further ‘refine or refute 
naïve ideas’ emerging through the study (Nicholls, 2009b, p. 644). In 
the context of qualitative research, accounting for the latter is thought 
to be crucial to ensure that a study’s findings, along with the theories 
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and practices developed in it, are as consistent as possible and have the 
necessary depth to make a substantial and justifiable ‘contribution to 
the literature relating to the research focus’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 580). In 
some approaches, theoretical saturation is defined as a point where not 
even a single case that is inconsistent with the developed theory can be 
found (Bryman, 2009, p.567). But even in its milder variations, 
accounting for negative cases is considered important to determine 
whether there are ‘no new research questions to be asked or no new 
comparisons to be made or no new theoretical insights to be developed’ 
and the theories and practices are sufficiently well developed (Bryman, 
2012, pp. 421, 452). 
 
The philosophical positions presented by the various cultures or 
practice-domains I research, have largely contradicting implications for 
the notion of theoretical saturation and its methodological pursuit. 
Because saturation is particularly relevant in relation to research 
findings, in this case, a set of ‘fully’ developed theories and practices, I 
was obliged to account for saturation at least in passing. I thus took the 
notion of theoretical saturation and working through negative cases as 
a general motivation to ensure that the theories and practices were 
coherent, consistent, and as well developed as possible.  
 
Despite his foregrounding of objectivity and theoretical coherence, 
subjective coherence is nonetheless intrinsic to Hadot’s eclecticism in 
two ways. Given their relation to the personal, these both resonate with 
the general, underlying tenets of autoethnography, and are relevant to 
a corresponding resolution of theoretical saturation in 
autoethnography, and its subsequent, final methodological stage. 
Hadot argued that ‘one can speak of a return to a subjectivity’ where 
the judgment of value that follows the judgment of objectivity is 
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concerned, and this return of subjectivity is, in fact, a methodological 
imperative in itself (Hadot, 2009, p. 68). The reasons that make this 
return of subjectivity and eclecticism possible and necessary are firstly, 
because ‘for the Greeks philosophy was not the construction of a system 
but a choice of life’ (Carlier, 2009, p. ix); yet secondly, ‘in the 
contemporary world … the schools no longer exist’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 
102). In other words, at a certain stage, before, during, or after having 
established the objectivity and adequacy of one’s insight into a given 
set of theories and practices, philosophy is bound to the philosopher 
making an ‘existential choice’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 140). The philosopher 
has to ‘make a judgment of value’ with regard to the theories and 
practices in question by asking: which of them have ‘a given 
significance for my life’ and which do not (Hadot, 2009, p. 68).    
 
Although abstracted from the specific field of its application, it is 
crucial to note that, at least in this sense, Hadot effectively argues for 
subjective choice as a methodological imperative in the study of ancient 
philosophy. And given that the ancient schools no longer exist, he 
advocates for this choice to be made eclectically, depending on ‘what 
seems to be the best solution’ in any given case or time (Hadot, 2009, p. 
103). Applied to the present study, this ultimately corresponds to 
acknowledging the researcher’s personal involvement in participation, 
observation, interpretation, comparison, critique, and now, the 
development and final presentation of theory and practice (Bryman, 
2012, pp. 574-575). More specifically, it is to acknowledge that an 
element of choice or subjective eclecticism is at play from the very 
start, and influences when saturation is achieved, as a result of the 
researcher making a judgment regarding what has or does not have ‘a 
given significance’ for the study (Hadot, 2009, p. 68).  
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This is not to say that I did not seek to establish coherence across the 
theories and practices that I have developed. Rather, it means that the 
theories and practices I have explored, developed, and am presenting 
here, ultimately reflect a range of very subjective and eclectic choices. I 
sometimes also made these irrespective of whether or not strict 
theoretical coherence was achieved in the theories and practices 
brought together, or whether one or more negative cases could be 
found to refute them. 
Practice 
The second way in which ‘coherence of the self’ is intrinsic to Hadot’s 
method and understanding of philosophy is already implied in the 
methodological imperative of subjective eclecticism. Due to its 
importance to Hadot and the present study, I decided to discuss and 
present it separately, as the final methodological imperative guiding my 
approach to autoethnography. For Hadot, the express purpose and 
central characteristic of philosophy as a way of life, and the very reason 
that warrants the return of subjectivity, is that the philosopher must 
put philosophy into practice, personally, in living. That is, it is not just 
a matter of choosing a set of possibly ancient theories and practices, 
but actualizing them in one’s life, thought, and actions (Hadot, 2009, p. 
68). 
 
Thus understood, ‘the ultimate aim’ of research may not be ‘to generate 
theory’, but rather, to practice it (Nicholls, 2009a, p. 531). It is ‘to 
transform the practitioner’s way of looking at the world’, but to do so 
with the particular purpose of transforming the philosopher’s self and 
‘his or her way of being’, doing, and living in the world (Chase, 2010a, p. 
2). By ‘addressing the student’s larger way of life’, the methodological 
imperative of practice thus implies that one should practice one’s 
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choice of philosophy in theory and practice, in one’s personal and 
professional life, and finally, demands ‘daily or continuous repetition’ 
(Sharpe, 2011, p. 5).  
 
Hadot’s strong emphasis on practice played a crucial role in my initial 
attraction to his work, resonating strongly with my own experiences 
and concerns regarding academic philosophy and research, as well as 
the strong emphasis placed on practice in Zen, Budo, and Shiatsu. To a 
large extent, the notion of a way of life and the methodological 
imperative of practice consolidated my hopes for this research, as a 
study aimed at developing physiotherapy theory and, especially, 
practice. It also meant that I needed to consider whether the theories 
and practices I would develop are practicable, and, ideally, evaluate by 
practising them in my personal, professional, clinical and scientific life. 
Dialogue 
The strong emphasis given by Hadot to practice in ancient philosophy 
implied that ‘even someone who neither wrote nor taught anything was 
considered a philosopher, if his life was, for instance, perfectly Stoic’ 
(Davidson, 1997, p. 199). Hadot argued that it is not necessary ‘to 
construct a philosophical system before’ one can ‘live philosophically’ 
(Hadot, 2002, p. 275). And finally, that in ancient philosophy, ‘the 
choice of a way of life has not been located at the end of the process of 
philosophical activity’ but ‘at the beginning, in a complex interrelation’ 
with a variety of historical, social, and personal attributes (Hadot, 2002, 
p. 3). 
 
This preference of practice and life over theoretical reflection, 
discourse, and writing is not meant to suggest the dismissal of thinking 
in favour of action, nor should they be thought of as opposing one 
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another. Rather, all practice is philosophical insofar as it corresponds to 
an underlying worldview, as much as discourse, ‘logic, physics, and 
ethics are’, or at least were and could once again be ‘both practical and 
theoretical’ (Davidson in Hadot, 2009, p. 94). Notwithstanding all 
emphasis on the way of life, ancient philosophers still thought of 
dialogue as an inseparable and particularly important part of 
philosophical life, and so to practice and live ‘as a philosopher also 
means to reflect, to reason, to conceptualise’, as well as engage in 
discourse and dialogue (Hadot, 2002, p. 280).  
 
The importance attributed to dialogue, a term that was also used to 
refer to the written texts of ancient philosophical schools, was based on 
the practical ‘formative, educative, psychagogic, and therapeutic’ 
potential it was perceived to have (Hadot, 2009, p. 54; 2002, p. 176). 
These functions also describe the effects that the various philosophies 
and practices have had for me as their student and reader in the context 
of this autoethnography. That is, they have been educative insofar as 
they provided me with insight and understanding. They were formative 
and psychagogic insofar as they shaped and reshaped my personal, 
professional, clinical and methodological thinking and practice alike. 
Beyond dialogue being merely advantageous, Hadot considered there to 
be an obligation for it as a means to ‘reveal and rationally justify this 
existential option, as well as this representation of the world’ (Hadot, 
2002, p. 3). To engage in spoken and written dialogue is thus also a 
requirement implied in the methodological imperative of practice.  
 
For Hadot, it was particularly important to write in a style accessible to 
a wider public and thus potentially relevant to everyday life. This 
contributed to my decision to use the term ‘passivity’ rather than 
‘radical passivity’ that is commonly used in Levinassian literature to 
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define its difference to the couplet active/passive (Hofmeyr, 2009; Wall, 
1999). I have also experimented with a variety of terms through the 
course of my writing and use several of them in synonymous fashion in 
the following chapters. Despite methodological difficulties encountered 
along the way and discussed in the following section and again in the 
final chapter, everything that I have written would not have been 
possible to inscribe were it not for it being embedded in my personal 
life. It is this that I have tried to convey in the opening sections of the 
thesis and within this chapter. 
Methodological difficulties 
One of the major methodological challenges was the simple 
consequence of not having a clearly predefined theoretical and 
methodological framework, but developing it along the way, with 
relatively little guidance from existing literature due to the specific 
combinations of research domains I aspired to. It could certainly be 
argued that I could have avoided this entanglement by choosing an 
existing, readily set out approach to autoethnography. However, the 
possibility of doing so would rely on one either coming to research as a 
tabula rasa, or being able to wipe away the philosophical baggage one 
brings to it. Both of these approaches seem incongruent with 
autoethnography as I have described here. Given that none of the 
philosophies and practices falling outside of the current boundaries of 
contemporary physiotherapy corresponds closely to any of the existing 
research paradigms, I was thus effectively left without choice with 
regard to circumventing this problematic. 
 
The greater subsequent challenge was to put the theoretical framework 
developed throughout the study into methodological practice. Defining 
in a sense the ‘heart’ of the present thesis, throughout the following 
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chapters I develop this theoretical framework while exploring how it 
might be put into clinical physiotherapy practice first and foremost. 
Levinas formulated this as a ‘methodological problem’ that results from 
the question as to ‘whether one can at the same time know and free the 
known of the marks which thematization leaves on it by subordinating 
it to ontology’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 7). He largely refrained from 
commentary on the possibility of converting his philosophical insights 
into practice. Yet he primarily sought for a resolution in a kind of 
‘ethical writing’ that consist in an effort ‘to enact within language’ a 
movement ‘between two orders of discourse’ that he referred to as ‘the 
Saying and the Said’ (Critchley, 1999, p. 165).  
 
I will briefly revisit this Levinassian theme in the final chapter and 
review where and how I might have or have not been able to do justice 
to this problem and its resolution, methodologically speaking. One of 
the most difficult areas has been to do so in the format and structure of 
the thesis. The remaining chapters follow a common structure of 
academic writing, moving from the now outlined methodological 
approach, to its application to the study’s central areas of inquiry, and 
their final revision and conclusion. 
Ethics and ethos 
In a sense not entirely unlike that of Levinas, Hadot argued that ‘the 
philosophical act transcends the literary work that expresses it; and this 
literary work cannot totally express’ what is lived in one’s daily life 
(Hadot, 2005, p. 234). He further cautioned that ‘by habit, distraction, 
and the concerns of life, philosophical discourse quickly becomes 
purely theoretical’ and lose its practical relevance’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 
110). It is therefore necessary to continually remember that discourse 
may well be part of and means to an end, but never exclusively so.  
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The greater and possibly more important part and means to this end 
remains the practice of one’s philosophies in one’s life, and thus more 
broadly, the development of a way of life, or ethos. As noted by 
Foucault, in ancient Greece and Rome, this ethos could and needed to 
be seen in someone’s entire ‘way of being and one’s way of behaving … 
in their attire, in their manner, their gait, the calm they display in 
responding to events, etc.’ (Foucault in Frost, 2009, pp. 540-541). In the 
context of this research, it meant that my primary focus always remains 
on the exploration and development of a physiotherapy practice, or 
ethos that I would have to put into practice in my personal and 
professional life, first and foremost.  
 
The present study also centers around ethics insofar as the practice-
ethos it seeks to develop is based on what is ultimately a conjoined 
notion of ethics derived from Levinassian ethics, the theories and 
practices of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, as well as Zen, Budo, 
and Shiatsu. As I develop this ethics in the following chapters, I 
emphasise its fundamental difference and, in many ways, opposition to 
normative, contractual and procedural ethics commonly thought of and 
prefixed in scientific research. Though this general mention of their 
difference presents an opportune moment to present a few practical 
decisions I have made with regard to conventional research ethics for 
the purpose of the thesis.  
 
My study, like most autoethnographies, does not involve any human 
participants other than the researcher (and supervisors). I was thus not 
required to submit an application for ethics approval to the Auckland 
University of Technology Ethics Committee (AUTEC). Following my 
initial exploration of autoethnography and the broad debate around 
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ethics in autoethnography, I nonetheless endeavoured to account for 
potential issues arising through the course of my study and its 
publication (Anderson, 2006; Ballard, 2009; Dauphinee, 2010; Roth, 
2009; Tolich, 2010; Wall, 2008). I thus compiled a few very general 
notions to guide my study, practice and writing during this research 
project: 
 
v The most basic of these guidelines, applying to academic 
research generally, was to gain an understanding of and 
continuously reflect on my methodology (Tolich, 2010).  
v I also went through all necessary protocols in fulfilling my 
responsibilities to research and the university, from my initial 
application to enrol in the doctoral program, to the proposal 
presentation and approval of my candidature after its first year, 
through regular progress reports (Tolich, 2010).  
v Given that my study did not involve human participants other 
than myself, and my supervisors in their customary role, 
informed consent was partially implied, and partially given in 
the supervisory agreement discussed and signed shortly after my 
enrollment in July 2011. My supervisors were also those I 
consulted primarily to gain feedback with regard to my 
theoretical reflection, conceptualization and writing.  
v Building on the fundamental assumption that the personal and 
cultural are inseparable from each other and, thus, every 
personal story or experience inevitably implicates others, I 
sought to ‘protect the privacy and safety of others by altering 
identifying characteristics such as circumstance, topics 
discussed, or characteristics like race, gender, name, place, or 
appearance’ (Ellis, Adams, Bochner, 2011; Morse, 2002; Tolich, 
2010).  
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v Finally, even though acknowledgement, transparency, and even 
vulnerability of the researcher are generally advocated as the 
particular strength of autoethnography, it is just as frequently 
pointed out that it carries risks for the researcher that warrant 
consideration (Adams & Holman Jones, 2008; Ellis & Bochner, 
2000; Gingrich-Philbrook, 2005). I thus sought to minimize the 
risks that could result from undue exposure of personal 
information by continuously refecting on this issue over the 
course of my writing.  
In summary 
In the present chapter, I have described the methodological approach 
for the thesis by drawing together my philosophical background and the 
qualitative research methodology of autoethnography. I began by 
describing how my philosophical background led me to identify 
autoethnography as a suitable methodology that I could adapt to the 
requirements of the study. I then outlined how matching philosophy 
and methodology consolidated the aim of my research as a study and 
development of the self, the other, and their relation in physiotherapy 
theory and practice. This consolidating clarified that description, 
critique, development, and practice were the focal areas needing to be 
addressed to achieve this aim. In relation to the early stages of the 
study, I discussed objectivity—or beginning with the personal—and 
relevance—or correlating the personal and the professional—as the first 
methodological imperatives guiding my approach to autoethnography. 
 
I then sought to describe the path that I have taken in following this 
central aim and methodological imperatives. This required describing 
the fields I engage and the methods I use for engaging and reflecting, as 
well as generating understandings for further analysis. I then 
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introduced two further methodological imperatives adapted from 
Hadot’s work that helped begin the process of organising, improving, 
and focusing the information collated in early stages of this project by 
making judgments of adequacy and value. The crux of my methodology 
then becomes comparative method—comprising comparison, critique, 
and eclecticism—in order to develop a critical perspective for the 
further analysis of existing theories and practices, and a theoretical 
framework for the development of physiotherapy practices based on 
fundamental ethics.   
 
Already an integral part of this framework, I introduced practice as the 
final methodological imperative. I argued that this imperative further 
consolidates the primary orientation of the study, yet simultaneously, 
emphasises the challenges encountered in the process of adapting 
autoethnography to the theories and practices developed throughout it. 
Given the potentially drastic implications of a comprehensive liaison 
along these lines, I finally decided in favour of the more practical, 
partial approach to their conjunction as presented in this chapter. 
Because they depend on a more detailed understanding of the theories 
and practices developed in the following chapters, and because I did not 
intend methodology to become the primary focus of my study, I will 
only revisit some of these implications and challenges in the concluding 
chapter of the thesis as part of my discussion of its strengths and 
limitations. Having briefly introduced practice, fundamental ethics and 
passivity as central to my critical perspective and development of 
physiotherapy, in the following chapter I continue to develop them as I 
contrast and compare these notions with physiotherapy’s identity and 
professional grounds. 
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Chapter Three  
Practice and Passivity 
 
Evil is not the inclusion of finite games in an infinite game, but 
the restriction of all play to one or another finite game (Carse, 
1986, p. 108). 
 
Once again, I have said that Being is evil in certain situations of 
my description: it is the man who is not in front of Being, but 
who eagerly encroaches on Being and who never has enough, 
who as every other creature besides, desire increase and always 
wants more, wants more immoderation (Field & Levinas, 
1993). 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I laid out the methodological framework 
developed for this study by tying together my philosophical background 
with the qualitative research methodology of autoethnography. I 
outlined how particularly Pierre Hadot’s notion of philosophy as a way 
of life and its inherent emphasis on practice helped consolidate the aim 
of my research as not only oriented toward the critique and 
development of physiotherapy theory, but its practice. The broader 
conjunction of autoethnography with Hadot’s and Levinas’s work and 
methods, and resonating elements from my other sources, additionally 
clarified the focal areas needing to be addressed to achieve this aim, as 
well as the path, methodological imperatives, and tools that would 
guide their exploration. 
 
Throughout this process, I also introduced the central notions of 
Levinas’s philosophy relevant to the study, and specifically, to the 
development of a critical perspective to be applied to the exploration of 
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physiotherapy and other theories and practices, as well as their 
revision, or further development. Having introduced these notions in 
the previous chapter, I now continue to explore and develop them by 
applying them to the theories and practices of contemporary 
physiotherapy.  I begin by discerning some of physiotherapy’s defining 
philosophical and practical foundations, and critically review these by 
drawing on Levinas’s critique of ontology and epistemology. I then 
propose a momentary reorientation of physiotherapy research and 
practice toward itself, particularly the self of the therapist. In this 
context, I  review and discuss the place of self-practice in contemporary 
physiotherapy, and juxtapose this with its role in ancient Greek and 
Roman philosophy, as well as Zen, Budo, and Shiatsu.  
 
In the final section of the chapter, I develop a range of self-practices. 
Due to their particular content and orientation, I eventually refer to 
them as practices of passivity by drawing on Levinas’s homonymous 
notion. I argue that they are feasible, practicable, and an instrumental 
first step toward a novel physiotherapy theory and practice.  I conclude 
the chapter by examining the effects and implications of these practices 
for the self of the therapist, and how these practices and the self thus 
affected can provide the foundation for the development of an 
otherwise approach to physiotherapy.  
The foundations of contemporary physiotherapy  
In line with a growing body of research, in Chapter One I argued that 
any attempt at reviewing and further developing physiotherapy theory 
and practice at a fundamental level requires the thorough scrutiny of 
the profession’s history, as well as its contemporary theories and 
practices (Kumar, 2010; Nicholls & Cheek, 2006; Ottoson, 2011; 
Terlouw, 2006). Particularly research from the emerging field of critical 
   102 
physiotherapy history suggests that contemporary physiotherapy is 
predominantly shaped by biomedical discourses. This positioning has 
also been argued as a critical element ensuring the profession’s 
longstanding position as a prominent voice in contemporary western 
healthcare (Gibson & Martin, 2003; Grant & Giddings, 2002, p. 14; 
Nicholls & Cheek, 2006). 
 
Biomedical discourses are underpinned by positivism, which 
emphasises ‘objectivity, systematic and detailed observation, testing 
hypotheses through experimentation, and verification’ (Grant & 
Giddings, 2002, p. 14). These, in turn, are understood to enable the 
discovery of facts about realities that are ‘equated with Truth’ and 
either inform or become the basis for further action (Grant & Giddings, 
2002, p. 13). The pervasive influence of positivism is clearly visible in 
evidence-based medicine (EBM) that has become a prominent practice 
paradigm in orthodox healthcare (Greenhalgh et al., 2014; Holmes et 
al., 2016; Miles et al., 2008).  
 
The influence of EBM is thought to reach into various aspects of 
contemporary physiotherapy such as its underpinning notions of 
health, the body, physical functioning and normality (Gibson, 2014; 
Jorgensen, 2000; Rosberg, 2000), movement and function (Allen, 2007; 
Cott, Finch, & Gasner, 1995; Gibson & Teachman, 2012; Wikström-
Grotell & Eriksson, 2012), evidence, knowledge, expertise (Shaw, 2012), 
and therapeutic touch (Bähr, Nicholls & Holmes, 2012). How then do 
the positivist underpinnings affect the profession’s aims and practice 
aspirations, and how might these be critiqued from the perspective of 
Levinas’s fundamental ethics and related understandings of ontology 
and epistemology? 
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The aim of physiotherapy 
According to the WCPT and Physiotherapy New Zealand respectively, 
the aim of physiotherapy is: 
 
to provide services that develop, maintain and restore people’s 
maximum movement and functional ability … at any stage of 
life, when movement and function are threatened by ageing, 
injury, diseases, disorders, conditions or environmental factors 
… help people maximise their quality of life, looking at physical, 
psychological, emotional and social wellbeing … in the health 
spheres of promotion, prevention, treatment/intervention, 
habilitation and rehabilitation (WCPT, 2016a). 
   
to help restore movement and function to anyone affected by an 
injury, disability or health condition (PNZ, 2017). 
 
The definitions of health, disease and disability underlying these 
formulations draw heavily on the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
definition of health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’ (WHO, 
1948), and the WHO’s International Classification of Functioning, 
Disability & Health (ICF).  This provides a tool for the comparison and 
measurement of ‘levels of health’, using ‘optimal health’ as its 
benchmark and ‘common metric…applicable to all people irrespective 
of health condition’ (WHO, 2002, p. 3). The WHO further defines 
disabilities as: 
 
an umbrella term, covering impairments, activity limitations, 
and participation restrictions. An impairment is a problem in 
body function or structure; an activity limitation is a difficulty 
encountered by an individual in executing a task or action; 
while a participation restriction is a problem experienced by an 
individual in involvement in life situations (WHO, 2014). 
 
These definitions are inherently positivistic because they rely on the 
belief that (i) impairments, disability, and activity limitations exist, are 
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‘real’ states or phenomena, and not subject to our imagination, (ii) are 
observable and, therefore, inherently objective (Grant & Giddings, p. 
14; Nicholls, 2009a, p. 527-528). This further allows for these 
phenomena to be accounted for numerically, and thus compare and 
measure them using ‘common metrics’, including through classification 
systems like the ICF (WHO, 2002, p. 3). Preference of such numerical 
methods also underlies the widespread use of quantitative research in 
biomedical literature that is homonymous with the scientific method 
associated with positivism. The belief in the objective existence of 
phenomena and the objectivity of their scientific findings leads to the 
belief in their universality and generalizability, which ultimately 
renders them ‘applicable to all people’ (WHO, 2002, p. 3). 
 
The WHO definitions of health and all variants of sickness also rely on 
the latter assumptions and are particularly pertinent to healthcare 
practice: their existence making both health and ‘the absence of 
disease’ attainable, and thus available as an aspirational aim of 
healthcare (WHO, 1948). Their distinction from each other further 
points to the underlying reductionism characteristic of positivism and 
the scientific method. This reductionism underlies many health 
professional specialisations and further underpins the view that 
‘physical, mental, and social well-being’ can be distinguished from each 
other and thus treated separately (WHO, 1948).  
 
It is important to keep in mind however, that this reductionism is only a 
variant of the belief in the independent existence of object-phenomena 
that allows their identification and distinctness from each other and the 
subject-observer. The gradual progression from general to specific 
implied in reductionism also underlies the definition of impairment as 
‘a problem in body function or structure’ (WHO, 2014); and hence 
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physical movement and functioning as an ‘essential element of health 
and wellbeing’, which in turn underpins the physiotherapy profession’s 
name-giving, historical specialization on physical therapies (WCPT, 
2015a, p. 3). These definitions evidence the underlying, positivist belief 
in their distinguishability, and the profession’s ongoing, primary focus 
on the physical. 
 
Hadot discussed another characteristic of positivism was discussed by 
Hadot in The Veil of Isis that he called the Promethean and the Orphic 
attitude in reference to two alternative approaches to nature (Hadot, 
2006). Playing on the Greek myth in which Prometheus stole fire from 
the gods and gave it to the humans for their benefit, Hadot argued that 
the eponymous attitude is defined by a utilitarian approach to nature in 
which knowledge is sought for human purposes. According to Hadot, 
the Promethean attitude underlies many historical and modern human 
endeavours including the natural and medical sciences that display an 
effort to manipulate nature. This corresponds to positivism insofar as to 
arrive at and implement such useful knowledge, nature must be 
objectively observable and allow for human manipulation (including 
observation, measurement, knowing). 
 
In extension, I argue that the desire to manipulate natural phenomena 
underpins western science and biomedicine. In relation to 
physiotherapy, lack or loss of ‘maximum movement and functional 
ability’, for example, is the principal motivation and justification for all 
research and practice (WCPT, 2016a). Similarly, the notion of evidence-
based practice and its progression from diagnosis to aetiology, 
prognosis, and treatment, expresses the utilitarian orientation of 
healthcare science and practice that grows from the underlying 
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to be perceived as undesirable however, it is necessary for it to be 
identifiable, thus returning to the underlying characteristics of 
positivism and affirming the paradigm’s close relation to healthcare.  
 
According to Cave (2012), virtually all of science, but specifically 
medicine ‘emerged from the pursuit of indefinitely increasing lifespans’ 
and the associated identification of death, ageing, and sickness as 
undesireable (p.310).  It could further be argued that the desire to 
elongate lifespans has shifted the focus towards ‘prevention… as a key 
component’ of 21st century physiotherapy (APA, 2014; Deusinger et al., 
2014; Hitchcock, 2014). In consequence, ailments that have previously 
been considered an intrinsic part of ageing, and even ‘ageing’ and 
‘infirmity’ themselves, are now increasingly considered undesirable 
‘degenerative and chronic conditions’ that ‘threaten’ health and are to 
be prevented (Armstrong, 2014; Deusinger et al., 2014; Kreiner & Hunt, 
2014). Recognition of these undesirable phenomena therefore 
fundamentally shapes the aims of contemporary physiotherapy.  
 
Critically, these foundations not only orientate subsequent practices, 
but are themselves already practices. That is, a Promethean or positivist 
‘view’ entails observation, identification, definition, and manipulation, 
thus situating the observer-practitioner and observed-object in a 
relation that makes these epistemological practices possible. It is, 
therefore, not only a set of theories and practices that logically 
correspond with one another, but also relations of subjects and objects, 
and these relations correspond with a particular ontological 
understanding of the subject-self and object-other. In positivism, this 
self is understood and acts on the world through gaining and applying 
knowledge to it, while the object-other of research and practice is  
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characterised by lacking such knowledge and skills (Grant & Giddings, 
2002, p. 14-15). 
 
These epistemological characteristics of positivism are clearly visible in 
extant definitions of physiotherapy. Physiotherapy New Zealand, for 
example, states that ‘a physio will use their in-depth knowledge of how 
the body works, combined with hands-on clinical skills, to assess, 
diagnose and treat your symptoms’ (PNZ, 2017). Adding to this, the 
definition provided by the WCPT highlights that the profession is not 
only ideologically but legally tied to the theoretical, practical, and 
relational foundations of positivism, stating that ‘Physical therapists 
are … professionally required to: undertake … examination; evaluate 
the findings; formulate a diagnosis, prognosis and plan’ and intervene 
accordingly (WCPT, 2016a).  
The ethics of physiotherapy 
Having outlined the way in which the aim and definition of 
physiotherapy advocated by the WCPT and PNZ express the ontological 
and epistemological foundations of the profession, I now turn to their 
further exploration and critique. Drawing on Levinas’s critique of 
ontology and epistemology, I argue that these foundations contradict 
its fundamentally ethical motivation, which is equally implied in its aim 
and definition. This aligns with research exploring the implications of 
Levinas’s philosophy for other healthcare professions but develops the 
argument more specifically in relation to physiotherapy theory and 
practice (Armstrong, 1999; Burcher, 2011; Clifton-Soderstrom, 2003; 
Naef, 2006; Nortvedt, 2003; Surbone, 2005). 
 
To reiterate, Levinas used the terms ontology and epistemology to 
describe any ‘relation to otherness that is reducible to comprehension 
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or understanding’, or in other words, any relation in which ‘all forms of 
otherness’ are reduced in such a way that they can be grasped 
conceptually, comprehended and thus manipulated by an ultimately 
superior, knowing ego (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 11). By 
referring to them as a relation rather than merely theories, Levinas 
emphasised their intrinsic, immediate practical nature. That is, it is the 
way in which they always already coincide with a reductive relation to 
the other, in the act of comprehension, that enacts that totalization that 
Levinas referred to as ‘the first act of violence’ (Beavers, 1999, p. 3). In a 
Levinassian sense, this radically fundamental act that further ‘occurs 
whenever I limit the other to a set of rational categories, be they racial, 
sexual, or otherwise’ lies at the heart of all historical and modern day 
acts of human violence (Beavers, 1999, p. 3). 
 
This is crucial for the critique of physiotherapy, because it infers the 
fundamental violence of the profession’s theoretical and practical 
foundations, and implies that they are not, in fact, ethical in the sense 
to be developed here. According to Levinas, the other is precisely ‘not 
given as a matter for reflection ... not a phenomenon but an enigma, 
something ultimately refractory to intentionality and opaque to … 
understanding’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 8). Thus, practices 
that approach the other as a knowable phenomenon reduce and limit 
the other to epistemological categories, thereby denying their un-
encompassable otherness. In the practice of physiotherapy, this 
happens whenever practitioners impose professional categories on the 
other, beginning, even, with fundamental definitions of health, 
sickness, the use of specialised diagnostic labels such as rotator cuff 
tendinopathy, plantar fasciitis, and similar, but also the practice of 
diagnosis itself (Brukner & Kahn, 2009, pp. 108-126, 201-677).  
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In a sense resonating with Levinas’s characterisation of the other as 
unknowable, French physician and philosopher George Canguilhem 
argued that the notions of The Normal and the Pathological developed in 
the medical sciences do not represent ontological realities, but rather 
epistemological constructs (Canguilhem, 1989). As such, he discerned 
these constructs as based on two underlying epistemological practices: 
firstly, the establishment of ‘constants or invariants’ as a means for 
‘metrical determination’, because ‘the science of an object exists only if 
this object allows measurement and causal explanation’ (Canguilhem, 
1989, p. 221); and secondly, the identification of biological norms with 
mathematical averages building on the belief that natural phenomena 
can be represented numerically.  
 
Canguilhem argued that there is no evidence for such constants, 
invariants, or states in biological life, and that they can neither be 
justifiably established, nor rendered universally valid using 
mathematical concepts. Rather, biological life presents itself as a highly 
dynamic process of continuous change, and it is this process of change, 
alongside the ability to adapt to and tolerate these changes that should 
more accurately be considered as representative of health. Thus 
understood, it could be argued that pathological states like, e.g. 
inflammations, can equally be identified as adaptations to novel 
circumstances, and therefore be considered ‘healthy’, rather than 
pathological, simply because they deviate from some defined ‘normal’, 
or healthy state (Canguilhem, 1989, p. 198). Health is, therefore, 
neither a measurable, normative or objective state, nor pathology a 
deviation from it (Canguilhem, 1989, p. 186). Instead, both are in a 
constant process of change and diversification over time, space, 
circumstance, and from subject to subject, and thus their categorization 
as positive or negative first and foremost qualitative and subjective.  
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Canguilhem referred to the combination of the subject’s ability to 
change or establish new forms of life, and assign normative values to 
them as the subject’s normative capacity, and argued that it is much 
rather the presence or loss of this capacity that might be thought of as 
health or sickness rather than any particular state defined as such 
(Canguilhem, 1989, pp. 183-184). Critically, in Canguilhem’s view this 
loss can be genuine, that is personal, or from within, or they can be 
spurious, synthetic, or from without.  From this perspective, the 
healthcare profession’s today, and their professional categories, 
theories and practices effectively rob or undermine the subject’s 
normative capacity and render it sick, or incapable, irrespective of 
whether or not a genuine loss is factually present. This notion echoes a 
‘rapidly growing movement, led jointly by clinicians, academics and 
patients’ that ‘aims to reduce harm from overdiagnosis, overscreening, 
and overtreatment’ (Greenhalgh et al., 2014, p. 6).  
 
The qualifier ‘over-’ however, implies an agreement with these 
practices and their underlying foundations in a general sense, whereas 
the present, more fundamental critique does not. It is in this more 
radical sense that I argue Canguilhem’s work resonates with a 
Levinassian critique of ‘modern medicine’s imposition of scientific 
language on illness experiences which universalizes persons into 
general categories before understanding their specificity’ (Clifton-
Soderstrom, 2003, p. 459). Similarly resonant, the following quote by 
Portuguese writer and philosopher Fernando Pessoa (1888–1935) helps 
to elucidate its overall sensibility and central tenets by using yet again 
slightly different terms:  
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Helping someone, my friend, is tantamount to treating them as if 
they were incapable; If that person is not incapable, then you are 
making him incapable, or else assuming that he is incapable. 
You are, firstly, committing an act of tyranny and, secondly, an 
act of scorn. On the one hand, you are limiting the freedom of 
another person, on the other, you are basing yourself, at least 
unconsciously, on the idea that someone else is worthy of scorn 
and unworthy or incapable of freedom (Pessoa, 1997, p. 103). 
 
In summary, I argue that the critique presented here is crucial as a first 
step toward the potential realignment with an ethical motivation that I 
will pursue in the present thesis and, as has been argued, underlies all 
medical and therapeutic practice (Burcher, 2011; Clifton-Soderstrom, 
2003; DeSongh, 2008; Holm, 2006; Larner, 2008; Myhrvold, 2006; 
Nortvedt, 2003, Surbone, 2005, Tiemersma, 1987). In addition to 
exposing a primary act of violence in medical practice and its 
ontological and epistemological foundations, this critique also carries a 
range of more practical implications. The potentially most drastic one, 
and the one I will explore in the following would be a cessation, or at 
least momentary interruption of our extant scientific and therapeutic 
practices. Given that these have revealed themselves as an 
incapacitation and immobilisation that reduces or restricts the other 
and the other’s infinite otherness, constant change, or movement, I 
argue that this seems particularly pertinent to a profession whose 
precise aim is to ‘develop, maintain and restore people’s maximum 
movement and functional ability’ (WCPT, 2016a).  
 
Such a drastic interruption undoubtedly appears antithetical to the 
common therapeutic intuition that we have to know, and on its basis, 
do something to achieve this aim. Throughout the remainder of the 
chapter I argue that it is nonetheless worthwhile to consider this 
interruption for the purpose of exploring and developing other avenues 
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for theory and practice. In a later section of this chapter for example, I 
explore the letting go of practice as one such possibility to integrate a 
Levinassian sensibility into physiotherapy. Before doing so however, I 
first turn toward a broader implication of this interruption that 
provides the context for the subsequent development of more specific 
practices.   
Reorienting physiotherapy practice  
 
Why not define the philosopher not as a professor or a writer 
who develops a philosophical discourse, but, in accordance with 
the concept which was constant in antiquity, as a person who 
leads a philosophical life? (Hadot, 2002, p. 275). 
 
In very general terms, the interruption of our scientific and therapeutic 
practices in their current form implies a step back from conventional 
forms of grasping and manipulation of nature, the other, or specific 
conditions of the other by acquiring or applying knowledge. But while 
this introduces a rift between the self and other, I argue that it also 
opens a space for an inward turn of sorts, including an exploration of 
self-practice as an alternate arena for professional engagement. In the 
present section, I discuss the hitherto role of self-practice in 
contemporary physiotherapy and juxtapose this with its understanding 
and place in ancient philosophy, Zen, Budo, and Shiatsu to consider 
novel possibilities for physiotherapy practice. 
Professional practice 
Though they are not referred to in these terms, it could be argued that a 
variety of practices of the self are already an intrinsic part of 
professional practice, beginning with the development of physical 
therapists through professional education. The WCPT specifies that 
education ‘should equip [physical therapists] to practice without 
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limitation within the scope of practice defined in individual countries’, 
and encompass the ‘completion of a curriculum that qualifies the 
physical therapist for practice as an independent autonomous 
professional … [that this] will enable physical therapists to attain the 
knowledge, skills and attributes described in the guidelines for physical 
therapist professional entry level education’ (WCPT, 2015b, p. 1). Here, 
professional education is concerned with the development of 
professionals that are necessarily characterised by a particular 
professional identity, or self, characterised by its professional 
‘knowledge, skills and attributes’.  
 
Following the development of entry level professional identity, 
professional education is deemed a requirement and practised as 
Continuing Professional Development (CPD). Defined as ‘the 
systematic, ongoing structured process of learning that underpins 
professional practice … it enables physical therapists … to maintain, 
develop and enhance their personal and professional skills, knowledge 
and behaviours, and ongoing competence to practice’.  It is argued that 
this ‘advances practice, service delivery and ultimately outcomes’ 
(WCPT, 2011a, p. 2). The definition of CPD further promotes the idea 
that professional identity needs to be practised on an ongoing basis to 
be maintained, developed and enhanced; that certain ‘personal and 
professional behaviours’ are part of this identity; and ‘competence’ lays 
the foundation for the quality, efficacy, and advancement of practice 
(WCPT, 2011a, p. 2).  
 
As a process of development of professionals, it could be said that 
undergraduate education represents a time of self-transformation or at 
least the development of an additional identity. Whether as a 
replacement or addition, the professional self being developed is both 
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clearly described and progressively distinguished from the personal self. 
While the WCPT’s definition of CPD also implies that personal skills, 
knowledge, and behaviours are supplementary to professional ones, 
based on my experience in both undergraduate and postgraduate 
physiotherapy education, I argue that this supplementation 
nonetheless affirms their underlying distinction and the gradual 
exclusion of the personal from the professional. 
 
This supplementary and subordinate relationship is similarly evident in 
self-reflective practice and supervision, with the latter advocated as a 
self-reflective practice aimed at ‘helping the development of a 
professional identity’ (PNZ, 2012b, p. 1), and the former as an ‘activity 
in which a person reflects on the process and outcomes of a situation 
with the aim of improving or affirming their professional practice’ 
(PBNZ, 2011, p. 22). Thus, supervision and self-reflection are practices 
based on existing, professional theories and practices of the self, and 
are aimed at aligning the ‘person’ with these theories and practices, 
rather than encouraging the practitioner to reflect on them in a more 
fundamental sense.  
 
Another type of self-practice encompassed in professional education is 
peer-to-peer practice. This is because the ‘complex skills’ pertaining to 
professional identity and practice are ‘introduced and then developed 
through practice on peers…prior to application in the clinical context’ 
(WCPT, 2011, p. 8). Specifically, practice with peers is self-practice in 
two respects: firstly, for the practitioner developing their skills on peer-
clients, and secondly, for the peer-client being practised on, who is 
developing their professional knowledge of the client-perspective and 
experience.  
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The PBNZ ‘Code of Ethics’ further states that ‘physiotherapists take 
responsibility to maintain their own health and wellbeing’ (PBNZ, 2011, 
p. 18). Yet in this context, self-practice still remains in service of 
professional practice on or for others, rather than on or for the self, in 
the strictest sense of the term. Though paradoxically, self-practice also 
lies at the heart of physiotherapists’ efforts to re/habilitate clients’ 
abilities to maintain their own health and wellbeing. Thus, notions like 
helping others help themselves also exist in physiotherapy, for 
example, in framing and directing practice to support the capacity of 
the body and its tissues to adapt and self-repair (Mueller & Maluf, 
2002).  
 
Of particular, historical interest to physiotherapy, the German 
Naturheilkunde movement that briefly shared a name with the latter 
and played a large role in its development in continental Europe, 
explicitly advocated the mobilisation of ‘patient’s natural healing 
powers (Lebenskraft) by means of physical agents such as water, air, 
light, movement’ (Brauchle, 1971; Terlouw, 2006, p. 56). This example 
highlights that physiotherapy is not alone in this effort, but that 
supporting the body’s natural healing properties is a common thread 
across many historical and existing healthcare professions, including 
naturopathy, the current form and denominator for Naturheilkunde, as 
well as osteopathy, and chiropractic (Ottoson, 2011). As another 
example pertinent to the present study, Shiatsu practice is likewise 
thought to aim at ‘joining forces with a person’s natural healing ability’ 
(Kawada & Karcher, 2009, p. 1).  
 
One could argue that the ultimate goal of these practices is for the 
client to engage in the advocated self-practices ‘across the lifespan’ 
(WCPT, 2015c). This emphasis has been popularised in recent years in 
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the field of health promotion, where patient education, health beha-
viour and lifestyle change have taken up ‘established and uncontested 
position[s] not only in health research but among policymakers, the 
media and the public more generally’ (Cohn, 2014, p. 157). It can also 
be seen in the WCPT’s definition of health promotion as ‘the 
combination of educational and environmental supports for actions and 
conditions of living conducive to health’ and its purpose as ‘to enable 
people to gain greater control over the determinants of their own 
health’ (WCPT, 2015, p. 4).  
 
It has, however, been pointed out that the exact role of physiotherapists 
in health promotion is not entirely clear, and that there is a consequent 
gap in the practice of health promotion in physiotherapy (Taukobong, 
Myezwa, Pengpid, & Van Geertryuden, 2013; Verhagen & Engbers, 
2008). Yet despite this lack of clarity, both the WCPT and PNZ argue 
that ‘health promotion and injury prevention education are core 
components of any physiotherapy discharge plan’ (PNZ, 2012a, p. 26). 
This underscores that clients are to engage in certain practices across 
their lifespan, whereas therapists are primarily educators aiming at 
‘modifying people’s health beliefs’ and behaviours ‘through education 
initiatives’ (Cohn, 2014, p. 158). 
 
Thus, even this initial overview suggests that at least two types of self-
practice are already well established in physiotherapy: self-practices for 
clients learned from professionals and subsequently practised across 
their lifespan; and self-practices for professionals aimed at developing 
and maintaining their professional identity, knowledge, skills and 
competence about client’s practices. The question is therefore not so 
much whether self-practice has a place in contemporary physiotherapy, 
   117 
but rather, whether an expansion of its understanding and application 
is possible, and how this might be justified.  
 
What can nonetheless be said about the contemporary approach to self-
practice from the critical perspective developed so far, is that it 
perpetuates the same violence that pervades its foundations. That is, 
distinguishing practice in the present sense further strengthens the 
distinction between the knowing and educating professional, and the 
‘discrete, stable, homogeneous, observable and, crucially, measurable’ 
client (Cohn, 2014, p. 159). And, similarly, professional self-practice 
oriented toward the development of a professional identity undoes the 
potential otherness of therapists to practitioners to the confines of a 
group identity, or sameness. In other words, the assimilation of 
individual professionals into a group identity reduces or subordinates 
their fundamental, personal difference and otherness. What remains as 
a professional identity presents a restricted category that is equally 
irreconcilable with a Levinassian notion of ethics and a profession that, 
as discussed before, aims to maximise rather than restrict movement 
and functional ability.  
 
Further exacerbating this, the current distinction and types of self-
practice limit the possibilities of broadening the theory and variations 
of self-practice in physiotherapy. From this perspective, they provide 
additional exemplary support to one of the central theses of the present 
study: that the professions current foundations restrict broadening and 
change at a fundamental level, hence contradicting their underlying 
ethical motives and aspirations. This broadening however, is the precise 
aim of the present work, motivated by its second central thesis: that 
drawing on other philosophies and practices can revive this underlying 
agency and provide examples for otherwise theories and practices. 
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Physiotherapy as a way of life 
The first possible alternative to the physiotherapy profession’s 
conventional placement of self-practice that I propose, is to reconsider 
the self-practices currently relegated to clients as a central part of 
professional self-practice. A physiotherapists’s practice would then not 
only consist in instilling self-practice in clients, but in engaging in the 
same practices, in the same way, and for the same purposes. The 
medical profession already has some implicit historical relation to this 
approach through the Oath of Hippocrates, which recommends that the 
physician lives according to their ‘diet’ so as to embody proof for the 
advice given to clients (Modified from Repschläger, 2011, p. 20).  
 
The principle of incorporating one’s philosophy into one’s own life lay 
at the heart of Hadot’s critique of professional or academic philosophy, 
and the most central characteristic of the alternate approach to 
philosophy that he explored was that it ‘aimed at addressing the 
student’s larger way of life … demanding daily or continuous repetition’ 
(Sharpe, 2011, p. 5). Hadot argued that this approach was as necessary 
now as ever, and that it was both ‘still “actual” and can always be 
reactualized’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 275). As with medicine, however, Hadot 
also recognised that ancient Greek and Roman philosophy was not 
sufficiently ‘actual’ and that it might be necessary to research other 
‘models of life’ beyond the confines of occidental thinking, as for 
example,‘in the oriental philosophies’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 279). 
 
Taking Shiatsu as one such example, one can consonantly find that 
‘self-maintenance and personal development are ongoing requirements 
for the Shiatsu practitioner’ (McClelland, 2011, p. 98). As is customary 
in many courses worldwide, in my own training, I was thus also required 
to receive treatments throughout the course. While undoubtedly aimed 
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at improving our own practice, it was clearly stated that this also helped 
us to develop the habit of practising what we would recommend to our 
clients. Shiatsu hence differs from physiotherapy, insofar as it offers a 
comprehensive ‘mixture of philosophy, self-help and professional 
expertise, exercises and stretches, thoughts on living’ and a ‘way of life’ 
that is to be lived by practitioners in at least equal measure as by clients 
(Kawada & Karcher, 2009, p. 3). 
 
Closer yet to Zen practice, it is similarly argued that ‘the most 
important point in Buddhism is that each of us practices it ourselves. 
We must apply every teaching and every practice to ourselves’ 
(Uchiyama, 2004, p. 149). Consistent with this emphasis, Zen and 
martial arts teachers have long been admired particularly if and when 
they enact their philosophies throughout their lives, and their 
biographies continue to be published and used as inspiration and 
guidance for study and practice precisely for this reason (Braverman, 
2003; Chadwick, 1999). The inscription on Kashima Shinryu master 
Kunii Zen’ya’s tombstone for example, states that ‘the master prayed 
regularly … never laying aside his diligence. Awake or asleep he kept his 
sword … Into his seventy-second year’ – the year of his death – ‘he 
practised martial art morning and evening’ (Friday & Humitake, 1997, 
pp. 48-49).  
 
As I have tried to show, the importance of practice across the lifespan is 
already recognised and considered critical both as a crucial element of 
client’s and professional’s self-practice. What the particular emphasis 
of the latter traditions adds to this however, is the import they place on 
the professional, or educator to engage in the same practices as the 
students throughout their life; and on exactly this as the fundamental 
professional and educational practice. Following Hadot and the Asian 
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traditions featured in this thesis, it is precisely through self-practice 
that a theory and practice can become a way of life, and, as such, 
become the foundation for one’s professional practice. We could thus 
rephrase Hadot’s question regarding the redefinition of the philosopher 
and ask:  
 
Why not define the physiotherapist not as a professional who 
develops and maintains therapeutic theories and practices and 
applies them to others, but as a person who practices them on 
her/himself across their lifespan, and in this sense, leads a 
physiotherapeutic life? 
 
The import of this question and the recontextualization of self-practice 
that it suggests lies in the challenge it presents to the hierarchical 
structure between therapist and client that pervades contemporary 
physiotherapy and the ontological and epistemological relation. This 
builds on the argument that, in the case of ancient philosophy, ‘even 
someone who neither wrote nor taught anything was considered a 
philosopher, if his life was, for instance, perfectly Stoic’ (Davidson, 
1997, p. 199). Applied to physiotherapy, this would mean that even 
someone who neither learned nor received physiotherapy but lives a life 
according to the theories and practices usually reserved for clients 
could be considered a physiotherapist. Redefining the physiotherapist 
as a practitioner in this sense thus presents a radical questioning of the 
profession, its status and practice, given that all of these are commonly 
built on and defined by the accumulation and application of 
professional knowledge. 
 
The associated assumption underpinning the argument that ‘real 
change must begin inside myself’ is not exclusive to Hadot’s work, but 
can also be found in Zen philosophy and its application to other fields 
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(Brandon, 1982, p. 94). In the context of western healthcare, the notion 
of the ‘wounded healer’, first introduced by the psychotherapist Carl 
Gustav Jung in 1951, is similarly grounded in the idea that somebody 
who has suffered from a particular problem is better positioned to help 
someone suffering from a similar one. According to Jung, it was ‘the 
physician’s experience of being wounded’ that not only led to the 
development of a mutual, experiential understanding, but ‘makes him a 
brother of the patient, rather than his master’ (Daneault, 2008, p. 1219). 
It has thus been argued that this perspective not only ‘offers the 
possibility that physicians’ health’ can contribute to healthcare 
practice, but does so by additionally mitigating the hierarchical, 
epistemological relation between client and therapist (Daneault, 2008, 
p. 1219). 
  
So far, the notion of the wounded healer has, perhaps, been most 
prominently researched and integrated into psychotherapy and related 
professions, though it has also made its way into many other healthcare 
domains, including nursing and general medical practice (Conti-
O’Hare, 2002; Dunn, 2015; van den Brink, 2013, p. 85). Whilst it has 
been argued that seeking and receiving professional help, or engaging 
in therapeutic self-practice, ‘should carry no more stigma or alarm than 
the football player who needs physiotherapy to relieve his pain and 
keep him competent for his task’ however, evidence of a more 
fundamental, professional integration of such practices remains scarce 
within physiotherapy (Zigmond, 1984, pp. 70-71).  
 
In my own experience of having several ‘successfully rehabilitated’ 
several injuries myself, telling my clients about them has repeatedly 
prompted many of them to say that this greatly reassured their 
confidence in me, as well as their belief in a positive course of their own 
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rehabilitation. While this is only anecdotal evidence, its simple point 
here is that ‘the notion of the wounded healer’ and its wide spread 
across a variety of traditions, geographic locations, times, and 
healthcare professions supports the argument that an integration of 
self-practice in the sense I have tried to develop here could be 
beneficial to contemporary physiotherapy (Daneault, 2008, p. 1218). 
Further historical support for this can also be found in ancient Greek 
philosophy and medicine, for example in Plato’s statement that ‘the 
most skilful physicians, rather than being models of good health, are 
those who have suffered from all sorts of illnesses’ (Daneault, 2008, p. 
1218). While Jung went so far as to argue that as much as ‘a good half of 
every treatment … consists in the doctor's examining himself’, I argue 
that at least some integration of self-practice into physiotherapy might 
be warranted on this basis (Jung in A. Stevens, 2011, p. 170). 
 
Nonetheless, such a reconsideration of self-practice comes with a 
number of considerable challenges. Conceiving self-practice as 
fundamental to physiotherapy, for example, further challenges the 
conventional role and hierarchical authority of the professional, by 
opening the possibility of viewing non-professionals as equals, or 
perhaps even more qualified than trained professional. In a general 
sense, this aligns with central concerns of critical, radical, and feminist 
research, insofar as it is ‘explicitly political … aimed at emancipation’ 
and asking ‘questions regarding social values and norms, institutional 
priorities, and socio-cultural power relations’ (Gibson & Teachman, 
2012, p. 475). 
 
Already well-established across a variety of healthcare professions, 
critical research is now increasingly making its way into physiotherapy, 
rehabilitation, and the closely related field of disability studies. In their 
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study of walking and disability, Gibson and Teachman argued that 
‘dominant discourses’ in rehabilitation ‘risk perpetuating particular 
ideas about disabled people, what they should be, do, and value, that 
closely aligns with western notions of normative bodies and 
independence’ (Gibson & Teachman 2014, p. 1332). Such discourses, 
they argue, ‘risk privileging or discrediting particular ways of being and 
doing’ (ibid, p. 1329). It should be evident that this is of particular 
import to physiotherapy because it locates the causes of impairment ‘in 
anatomical or physiological departures from “normal” that need to be 
“fixed” or cured’, which in turn justify the existence and ‘reliance on 
specialized professionals to diagnose and treat these conditions’ (Roush 
& Sharby, 2012, p. 1716). 
 
The present thesis aligns with these arguments and their challenge to 
dominant, hierarchical discourses, structures and relations.  Drawing on 
Levinas and my other sources, it additionally contributes a perspective 
unconsidered to date. In a study drawing on Levinas’s and 
Canguilhem’s work in relation to disability DeSongh (2008) has 
explored the convergence of disability studies and the dis/ability of 
language and philosophy. Different from this, my focus in drawing 
together Levinas’s and Canguilhem’s perspectives here, was on their 
potential implications for a reconsideration of dis/ability to 
physiotherapy or other healthcare practices. Beginning with the 
therapeutic relation, this critique and otherwise directions sets out 
from a moderation of the hierarchical relation between the 
physiotherapy professional and client.  
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Practices of passivity 
Where the initial critique of fundamental physiotherapy theory and 
practice suggested a preliminary interruption and reorientation in the 
search for novel possibilities, the previous section focused on a 
reconsideration of self-practices as a fundamental arena of 
physiotherapy. In this section, I turn to the exploration and 
development of a range of corresponding self-practices.  I then close 
the chapter by considering their further implications for a novel 
understanding and practice of physiotherapy. 
Letting go of practice 
Following a Levinassian critique of ontology and epistemology, I have 
argued that a fundamental violence, consisting in a reduction, 
limitation or immobilisation of the other, pervades the theories and 
practices underpinning contemporary physiotherapy. I consequently 
argued that it is pertinent to explore ways for refraining from this harm 
given that the express aim of physiotherapy is to ‘develop, maintain 
and restore people’s maximum movement’ (WCPT, 2016a). Going back 
to the idea that the initial possibility for doing so consists in refraining 
from practice altogether, and this already constitutes a self-practice for 
the professional physiotherapist, I now continue to explore this 
practice and the peculiar effort required for it.    
 
Specifically, I argue that this effort requires overcoming certain 
resistances within the practitioner, as well as the broader context of 
physiotherapy practice. My reasoning for this begins with a personal 
experience from my first encounters with Levinas’s work and its initial 
impact on my professional practice that led me to question the ethics of 
my practice and left me wondering what I might do differently. My 
concerns became particularly clear when a client vehemently stated 
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they would not accept if I was to claim to know more about their body 
or pain then they did. I was momentarily stuck for words and needed a 
few moments before finding my way back into the conversation, but an 
underlying feeling of unease persisted long after the treatment session. 
In those few words, my client had exposed my customary approach to 
clients, as an expert, holding  - as I thought – all relevant knowledge 
and skills in hand.  Upon reading the argument that ‘the current 
educational system in the West is rooted in fear of silence’ many years 
later, I could readily identify with the ‘fear of silence’ I experienced in 
this encounter (Zembylas, 2007, p. 37). Not knowing what to do or say, 
with my knowledge and skills put into question, I felt deeply 
uncomfortable.  
 
Kishi & Whieldon acknowledge that it is difficult to withhold practice 
‘when the model we use’, even if merely ‘unconsciously, is the scientific 
one’ (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 78). What their statement reiterates 
however is that resistance is never exclusively intentional, but also 
operates in ways that we might not be able to influence as easily. In 
physiotherapy, professional education and theory run counter to 
passivity, demanding knowledge and active intervention on the side of 
the practitioner. Alongside the societal, legal, and professional rules 
and regulations, professional education and identity ultimately enable 
the identification and classification of not-practising as an ‘antisocial’ 
practice that ‘does not align … with the demands of moral norm[s]’, 
much as has been noted in relation to Lacanian psychoanalysis 
(Modified from Adam, 2006, p. 321). 
 
Nonetheless, I argue that this theoretical exploration remains 
warranted for a number of reasons. To begin with, if not-practising can 
be thought of as being metaphorically akin to not-speaking, then such 
   126 
non-practices could be thought to open the possibility for an ‘exercise 
of silence’ or listening in healthcare practice (Zembylas, 2007, p. 37). In 
some approaches to person-centred care for example, it has already 
been argued that ‘an understanding of the patient’s perspective should 
underpin good practice in an equal therapeutic relationship’ (Kidd, 
Bond, & Bell, 2011, p. 155). Cruz, Caeiro and Pereira (2013) likewise 
argue ‘patient’s needs and perspectives’ should be incorporated into 
physiotherapy in a way that is ‘complementary to the traditional 
diagnostic and procedural hypothetico-deductive reasoning’ (p. 6). 
Critically however, this is achieved precisely by ‘listening attentively to 
the actual words that are spoken’ as part of the pathway ‘leading to 
diagnosis and treatment’ (Burcher, 2011, p. 13). 
 
There is resonance in this to the ‘receptivity and susceptibility’ that 
have been described as the heart of Kishi’s further development of 
Shiatsu (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 85). In the context of Zen, it is 
similarly thought that ‘we have to stop the inner conversation, one’s 
self-repetition, the “being-in-love” with one’s own thoughts and ideas’ 
if we want ‘to become directly and immediately receptive for the 
moment, for that which happens now’ (Modified from Tenbreul, 2011, 
p. 83). Critically, such receptivity approximates the Levinassian critique 
of epistemology insofar as it implies that ‘physicians must not be 
misled into believing that their attentiveness implies a complete 
understanding’ (Burcher, 2011, p. 13). Non-practice, listening and 
receptivity thus understood cannot consist in a momentary 
intervention, but rather in an effort ‘to rigorously hesitate’ in a more 
pervasive sense (Ronell & Dufourmantelle, 2011). This rigour lies in 
probing into and interrupting one’s urge to practice on an ongoing 
basis, ‘staying open to the full speech and discourse of the other’, and 
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refraining ‘from representing and offering a closed knowledge’ 
(Modified from Adam, 2006, pp. 118-119).  
 
From their respective viewpoints, the assumption underlying these 
approaches is that hesitating in this manner presents an approach to 
‘patients in a manner that respects their alterity and otherness’ 
(Clifton-Soderstrom, 2013, p. 458). Rather than assuming that ‘we know 
what our Shiatsu partner needs for their healing or that we actually 
have the ability to heal this person’, liberating them from our 
delimiting grasp becomes the primary therapeutic practice and creates 
‘space for’ further ‘healing to occur’ (McClelland, 2011, pp. 64-65). The 
emphasis on continuity implied in the notion of a way of life further 
stresses that we inflict harm whenever we close this space, thus 
implying a much more fundamental letting go of practice than a 
momentarily interjected intervention. For this to be possible in turn, it 
is also necessary to let go of the aim to which practice is directed, and 
that remains the driving force for therapeutic intervention. 
Letting go of knowledge 
Drawing on Canguilhem, I have critiqued the underlying tendency to 
establish constants or invariants in healthcare, as in the theories, 
concepts, definitions and related knowledge, that are commonly 
imposed on clients (Canguilhem, 1989). The teaching of emptiness, or 
impermanence is one of the two most central teachings of Buddhism 
that resonates well with this critique of constant knowledges in the 
medical sciences. In an overarching sense, it alludes to the insight that 
‘nothing that appears is permanent’ (Okumura, 2012, p. 83), but rather, 
‘things are always changing’ (Chadwick, 1999, p. 81).  
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In further resonance with Canguilhem’s perspective, more specific to 
health and sickness, the teaching of impermanence implies that ageing 
and sickness are normal, healthy and inevitable phenomena of ‘the 
cycle of birth’ and death (Okumura, 2012, p. 4). Buddhist practitioners 
are therefore encouraged to practice acceptance of birth, ageing, 
sickness and death, and practice an attitude of ‘living straight through 
whatever reality of life’ they are ‘faced with’ (Uchiyama, 2004, p. 132). 
What is more, resisting them is thought to create an additional and far 
greater suffering than these phenomena themselves.  
 
Hadot found inspiration to research a similar practice in Michel de 
Montaigne’s essay ‘To do philosophy is to learn to die’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 
125). It has further been argued this understanding of philosophy as a 
practice for learning to die ‘was axiomatic for most ancient philosophy’, 
though taking different forms across various philosophical schools 
(Critchley, 2008, p. xi). For the Stoics, ‘the exercise of dying’ sat ‘within 
the perspective of the preparations for the difficulties of life, the 
praemeditatio malorum’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 105). Accordingly, difficulties 
like sickness, ageing, death, and natural catastrophes, ‘were neither 
good nor bad but indifferent, the consequences of the necessary course 
of events in the universe, which had to be accepted’ and ‘became goods 
or evils according to our attitude toward them’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 156). 
Motivated by the same insight into the inevitability of these 
phenomena, the Epicureans argued that ‘it is useless to worry about 
death’, but one should rather turn one’s attention and efforts to life 
(Critchley, 2008, p. xxvii). 
 
Similarly, it is often argued by teachers and students of the Japanese 
martial arts, that their practice is ‘about learning to die’ (Gaurin, 2012, 
p. 8). Resonating with the Stoic perspective, the martial tradition of 
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Kashima Shinryu understands itself as an art and ‘science of acceptance 
and resorption in all its myriad applications’ (Friday & Humitake, 1997, 
p. 65). Many of its practices consequently aim to prepare the 
practitioner for all sorts of difficulties, and develop an increasing 
degree of acceptance, calmness and relaxation, as a foundation for 
action.  
 
Relaxation is also at least one of the aims of virtually all approaches to 
Shiatsu. In many instances, this overlaps with the sense of ‘helping 
people to be aware and helping them to tolerate those parts of 
themselves from which they are trying to escape’ (Palmer, 2014, p. 7). 
This principle includes becoming ‘acquainted with the manifestations 
of our resistances against the flow of life’, which inevitably includes 
pain, ageing, sickness and death’, thus also helping us to ‘deal with 
these resistances more consciously’ (Rappenecker, 2014, p. 1). Thus 
understood, Shiatsu could equally be considered a practice of acceptance 
grounded in the belief that ‘there is nothing which needs to be fought, 
and nothing, which needs to be eliminated’ (Rappenecker, 2003, p. 4). 
 
The sizeable, ready opportunity this presents to physiotherapy, would 
be to reconsider, for example, its many integral exercises aimed at 
relaxation as an approach to the practice of acceptance and the letting go 
of knowledge rather than its pursuit. In some instances, there is 
evidence that this is already beginning to occur, as for example in the 
use of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) as part of the 
management of chronic pain (Scott-Dempster, Toye, Truman, & Barker, 
2013). ACT is a relatively recent derivative of Buddhist notions like 
mindfulness-based approaches developed by psychotherapists that 
have been shown to give people with chronic low back pain a different 
approach to their pain, which ‘rather than fearing, blocking, or 
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resisting’, helps them ‘find ways to move through it and live with it’ 
(Doran, 2014, p. 10). 
 
Reintegrating (chronic) pain, ageing, sickness, and death through 
practices of acceptance would significantly broaden the aims of 
physiotherapy, though it would not represent a fundamental 
disruption. As a redefined health-goal, it would echo ‘the common 
denominator of the therapies specialising on the restoration of the 
capacity to enjoy’, that is, ‘the will to non-acceptance’ that identifies 
them as just another symptom or cause of suffering (Modified from 
Adam, 2006, p. 130). As in the case of practice, for the practice of 
acceptance to be fundamentally different, a more penetrative and 
continuous letting go of knowledge would be necessary to ensure that 
whatever alternate or temporary norms are established, nothing will 
‘keep them from being eventually transcended again’ (Canguilhem, 
1989, p. 206).  
 
In the Zen tradition, the tendency to establish constants, and in this 
sense, hold on to knowledge, is considered to have a negative effect on 
the other on whom knowledge and norms are superimposed, and the 
self that imposes them alike. Limiting not only the other’s movements, 
‘the moment I have a fixed image of another person, I not only trap that 
other person, but I also trap myself’ (Lehnherr, 2012). As a self-practice 
then, letting go of knowledge also presents a largely unconsidered, first 
autotherapeutic practice for physiotherapists, in addition to the 
foregoing reorientation of practice onto the therapist.  
 
Evidently, letting go of our knowledge and goals in this pervasive sense 
is radically different from the customary practice of physiotherapy, 
where ‘specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, time-based … short 
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and long term goals’ are set with clients and are to be ‘used at the 
beginning and end of treatment’ (PNZ, 2012b, pp. 24-25). However, to 
‘rigorously hesitate’ implies not only letting go of practice, but also of 
all knowledge to the point of forgetting ‘that I knew what I knew’ 
(Ronell & Dufourmantelle, 2011). Having an empty, or ‘beginner’s 
mind’ (Suzuki, 1988), is not to be misunderstood as ‘a cessation of 
thought, however; since it is not possible to stop thinking’, but to 
‘develop the capacity to allow our thoughts to pass through and not 
become stuck’ (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 76). Going back to the earlier 
critique of metrics, rulers and measurement tools: 
 
Letting go of thought is letting go of my yardstick … this doesn’t 
mean I should discard this yardstick, because it’s all I can use. 
Letting go doesn’t mean it disappears; it is still there, but we 
know that it is relative and limited. That is the way we can see 
things from a broader perspective. Our minds become more 
flexible (Okumura, 2012, p. 128).  
 
As with the practice of relaxation, if letting go of knowledge can be 
considered a practice of flexibility, then physiotherapeutic practices 
aimed at increasing flexibility could be reconsidered as physical 
variants for letting go of knowledge in themselves. If as in the case of 
Shiatsu, physiotherapy could additionally be ‘performed with this 
empty-mind rather than from theory’, then letting go of knowledge 
might open a pathway to a different approach to practice, and to clients 
(Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 76). Such a disruption would develop the 
Levinassian critique of therapeutic practice in an applied sense, 
beginning with a reorientation toward self-practice, and their further 
inversion through the relocation of the expert-therapist to a position of 
the not-knowing, and the previously known or knowable into the 
position of the unknown.  
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This inversion is crucial for the approximation of fundamental ethics 
and the therapeutic relation attempted in this thesis. In ethics, I 
precisely ‘receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I … But this 
also means: to be taught. The relation with the Other’ is ‘an ethical 
relation’ precisely because it ‘is a teaching’, because ‘it comes from the 
exterior and brings me more than I contain’ (Levinas, 1969, p.51). That I 
receive ‘beyond the capacity of the I’ and the other ‘brings me more 
than I can contain’, emphasises that I am not only the student and the 
other the teacher in this relation (Levinas, 1969, p. 51). More radically 
still, it suggests that any knowledge I acquire can never be 
comprehensive: can never be established as constant or invariant, and 
thus, cannot be utilised as such.  
 
Levinas’s focus was primarily on describing its otherwise than being and 
otherwise than knowledge as the crucial characteristic of the ethical 
relation. Therefore, the practice of letting go of knowledge presents a 
further, concrete practice and movement toward an otherwise 
therapeutic relation. This could consist in a momentary interruption in 
putting a diagnostic label on a condition a client presents with, where 
this appears to be feasible. It could also be a far more radical ongoing 
practice wherever the holding on to any one label or idea takes place, 
beyond its momentary consideration, or positing. Though daily clinical 
practice and the rules and regulations by which it is governed today 
would still put considerable restriction on the latter. 
Letting go of intention 
In the Zen tradition, the what is sought for through letting go of one’s 
practice, knowledge and aims, is referred to as mushotoku, ‘desiring to 
obtain nothing, without striving for a goal’ (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 96). It 
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is consonantly argued that since ‘everything is … emptiness’ and there 
is consequently, ‘nothing to look for, nothing to be obtained’, goals and 
desires merely consitute one of the most fundamental causes of human 
suffering (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 96). Letting go of one’s goals and 
intentions, becoming ‘detached from our desires’, therefore, constitutes 
another practice overlapping with those of letting go of practice and 
knowledge (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 41). As in the case of letting go of 
knowledge, in physiotherapy practice, the extent of this could vary 
anywhere from a letting go of the therapist’s goals to make space for 
goals as defined and aspired to by clients; to the more radical letting go 
of all goals altogether and at any point in time. Though equally 
impeded by health policy, rules and regulations that require the setting 
down of (client’s or therapist’s) goals and the measurement of 
therapeutic success, or efficacy according to them, it is particularly the 
latter possibility that I focus on here.  
 
Much in line with this more radical approach to the letting go of goals 
implied in Zen practice, the philosophical schools of Stoicism and 
Epicureanism similarly thought that ‘the principal cause of human 
suffering is the passions’, and thus ‘philosophy is in the first place, a 
therapeutics for the passions’ (Davidson, 1997, pp. 196-197). Their 
respective definitions of passions encompass ‘unregulated desires and 
exaggerated fears’ (Hadot, 1995, p. 83), as well as ‘false judgements’ 
passed upon events and circumstances (Hadot, 2009, p. 154). Each 
school consequently had an approach to reducing the passions, for 
example via ‘the limitation of desires’, or the acceptance of 
circumstances like sickness, ageing, and death falsely identified as 
undesirable (Hadot, 2009, p. 88). 
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As a centrepiece of Zen, mushotoku is practised in virtually all activities 
of daily life. Each meal, for example, is considered ‘an opportunity to 
practice … having few desires and knowing how much is enough’ 
(Okumura, 2012, p. 108). Its most quintessential practice, however – 
zazen (commonly translated as meditation, but literally ‘sitting zen’) – 
is frequently also referred to as shikantaza, that is, sitting (za) without a 
goal (shikan), to emphasise the paramount centrality of letting go of all 
desire and intention (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 22). Since there is ‘nothing to 
look for and nothing to flee from’, and ‘both searching for and fleeing 
from are themselves’ unnecessary forms of suffering, all there is to do is 
letting go of them (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 87).  
 
Shikantaza offers a radical call to let go of even one’s desire to be free of 
desires, and places its practice counter to any application, use, or 
benefit (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 84). It is not so much the case that Zen 
philosophy and practice is dismissive of ‘the incorporation of zazen’ 
into therapeutic practice ‘if doctors or psychologists felt their patients 
had greatly benefited from’ it (Uchiyama, 2004, p. xxvii). Though such 
appropriations are nonetheless considered to perpetuate non-
acceptance; a ‘utilitarian Zen, or Zen for the sake of bettering or 
improving your condition or circumstances’ (Uchiyama, 2004, p. xxvii). 
Contrary to this, zazen practice: 
 
was never intended as a means of disciplining the mind or of 
becoming physically healthier. Our ideas about a mind to be 
trained or a body to be made healthy are expressions of the view 
of existence, which presupposes that there are things that can be 
accumulated. The wish to train and discipline our minds and 
bodies is nothing but our own egoistic desire (Uchiyama, 20014, 
p. 109). 
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Beyond the flexibility gained through initially expanding one’s 
understanding of the goal of healthcare, and then letting go of it, the 
implication here is to additionally let go of all intention. Adding an 
inversion of therapeutic agency to the previous inversion of the 
therapeutic relation, ‘the desire of the analyst’, therapist, or 
practitioner ‘can thus not be to do good or to heal … Strictly speaking, 
the analyst wants nothing’ (Modified from Adam, 2006, pp. 320-321). 
Certainly, to practice with an attitude that ‘we are not fixing somebody 
… not curing this person of a disease’ remains within a desire to heal, 
even if merely by ‘creating a space for healing to occur’ (McClelland, 
2011, p. 64-65). But the practice of letting go of intention highlights that 
we cannot practice it intentionally, as this would close the very space in 
which an unknowable healing might occur. 
Letting go of self 
The letting go of practice, knowledge, and intention already present a 
variety of challenges to the therapist. They are intrinsically difficult to 
action, and antithetical to the theories and practices that are 
conventionally thought to define professional identity. If the intention 
to heal, the knowledge that it motivates, and all subsequent practice, 
are fundamental pillars of the this identity, then letting go of them 
effectively implies a letting go of the professional self altogether. 
 
As discussed before, for Levinas, the identification of the self is effected 
through its ontological and epistemological relation to the world, as 
‘the ego … reduces the distance between the same and the other’ and 
transmutes ‘all otherness to itself’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 15-
16). Based on this understanding of epistemology as a movement 
resulting in the identification of the other with the same, the 
fundamental violence highlighted by Levinas is effectively a 
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consequence of its perpetual self-identification. From this perspective, it 
is, even more radically, possible to say that ‘war presents itself as 
necessary for self-protection, when in fact it is…self-identification’ 
(Carse, 1986, p. 120).  
 
Building on this critique and the intensity of the violence it addresses, 
Levinas described the conscious, knowing ego or self as the usurper of 
the place of the other and consonantly prefaced Otherwise than Being 
with Blaise Pascal’s phrase, ‘That is my place in the sun.  That is how the 
usurpation of the whole world began’ (Levinas, 1986, p. 24; 1998b). If 
accordingly, ethics ‘is critique… the critical putting into question of the 
liberty, spontaneity and cognitive enterprise of the ego’, then I argue 
that ethics itself could be considered a therapeutic practice that 
counteracts the fundamental violence of self-identification (Critchley 
& Bernasconi, 2002, p. 15). As in the case of letting go of knowledge 
however, Levinas did not consider this practicable by the self but rather, 
effected by the other, who ‘escapes the cognitive power of the subject’ 
(Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 15). 
 
Hadot on the other hand, considered nature as ‘infinite’ and ‘ineffable’ 
(Hadot, 2006, p. 319), and argued for a more active rapprochement of 
ethics, through a philosophy in which ‘one practices to transform the 
self’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 93). Described as ‘an effort to undo themselves 
from the partial self and elevate themselves to the level of the superior 
self’, and ‘identity with … reason considered as God’, problematically 
places the ancient philosopher’s efforts diametrically opposite to the 
critique of self-identification (Hadot, 2009, pp. 107-108). At the same 
time, Hadot did not ‘like the expression “self-practices” that Foucault 
brought into style’ after having read Hadot’s work, precisely because of 
its self-elevating or –inflating implications (Hadot, 2009, p. 93). For 
   137 
Hadot, transformation of the self to a superior, universal self and even 
identification with God did not imply an elevation, but the realisation 
that ‘we are something microscopic in the immensity’ of the greater 
whole that surrounds us (Hadot, 2009, p. 137). I argue that this re-
approximates his iteration of self-transformation with ethics, as letting 
go of the self, though Hadot’s choice of words undoubtedly risks 
perpetuating its potentially violent interpretation and practice. 
 
In very few passages, Levinas criticised this problem in traditions that, 
like Buddhism, argue that since nothing is permanent and ‘no beings 
have self-nature’, practitioners merely need to recognise that they are 
‘one with all beings’ (Okumura, 2012, pp. 34, 85). Evidently, this 
reduces the difference between self and other, even if it leads to their 
identification as no-thing. As with Hadot however, I argue that this is 
primarily a terminological problem, resulting from the reading of such 
statements in isolation from other theories and practices from these 
traditions that I will discuss in later chapters.  
 
Assuming this possibility, Zen practices offer practical guidance with 
regard to a rapprochement of ethical practice by letting go of ‘our 
attachment to our self as though it were a substantial being’ (Uchiyama, 
2004, p. 100). Insight into its impermanence and the suffering caused 
by it leads eventually to the admonition that ‘to study the Buddha Way 
is to study the self’, but precisely ‘to study the self is to forget the self’ 
(Okumura, 2012, p. 27). Because practice, knowledge, and intention 
create the self, letting go of them is effectively to practice ‘the total 
abandonment of self, of its thoughts and aims, of its desires, and of its 
entire mental construction … a complete devastation, an absolute loss 
… total destitution, the death of the self, the extinction of the self and 
of all grasping’ (Deshimaru, 2012, pp. 100-101).  
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Finally, because neither letting go of intention, knowledge, or practice, 
can be intended or practised by the self, they become ‘practice[s] of 
radical negation’ (Collins, 2012, pp. xi, xii). One cannot simply let go of 
one’s intention, knowledge, practice, or self in any final sense given 
their inherent difficulties and contradictions.  It follows then that, ‘no 
state [can] be attained other than our practice of letting go’ (Okumura, 
2012, p. 61).  
The practices of passivity 
That this is the final result of the self-practices developed so far should 
clarify the way in which their pursuit inherently refutes the criticisms of 
egocentricity raised against them (Atkinson, 2006; Delamont, 2007). It 
is not that they undo the ‘permanent danger of egoism in the efforts 
one makes to perfect oneself’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 107). However they can 
be said to expose a harmful egocentricity of the commonly taken for 
granted, outward focus of the knowing, doing, and seemingly charitable 
self.  They may also present a set of practices to mitigate or even 
reverse this harm that are not only possible in healthcare science and 
practice, but necessary to approximate fundamental ethics.  
 
Given their particular nature and focus, they are also described as 
practices of privation and catharsis (Adam, 2006, p. 126). The practice 
of cleaning  in Zen and the martial arts, for example, is considered ‘a 
symbol and tool for us to clean everything out of our mind and body’, 
and this further aligns it with the ‘purification rituals’ central to the 
Shinto tradition (Loori, 2002, p. 160). Shinto practitioner and Aikido 
founder Morihei Ueshiba considered his art as a whole a form of 
purification, and this notion is shared by many martial traditions in 
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their foregrounding the need ‘to shave off excess rather than build and 
tack on more’ (Aunkai, 2007; Stevens, 2001).  
 
Applied to physiotherapy and its professional practitioner, I argue that 
the practices explored here lead to a radical privation of its theories, 
practices, and self-understanding. Building on the theoretical 
framework underpinning this thesis, I argue that this privation warrants 
their denomination as practices of passivity, in that they consist of 
practices of interruption or cessation of various kinds of activity, thus 
rendering their practitioner passive. This however raises the question: 
what is actually left after all this destitution, and how might this 
passivity constitute or be meaningful for physiotherapy theory and 
practice? 
 
A partial answer to this question has already been offered in the 
argument that practices of passivity require a peculiar, but nonetheless 
significant effort from the practitioner: from resisting the urge to 
practice, to the effort required to develop greater flexibility by letting 
go of thoughts, intentions, and the self. It could be argued, then, that 
there is much left to practice, even though the aims, addressees and 
contents of such practices appear contrary to common conceptions of 
physiotherapy. But what sort of practitioner might be left after all this 
letting go? 
The therapist as passivity 
As a practice that consists of sitting, breathing, and, at most, focusing 
on these, zazen, or shikantaza, leaves the practitioner with nothing but 
the bare minimum of physical and mental activity. It is thought that 
‘through the incessant concentration on posture … and breath … 
letting-go gradually becomes easier’ (Modified from Adam, 2006, p. 
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196). The fact that there is something to practice however, reaffirms 
that there is still something left at this bare minimum of existence and 
practice. Without going into an overly detailed definition of them at 
this point, initially, these are the mind, thought of as its capacity to 
focus, and the body, understood as one’s seated posture and breath at 
which the focus of the mind is directed.  
 
The fact that practice consists in focusing the mind on the body further 
implies that there is a particular relationship between them and that 
this relationship plays a critical role in the practice of letting go. 
Roughly speaking, the general assumption regarding this relationship 
that underpins Zen, Budo, and Shiatsu practice is that the mind has an 
inherently stronger tendency to be active and hold on, whereas the 
body retains closer proximity to functions of ‘letting go’ through the 
inevitability of exhalation, excretion, and decay that parallel its 
ingestive and constructive needs and activities. Practice thus aims at 
returning an overproductive or dominant mind closer to the functions 
of the body, or connecting mind and body. It is for this reason that 
focusing the mind on the nearly passive functions of posture and 
breathing is foregrounded in Zen practice (Adam, 2006, p. 196; 
Tenbreul, 2011, p. 83).  
 
It could be argued that other practices sharing this orientation are not 
too far from this conception, for example, the way in which awareness 
and proprioception (as the physical sense and organs of bodily 
awareness) are thought of and practised in contemporary physiotherapy 
and other similar therapeutic modalities. According to Moshe 
Feldenkrais, ‘the crucial work’ of his method ‘consists in leading to 
awareness in action’, that is, ‘the ability to make contact with one’s 
own skeleton and muscles and with the environment’ during movement 
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(Feldenkrais in Chaitow, Bradley, & Gilbert, 2014, p. 254). Similarly, a 
recent study on Norwegian psychomotor physiotherapy integrates body 
awareness as a central element for relaxation in trauma patients 
(Ekerholt, Schau, Mathismoen, & Bergland, 2014). Through its practice, 
patients firstly ‘became aware of a variety of bodily sensations other 
than pain and physical stiffness’, and this ability ‘to be within the body 
… gives awareness of tension signals and allows a reduction of tension 
before pain develops’, thus providing them with embodied coping 
mechanisms and practices (Ekerholt et al., 2014, pp. 5-6). 
 
However, the problem with such approaches remains that, as long as 
they are aimed at a ‘restoration of the capacity to enjoy’, they are still  
enclosed within the predominant framework of contemporary 
healthcare (Adam, 2006, p. 130). By contrast, in Zen, ‘awareness does 
not label or name, it only reflects’ and thus ‘means that … your mind 
should not get caught by any idea’ of health, sickness, or else, but 
remains ‘open’ (Chadwick, 1999, p. 312). From this perspective, the 
practice of awareness would rather be a variant of acceptance where 
each and every encountered phenomenon is witnessed and accepted as 
it is, prior to mental or physical evaluation and manipulation.  
 
Applied to the body, such practices imply becoming aware of the body as 
it is as expressed in Shiatsu, Zen, and the martial traditions. Founder of 
Aunkai Bujutsu, Minoru Akuzawa, for example, considers his method a 
means ‘to understand what is “natural” within our bodies’ (Akuzawa, 
2007). Consonant reference to something ‘natural’ in relation to the 
mind and body can be found in ancient Greece and Rome, for example 
in Galen’s understanding of euexia as ‘the natural state’ that marks the 
ultimate goal of medicine (Modified from Repschläger, 2011, p. 19). 
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In the Sino-Japanese traditions, hara, which broadly translates as the 
abdominal area though it ‘is a much fuller concept … than this 
anatomical definition could suggest’, is considered a fundamental 
element of the natural body as it is (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, pp. 15-16). 
Its common English translation as the center fails to encompass its 
varied meanings but suffices in the absence of a more comprehensive 
term. Incessantly targeted in martial arts, Zen, and Shiatsu practice, a 
sense of one’s center is arrived by shaving off excess, and further 
developed through a wide range of practices, including abdominal 
breathing, massage, Sumo-style stomping, and other exercises (Inaba, 
2006, pp. 48-63).  
 
Terminologically, the notion of a natural state and the idea of a ‘centre’ 
are equally problematic because they appear to imply permanence and 
the existence of an anatomical or physiological norm. As such, the 
center might suggest the existence of an essence, inherent to the self 
and sufficiently permanent to be identified independently from 
everything that is non-essential or extrinsic to it. In contrast, Gibson’s 
description of the subject as an assemblage in the context of 
rehabilitation studies resonates with Levinassian ethics and Zen 
philosophy insofar as it highlights the irreconcilability of their 
understanding of self with the notion of a centre. According to Deleuze 
and Guattari, from whom the notion of assemblages is drawn, subjects 
are ‘collections of heterogeneous elements that in coming together 
produce particular effects … are not stable or closed systems, but rather 
temporary connections that continually come together and then break 
apart, forming different assemblages with other elements that produce 
different effects’ (Gibson, 2014, p. 1329). As, or with such assemblages, 
the self can ‘have no center … is never stable, but … is the production 
that is being constantly made and unmade’ (Gibson, 2014, p. 1330).  
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While a discussion of the notion of assemblages is entirely outside the 
scope of this thesis, I argue that the apparent irreconcilability between 
impermanence, passivity and the notion of a center is reconciled in the 
philosophies and practices of Zen, Budo, Shiatsu, and Levinassian 
ethics. Significant here are the ways time and temporality are used to 
describe them akin to assemblages, as ‘temporary connections that 
continually come together and then break apart’, and are ‘constantly 
made and unmade’ (Gibson, 2014, p. 1330). Such brief moments of time 
that allow only fleeting connections, that are then immediately 
unmade, play a pivotal role in the reconnection of the mind and body, 
and the development of the center in zazen and martial arts practice for 
example (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 77; Tenbreul, 2011, p. 115).  
 
To clarify how this is the case, it is critical to note that the practice of 
the present moment is considered to overlap with the practice of 
accepting whatever emerges in a constant stream of change in the 
context of Zen and ancient Greek philosophy alike. According to Hadot, 
Roman emperor and Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius considered the 
final purpose of the premeditation malorum as ‘becoming aware that the 
moment one is still living has infinite value’ and thus ‘living in an 
extremely intense manner as long as death has not arrived’ (Hadot, 
2009, p. 105). Akin to the Epicurean motto ‘carpe diem’, ‘the Stoic is … 
not a miraculously insensible being’, but ‘believes that one must say yes 
to the world in all its reality, even if it is atrocious’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 
105). Consequently, the practice of prosoche – attention to the one’s 
present impressions, desires, and actions – ‘is a concentration on what 
we can really do; we can no longer change the past, nor can we act on 
what is not yet. The present is the only moment in which we can act’ 
(Hadot, 1995, pp. 55, 84; 2002, p. 138; 2009, p. 163).  
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Okumura consonantly writes that the practice and definition of zazen is 
a practice of the present moment, as ‘whenever we deviate from where 
we are now, we immediately return to what’s right here, right now, by 
letting go’ (Okumura, 2012, p. 86). As I have argued, this entails letting 
go of activity, knowledge, and intention, and returning to our posture 
and breath as that which is ‘right here, right now’. The assumption 
underlying this is precisely that the present moment is the only 
moment in which we can act, as much as the only moment there is:  
 
The word “now” means at this present moment, the only reality. 
The past is already gone and the future has yet to come. Neither 
is reality. Only this moment, now, is reality. And yet this now is 
strange and wondrous. We cannot grasp it because it has no 
length … So when is the present? The present is nothing. It is 
empty … When we try to grasp it, there is no substance … This 
present moment, which is zero or empty, is the only reality 
(Okumura, 2012, pp. 252-253). 
 
Focusing on posture and breathing, connecting mind and body, and 
returning to our self-centre in the present moment thus finally lead to 
the realisation that both this moment and everything in it is empty, 
insubstantial, or impermanent, being ‘constantly made and unmade’ 
(Gibson, 2014, p. 1330). The practice of the present moment is therefore 
simultaneously a practice of the empty-self, and precisely this is what 
remains of the self after the practices of passivity. It is a self that ‘is not 
attached to any object and simply rests in the natural flow of being, that 
is, in the clear situation of potential that is open in all directions. This 
situation of potential is our natural source, the clear water itself’, that 
which is natural within our bodies after all excess is shaved off 
(Modified from Tenbreul, 2011, p. 115). 
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It is alternatively referred to as shizentai (Japanese: shizen, meaning 
nature, or natural; and tai encompassing the meanings of body, 
posture, and attitude), in reference to an embodiment of calmness, 
relaxation and the ability to move anywhere, anytime with mizu no 
kokoro, the heart-mind of water (Sanner, 2012, p. 30). Renowned 
swordfighter Miyamoto Musashi further referred to it as ‘the stance of 
no stance’, in which one inhabits mind and body at all times (Sanner, 
2012, p. 56). In Kashima Shinryu, the stance of mugamae (Japanese: mu, 
meaning ‘not, nothing, without, nothingness, non-existent, non-being, 
or no thing’, and gamae/kamae, meaning stance) is considered the very 
heart of the tradition (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 76). With ‘no 
outward signs of readiness for action … The swordsman stands exposed’ 
in ‘a position of pure, unlimited potential’, free and open to move in 
any manner and direction (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 77).  
 
According to one of Kashima Shinryu’s fundamental laws – dōsei ittai, 
or motion and stillness as one – this situation or position of potential, 
open in all directions, at once, embodies motion within stillness, but like 
all positions, postures, situations and moments, it is only a fleeting 
moment amongst others, and thus simultaneously stillness within 
motion (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 70). It alerts the practitioner to the 
dangers of fixating on any one thing or moment, and simultaneously 
emphasises the necessity not to be distracted or disturbed too easily, 
but stay calm, even in the midst of a storm; ‘in the same way that the 
moon, reflected on a body of water, responds with the waves and 
current, neither swimming against them, nor being carried away by 
them’ (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 65). 
 
Critically, I argue that it is through their simultaneousness that motion 
and stillness can be considered as one, and reconciles the paradox 
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between having and not having a center or self.  Thus, it may be 
possible to retain a self despite all its destitution and impermanence, 
and it is this self that might form the basis for an alternate foundation 
for physiotherapy practice. Due to its inherent, de-constitutional 
passivity, and in lieu of any otherwise discernable therapeutic activity, 
this remnant of the self, or therapist can only be thought of as passivity. 
This passivity precedes the ontological mode of being, and is ‘not 
derived from an ontology of nature’ but ‘a meontology … a primary 
mode of non-being (me-on)’ corresponding to the fundamental ethical 
relation (Cohen, 1986, p. 25). In the following chapter, I explore this 
notion of the therapist as passivity, and its import for a physiotherapy 
that is not grounded in ontology and epistemology, but ethics. 
 
In summary 
Having laid out my theoretical and methodological framework 
alongside a range of pertinent notions in Chapters One and Two, in this 
chapter I continued to develop them by applying them to physiotherapy 
theory and practice. Drawing on Levinas’s understanding of ontology 
and epistemology, I began with a critique of some of the fundamental 
theories and practices of contemporary physiotherapy, by reviewing the 
broader definitions of health and sickness in which they are expressed. I 
have argued that this critique radically questions the profession’s 
foundations and self-understanding, and suggests a profound process 
of self-inquiry and -transformation. Before developing initial practices 
involved in this process, I reviewed the place of self-practice in 
contemporary physiotherapy and juxtaposed this with my other 
philosophical and practical sources to argue for its respective 
reorientation.  
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The subsequently developed practices of passivity, included letting go of 
professional practice, knowledge, intentions, and finally, the self. 
Building on the critique of contemporary physiotherapy and the 
discussion of these practices, I argued that they are not only feasible, 
but even necessary, if a practical approximation of fundamental ethics 
is sought. I argued that the present critical perspective, consequential 
inward turn, and practices of passivity already constitute the first 
theoretical and practical steps toward such an otherwise foundation for 
physiotherapy practice. And finally, a first look at the remnants of this 
foundation provided a glimpse of a novel, radically different notion of 
the physiotherapist-self. In the following chapter I will develop the 
notion of the therapist as passivity further, to discern its potential role, 
challenges and implications for an otherwise physiotherapy.  
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Chapter Four   
Passivity and Accompaniment  
 
Im innersten Heiligtum … wo ihm seiner Erwartung nach alle 
Welt und er selber sich zum Gleichnis herabsinken müsste für 
das, was er dort erblicken wird, erblickt so der Mensch nichts 
andres als ein Antlitz gleich dem eigenen. Der Stern … ist Antlitz 
worden, das auf mich blickt und aus dem ich blicke. … Und dies 
Letzte ist nichts Letztes, sondern ein allzeit Nahes, das Nächste; 
nicht das Letzte also, sondern das Erste (Rosenzweig, 2002, p. 
471).1 
 
Introduction  
The preceding chapter opened the exploration and development of 
physiotherapy theory and practice that constitutes the central focus of 
this study. Primarily drawing on Levinas’s analysis of ontology and 
epistemology, I began this exploration with a critique of some of the 
fundamental theories and practices of physiotherapy by reviewing how 
they shape its aims and concomitant definitions of health and sickness. 
I then argued for a momentary reorientation of physiotherapy research 
and practice toward the physiotherapist, as well as the understanding 
and practice of self that underpins the profession. In developing a range 
of corresponding practices for the practitioner, I eventually described 
them as practices of passivity due to their focus on the letting-go of 
practice, knowledge, intention, and the self. I finally argued that 
passivity is not only a somewhat paradoxical objective for practice but 
                                                   
1 In the innermost sanctum … where man might expect all the world and himself to 
dwindle into sameness of that which he is to catch sight of there, he thus catches 
sight of none other than a face like his own. The star … has become face, which 
looks upon me and out of which I look. … And this last is not last, but the always 
nearest, the nearest; not the last then, but the first (Modified from Rosenzweig, 
2005, pp. 446 – 447). 
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also the only characteristic of the self that remains at its center after all 
its destitutions. 
 
In the present chapter explore the self as passivity and its potential for 
the development of a novel foundation for physiotherapy in greater 
detail, beginning with a novel understanding of the professional self of 
the physiotherapist. I argue that passivity is a necessary theoretical and 
practical waypoint to another fundamental characteristic of the self. 
Over the course of this chapter, I gradually arrive at this other 
characteristic as I develop an otherwise understanding of the physical 
therapist and, finally, refer to it as accompaniment.  
 
The first of three broad sections of this chapter, ‘Beyond passivity’, 
draws on a claim that can be identified across my philosophical and 
practical sources: that what one finds in the midst of this passivity at 
the center of the self, and especially through it, is a relation to 
something other than itself. The second section discusses this claim, by 
juxtaposing and critiquing different views of ‘The fundamental relation’ 
from within Zen, Budo, Shiatsu, and ancient Greek philosophy, from a 
Levinassian perspective. The final section, ‘The self in relation’ 
explores characteristics of the self as passivity-in-relation, in 
conjunction with emergent understandings of the professional 
therapist and physical therapy.  
Beyond passivity 
The initial problem arising from practices of passivity is easily 
understood if we recall that all therapeutic research and practice is 
ultimately aimed at helping others, being therapeutically active and, 
ideally, effective. Undeniably, this also includes the present study 
despite all efforts to find a different approach for action or agency. 
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More specifically, all that is left at this point is a passive therapist doing 
nothing, and even more radically, a self so passive that it is even being 
nothing, or no being. Evidently, this is more than just unsatisfactory at 
first glance, as it leaves no knowledge or practice that can be 
meaningfully applied, or practised as physiotherapy for the benefit of 
others. In this sense, it could be argued that the practices of passivity 
and self as passivity are irrelevant to others and, by extension, not 
significant for physiotherapy. It is thus necessary to verify whether this 
is the case, or whether passivity so considered can somehow be of 
service to physiotherapy and its recipients after all. 
 
A second issue suggests or opens toward a possible resolution to the 
initial problem, yet carries a potential to merely exacerbate it. That is, I 
have argued that the first way in which passivity is meaningful to 
physiotherapy is, as a theoretical notion and objective for a range of 
practices for physiotherapists aimed at a revision of the theories and 
practice of physiotherapy, beginning with those concerning our 
professional identity. As professional practices for the therapist—
especially as practices that appear to relieve the therapist of all 
responsibilities by radically incapacitating the therapist-self and 
leaving no way out from this self—these practices could easily be 
criticised as nothing but self-indulgence.  
 
It is this twofold focus on the self—as object of research practice, and 
singular finding, or beneficiary of research practice—that earned 
certain approaches to autoethnography the critique of being self-
centered, ego-centric, qualitative methodologies. Hence, those engaged 
in autoethnography are required to remember and foreground what is 
considered imperative for social and healthcare research alike: to be 
meaningful and helpful to others, and ideally to be meaningful for 
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others by being about them (Atkinson, 2006; Delamont, 2007; Ings, 
2013).  
 
Drawing especially on Hadot, I have presented a counterargument that 
societal change can just as much begin with changing oneself and was 
considered preferable in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, and still 
has this place in many Zen and Budo traditions. This argument also 
constituted an important departure point for the present study and was 
further expanded through additional arguments developed in Chapter 
Three. The critique of ontology and epistemology highlighted an as yet 
unconsidered egocentricity inherent in the fundamental theories and 
practices of physiotherapy.  
 
The notion of passivity was developed as a momentary interruption, as 
well as the opening toward a potential novel direction, beginning with a 
deflation of the professional self and its practices. Notwithstanding 
these counterarguments and practices, the danger of egocentricity can 
appear to have been amplified through becoming reality in a self that is 
characterised by nothing but passivity, maximally withdrawn into itself. 
It is thus all the more necessary to clarify if and how the self and 
practices of passivity can be meaningful to physiotherapy recipients 
rather than leading to a culminating egocentricity.  
 
The ‘permanent danger of egoism’ is acknowledged in all of the sources 
on which I am drawing here (Hadot, 2009, p. 107). It is hence reiterated 
in their teaching and practice to prevent students and practitioners 
from misunderstanding passivity as the aim or end of practice. This 
misunderstanding is thought to be especially facilitated after a letting 
go of practice, knowledge, intention and self, when a sense of ‘having 
let go’, or even ‘self as passivity’ can instil itself. Consequently, 
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practitioners are alerted to this as a ‘dangerous time … when 
attachment is cunningly disguised by an air of false liberation, as with 
hermits’ (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 107).  
 
In this warning, the danger of this time is alluded to as resulting from 
holding on to passivity as a thing, or fixed concept in itself and, as such, 
also for the self. Far more than just being a danger, this 
misunderstanding, as well as the self-liberation within which it can be 
disguised, is ultimately criticized as ‘false’ (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 107). 
By means of dismissal, Deshimaru finally warns against the sense of 
comfort, security, and contentment that can be perceived through a 
diminution of one’s needs and self and, akin to the shelter provided by 
one’s home, might justify one’s withdrawal from the world. According 
to Deshimaru, this kind of ‘retreat’ can be observed in the practice of 
hermits who ‘reach realisation alone, and only for themselves … the 
exact opposite of true liberation’ as it is understood in Zen (Deshimaru, 
2012, p. 108). 
 
Given such emphasis of the gravity of the dangers of the practices of 
self-as-passivity, how does one deal with their practice and potential 
effect? The undoubtedly simplest solution would be to dismiss passivity 
altogether and revert to other practices or continue one’s search for 
alternatives. Contrary to this, my aim is to continue to explore ways to 
mitigate such dangers and pitfalls that can be drawn from Zen, Budo, 
Shiatsu, ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, and Levinas’s thought. 
The general direction of this path is implicit in their descriptions 
regarding passivity (emptiness, or other terms), as well as their 
curiously overlapping warnings against it being ‘not a sure harbour, or a 
place of retreat which the soul should enter’ and withdraw to (Levinas, 
1998, p. 136). It becomes even more evident when looking at the 
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meaning of the Japanese term for taking Buddhist vows—shukke—
which, as a practice, marks a practitioner’s distinct departure on the 
path of Buddhist practice, and literally translates to ‘leaving home’ 
(Nonomura, 2008, p. 204).  
 
In its simplest sense, leaving home refers to the practitioner’s 
transition to a new way of life, which in the case of monastic practice 
includes a very literal, physical relocation. Applied to the critique of 
passivity and the potential self-contentment resulting from its 
misunderstanding and malpractice, it suggests the continuation of the 
practice of letting go and ‘leaving home’ at any point at which one 
might get attached to or be tempted to establish a home. Even more 
drastically, its particular place as the very entry gates to the path 
effectively defines the path itself as the constant practice of leaving 
home, not resting and not finding a place of retreat. Evidently, if 
passivity can be one such place, then the practice of not resting must 
eventually also apply to passivity itself, to let go of letting-go itself as 
‘there is no state to be attained other than our practice of letting go’, 
and thus somewhat paradoxically, continue along the path of passivity 
to go beyond it (Okumura, 2012, p. 61). 
 
If we further consider passivity as a fundamental characteristic of the 
center of the self, arrived at through its practice, then its continuation 
as a practice equally means to say that it is by going through the center 
of the self that we go beyond it. This is also how the subsequent step 
and meaning of the ‘study of the self’ as thought of in Zen is ‘to forget 
the self’ (Okumura, 2012, p. 27). That is, the objective of the practices 
focused on the self and its center, is not the condensing and 
strengthening of passivity as an isolated self-center that shelters it 
from the world. Rather, it is a de-velopment closer to the etymological 
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sense of unwrapping or undoing, but an undoing to such a complete 
extent that it eventually reveals any such center as an opening towards 
something beyond the self (Harper, 2017d). 
 
How is it that one can go beyond the self-center by going through the 
self? This crucial question requires further exploration of some of the 
practices discussed so far. In addition to the connection of mind and 
body, in the martial tradition of Kashima Shinryu for example, it is 
thought that ‘properly executed … technique’ further ‘calls for the 
sword, the mind, and the body to operate as three integrated phases of 
a single phenomenon’, or in other words, ‘as one’ (Friday & Humitake, 
1997, pp. 69, 83). There are thus specialised practices focussing on the 
connection of any two, or all three of these components. In defining it 
as a theoretical and practical requirement, the threefold connection 
between mind, body, and sword could also be thought of as either a 
corollary effect of all if its practices, or, as an underlying requirement 
for an action to be identified as a properly executed technique. 
 
Whichever approach is taken, the critical point is that they invariably 
rest on the assumption that it is indeed possible to not only connect 
one’s mind and body but also with something beyond these, beginning, 
for example, with the sword. Especially in the combative context of the 
martial arts, this is not only a possibility, but a necessity, given that 
something other than one’s body, mind, or sword is likely to eventually 
connect with any or all of these whether ‘one’ wants this or not. Beyond 
being a necessity, the common theme across most Japanese martial 
traditions, Shiatsu lineages, and other arts underpinned by similar 
worldviews is that the preferable way to connect to something other 
than one’s self is with, or through one’s center. Development of one’s 
self-center is thus necessary as a means to eventually be able ‘to 
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connect to our partner’, sword, opponent, paintbrush, or canvas ‘from 
our hara or centre point’ (McClelland, 2011, p. 82).  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, there are specific practices in Shiatsu 
and many other arts that sometimes entirely overlap and sometimes 
differ but are nonetheless variations on the theme of developing one’s 
bodily self-center, one’s mind-ful sense, and their connection. In the 
martial arts, these are then either expanded by practices for connecting 
to one’s opponent, client, or training partner through one’s center, or 
by practices that facilitate the development of one’s center through the 
aid of a partner or object. Though the crux is that they are nonetheless 
de-velopmental practices of passivity in the preceding sense. That is, 
they are based on the assumption that ‘to be in your hara’, your center, 
is not only ‘to be in right relationship with yourself’ and with others 
from there, but also already to be in right relationship ‘with the world’ 
(Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, pp. 15-16). They do not aim to develop a 
connection beyond the self as an adjunct to its center, but rather, a 
process of pairing down to a connection beyond the self that is already 
in place, effect, and practice in its center.  
 
Analogous to practices of developing one’s center, practices of the 
present moment further elucidate this point. From a Zen perspective, 
for example, next to being empty, the present moment is also ‘the only 
time we can meet’ (Okumura, 2012, p. 253), or as Hadot notes, ‘it is the 
present instant that puts us into contact with the whole cosmos’ 
(Hadot, 2009, p. 166). Importantly, the only way in which we can 
practice the present moment is through, which must ultimately mean 
through to the extent of barely being, a constant letting go, passivity. 
Only through the practice of passivity can we meet something or 
someone else, and thus, in and as passivity the self is in contact with 
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something other than itself. By being in my center, barely because I can 
only be there in each and every fleeting present moment, I let go of my 
‘view of myself as an independent substantial entity’ and in doing so re-
view my self-center as a dependent insubstantial entity, a passivity, or 
self-in-relation (Uchiyama, 2004, p. 103).  
 
This enables the formulation of a provisional response to the question 
as to whether passivity and its practices engender nothing but a wholly 
egocentric self, irrelevant to others and particularly irrelevant to a 
therapeutic profession. While there is such danger inherent in passivity, 
this danger results from misunderstanding passivity of the self as the 
sole end of practice, and the self as passivity as the essential core of the 
self. Egocentric practices of passivity open an opposing perspective on 
practices of connection to something other than the self and its center, 
beyond passivity, beyond the present moment and, by extension, of the 
self as passivity as, fundamentally, a self-in-relation. The self as 
passivity is relevant to others because it is fundamentally related to 
them. How exactly this fundamental relatedness of the self might also 
present and enable an unburdening, or alleviating of the other and the 
other’s ailments in the therapeutic sense that the etymological root of 
the term relevare suggests, is discussed in what follows (Harper, 2017).  
 
The fundamental relation 
In developing an understanding of the fundamental relation, I 
juxtapose and critique a range of overlapping perspectives from within 
Zen, Budo, and Hadot’s iteration of ancient Greek and Roman 
philosophy from a Levinassian perspective and argue where they are 
consistent with fundamental ethics. This draws out what is necessary in 
considering any relation to be fundamental to the self, and the 
importance of passivity in it. A range of characteristics of the self are 
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then developed that can be applied to the professional self of the 
physiotherapist.  
 
There are two coincident arguments that can be identified in Levinas’s 
perspective and the others I reference. The first of these is that the 
relation is somehow fundamental to the self. This is clearly stated in 
Levinas’s argument that it is the ‘irreducible structure upon which all 
other structures rest’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 79), as well as in its 
identification as ‘the fundamental category of Buddhism’ (Modified 
from Adam, 2006, p. 156). The second argument is that it is not just 
central in a philosophical or theoretical sense, but also located as 
central in a physical sense in Zen, Budo, and Shiatsu. This also strongly 
resonates with Rosenzweig’s location of it in ‘the innermost sanctum’ 
of the self, as well as certain arguments raised by Levinas that I will 
introduce later (Rosenzweig, 2002, p. 471).  
Distance and causation 
The Zen Buddhist understanding of the fundamental relation builds on 
the teaching of impermanence, discussed in Chapter Three, as it is 
applied to all existence—self and other alike. Accordingly, neither the 
other nor the self are considered to exist as independent, substantial 
entities which, in turn, implies that each is brought into existence 
dependent on the mutual relation to its other. The relation is thus 
understood as fundamental to self and other because it is that which 
‘brings both the I and you into existence as such’, rather than being 
enabled through their existence as a secondary possibility (Modified 
from Adam, 2006, p. 190)2.  
                                                   
2 ‘Es ist nicht so, dass Ich und Du von vornherein als substantielle Personen 
vorhanden sind und dadurch gegenseitige Beziehungen entstehen koennen, sondern 
die Beziehung erst laesst Ich und Du als solche enstehen’ (Adam, 2006, p. 190). 
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This second assumption underpinning Zen, that ‘all abstract entities’ 
only ‘have meaning because of their mutual relations’ is referred to as 
the teaching of interdependence, co-dependent origination, or co-
dependent arising (Uchiyama, 2004, p. 98). Understood as an 
inseparable pair, impermanence and interdependence do not argue for 
the nihilistic notion that no thing exists at all. Their critical point is 
rather that instead of existing objectively and independently, things 
come into existence as subject to ‘various conditions of 
interdependence’ (Uchiyama, 2004, pp. 99-100). A closer look at the 
Sanskrit term sunyata that is commonly translated as emptiness and as 
such contributes to the impression that the teaching of impermanence 
corresponds to a nihilistic view of existence, further elucidates this 
point. As a derivative of the term suvi, ‘meaning expansion or 
centrifugal movement’, it ‘is not a negation of the concept of existence 
but contains the idea that every existence and its elements are 
dependent on the principle of causality’, that is ‘are relative and 
interdependent’ with constantly changing conditions (Deshimaru, 
2012, p. 28). 
 
This relation of impermanence and interdependence, as well as its 
implications, is reiterated in one of the sutras central to the Soto-Zen 
tradition stating that ‘form is emptiness, emptiness is form’ 
(Deshimaru, 2012, p. 45). The first half of this statement alludes to the 
emptiness of all forms of existence according to their impermanence 
and constant change; whereas the second part reiterates that the latter 
teaching, in itself, already encompasses the understanding that not 
only change and death, but also birth and life are an equal reality of all 
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forms of existence that momentarily arise through their ‘co-dependent 
origination’ (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 45). Consequently, Zen does not teach 
that nothing ever comes into existence, but rather that any ‘seemingly 
fixed form’ that arises does so dependent on all of its relative, ever-
changing conditions ‘within the flow of impermanence … a temporary 
form similar to an eddy in the flow of a river’ from which it emerges and 
into which it dissolves again (Uchiyama, 2004, pp. 99-100). 
 
Resonating with this understanding of impermanence, a conception 
underpinning the martial tradition of Kashima Shinryu in its drawing 
on Shinto, describes the ‘ultimate natural law or rhythm of nature’ as a 
process of ‘ongoing integration, disintegration, and reintegration’ 
alternatively referred to as ‘arise, return to source, go forth’ (Friday & 
Humitake, 1997, p. 68). The ‘Shinto concept of musubi’, further 
describes the process through which all forms of nature are thought to 
‘arise’ in the context of this fundamental rhythm of nature (Friday & 
Humitake, 1997, p. 68). Considered the original creative principle of 
nature, musubi is understood as a ‘process by which elements are 
brought together to create new life and new entities’ (Friday & 
Humitake, 1997, p. 68).  
 
The ‘native term musubu’, from which musubi derives, already 
encompasses this meaning and can alternatively be translated as ‘to 
give birth’, ‘to bring together’, ‘to create’, or even ‘to give life’ (Friday 
& Humitake, 1997, pp. 63-64). There are many more meanings and 
interpretations associated with this term that far exceed the 
possibilities of this thesis. But even these few, nonetheless, central 
ones sufficiently elucidate the close resonance of musubi to the concept 
of interdependence as it equally proposes that new forms of existence 
come to life by being brought together, that is, by means of their 
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mutual relation (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 68). According to the 
concept and process of musubi, all forms of existence thus come into 
being as beings-in-relation. 
 
Hadot developed a similar theory by drawing a philological, rather than 
nominative ‘conception of nature as creation’ from the work of Henri 
Bergson and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Hadot, 2009, p. 126). In line with 
his historico-philological approach, Hadot argued that an 
understanding of nature as process was ‘the original meaning of the 
word’ phusis in ancient Greek philosophy (Hadot, 2006, p. 314). Drawing 
on the German writer, poet, and philosopher Johann Wolfgang Goethe 
and his theory of ‘the genesis of forms’ Hadot further explored the 
creative process of nature (Hadot, 2006, p. 218).  
 
According to Goethe, ‘the fundamental law of natural phenomena’, i.e., 
creation, is to be found ‘in the two forces of polarity and intensification’ 
(Hadot, 2006, p. 222). As the two forces underlying the process of 
creation, polarity proposes the emergence of two poles as a result of 
separation as originary differentiation. The force of intensification or 
‘ascension’ implies a subsequent (mutual) reunification and 
amalgamation into singular form, prior to their next separation, and so 
forth (Hadot, 2006, pp. 218-225). Already in its terminology, Goethe’s 
theory thus resonates with Buddhist and Shinto theories of existence as 
governed by a fundamental, spiralling (centrifugal and expansive 
process) of mutual creation, decay and recreation (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 
28; Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 68).   
 
From a Levinassian perspective, on the other hand, any theory of 
creation in which existence, form, self and other are mutually created, 
is irreconcilable with the argument that this relation is fundamental to 
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them. Mutuality renders the separated forms as equal, specifically by 
rendering them equal in their relation to one another. This makes the 
equality as such identifiable as self-same, reducing ‘the distance 
between the same and the other’ by making them an object and part of 
the self in the form of knowledge and comparison (Critchley & 
Bernasconi, 2002, p. 15). While it is true that ‘a relation with otherness’ 
is still maintained in the ontological and epistemological domain of this 
knowing self, Levinas argued that this exemplifies and initiates a 
suppressive form of relation that eventually results in ‘transmuting all 
otherness to itself’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 16).  
 
For Levinas this was was not just a risk but also the underlying 
assumption of philosophical thought in the tradition from Plato 
onwards (Levinas, 1969, p. 126). It is especially expressed in its 
approach to the world from the perspective of ontological and 
epistemological understandings of being, that is, as existence that sets 
out to relate and explore the world on its own terms, and within its own 
terms (Levinas, 1969, p. 126). The ontological and epistemological self 
is thus neither fundamentally related, a situation that would preclude it 
from choosing if, when, and how it could relate to the world. Nor is its 
primary movement relative in a way that maintains its difference from 
the world, but only in ways in which their ‘opposition fades’ (Levinas, 
1969, p. 126). That is, the epistemological self reduces the distance 
between self and world by means of comparison, making the other 
same-to-itself in its ontological ground and epistemological categories. 
 
Given that Hadot presented his work as an exposition of ancient Greek 
and Roman philosophical thought, supported by modern works on this 
tradition, it is not surprising that Levinas’s critique can also be levelled 
against his work. This is especially the case in the theory of phusis and 
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its practice via ‘the view from above’ discussed by Hadot by drawing on 
a reading of Plato’s Timaeus (Hadot, 2006, p. 183). According to Hadot, 
Plato specifically argued that the goal of ‘lived physics’ was and can 
once again be to ‘become aware of the fact that we are part of the 
Whole … the universe … the All’ of creation, or phusis (Hadot, 2006, p. 
183; 2009, p. 95).  
 
The Levinassian problem becomes evident in Hadot’s description of 
phusis as a ‘means to overcome oneself and to move onto the plane of 
universal reason’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 60). Hadot argued that ‘what is 
capital’ in how one overcomes the self, is ‘the impression of immersion, 
of dilation of the self in Another to which the self is not foreign, 
because it belongs to it’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 8). Rather than effecting an 
‘opening to others’, as Hadot paradoxically also described it, I argue 
that, in Levinassian terms, the dilation of the self in the other reduces 
the distance between them by rendering them into the same (Hadot, 
2009, p. 60).  
 
That this is not a subsumption ‘of the self in Another’ but rather of the 
other into the same, is grounded in Hadot’s identification of this other 
with ‘universal reason’ (Hadot, 2009, pp. 6, 60). Consequently, the 
practice of physics leads to dilation of the self in the sense of its 
identification with universal reason, a ‘becoming conscious of … our 
identity with reason’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 107). This is dilation of the self in 
the sense of a letting go of the knowing ego inasmuch as identification 
of the self with universal reason appears as an ascending to a higher 
plane identified with universal ‘reason … considered as God’ (Hadot, 
2009, pp. 107-108). 
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In discussion of this problem inherent in this ‘view from above’ in the 
previous chapter, I argued that the same problem pervades Zen and 
Budo practices insofar as they are meant to lead to the realisation that 
the self is ‘one with all beings’ (Okumura, 2012, p. 34). Even if this one 
is ultimately referred to as nothing due to the impermanence and the 
insubstantiality of all existence, as in the case of Zen, sameness and 
identity with the self is nonetheless retained in this nothingness, 
becoming one all-encompassing (no)thing in itself. That is, if all 
existence was indeed one, then no present or future existence is 
separate from it, but only a permutation of the same that constantly 
recreates, or re-forms itself and its parts, yet ultimately stays the same, 
much as in the case of an eddy in the river (Uchiyama, 2004, pp. 99-
100).  
 
Regardless of the specific terms used for it, the consequence of the 
belief in universal identity as the ultimate, underlying reality of nature, 
is that there can be nothing other than the self, therefore no relation to 
anything other, and relation not fundamental to the self. This is also 
the case if the self is equal in its relation to the other, which is therefore 
not other, but self-same, and especially if its sameness consists in a 
mutual, contributive, active role in this relation. This would require its 
existence as self prior—and thus fundamental to—the relation. Finally, 
to have such an active, participatory role in this relation would mean 
that it has an active role in its own creation, or rather re-creation, since 
to have this ability would just as much require its prior existence. 
Capacity and causation 
That creation is, in fact, a self-referential process and capacity of the 
self rather than mutual is already a critical, integral assumption 
inherent in its universal identity. It is thus also not surprising that its 
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description as such pervades Hadot’s theory of phusis and the sources 
from which he draws it. Particularly explicit in the opening pages of 
What is Ancient Philosophy?, Hadot writes that phusis ‘originally meant 
the beginning, the development, and the result of the process by which 
a thing constitutes itself’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 10). The Veil of Isis continues 
with this conception of existence as a product and process of self-
creation (Hadot, 2006). Specifically, the same argument is implicit in 
Goethe’s argument that whatever ‘appears … must separate itself in 
order to appear’, and ‘the separated parts seek each other out once 
again and may find one another and reunite … in a transcendent mode’ 
that ‘procudes a third, which is new’ (Goethe in Hadot, 2006, p. 221).  
 
Goethe seems to suggest the existence of a range of entities involved in 
a mutual process of creation and recreation, by means of separation and 
reunification, though I argue he effectively asserts the contrary. In 
stating that whatever appears must separate itself, he firstly argues that 
appearance comes to existence through as much its own effort, as that 
from which it separates. Secondly, its efforts are at least as fundamental 
to its appearance as its relation to that from which it separates itself. 
But because it ‘must separate itself’ from something with which it has 
previously been one and with which it can ‘once again … reunite’, this 
is not a relation to something other. Rather, it is the self-generated 
relation to itself through the continuous separation and reunification of 
its parts to create and recreate itself (Goethe in Hadot, 2006, p. 221).  
 
Given the resonances between Hadot’s and Goethe’s theories of 
creation with those underlying Zen and Budo—via the influence of 
Shinto, Daoism, and Buddhism—a similar sense of creation and relation 
as capacity-of-self can be traced within their philosophies and 
practices. The notion of musubi provides a good example for how this 
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assumption plays out and even develops daily life and the comportment 
of the self. Its coincident relevance as philosophical and practical 
principle is also why it is considered of equal, name-giving importance 
to its phonetic and philosophical relative bu which forms the prefix for 
Budo, one of the central umbrella terms for the Japanese martial arts in 
modern times (Friday & Humitake, pp. 63-64).  
 
Bu more specifically refers to the military arts, martial prowess, bravery, 
power, and skill and, as such, closely relates to the emphasis on the 
need to accept death as an inevitable part of the trade. Its conjunction 
with musubi, as practical possibility and ideal, is derived directly from 
the understanding of contact or relation as the fundamental, life-giving 
principle. This leads to its inverse translation as ‘stop a spear’ or ‘to end 
conflict’, and as a result, musubi is reframed as an ideal capacity: the 
ability to end conflict in such a way that lives are preserved rather than 
taken and possibly even new alliances, and therefore lives, are built 
(Friday & Humitake, pp. 63-64). This in turn gives birth to the 
romanticised ideal of martial arts like Kashima Shinryu and Aikido as 
‘life-giving’ arts, and the pursuit of musubi as a capacity that can be 
acquired and applied by the self at the center of practice (Friday & 
Humitake, pp. 63-64). 
 
But if it is primarily understood, pursued and practised as an active 
capacity of the self, then the life-giving contact to something other can 
no longer be considered fundamental to the self, as its acquisition 
presupposes the existence of the self. Its relation to something else is 
thus relegated to a secondary place, outside of its self-center from 
which it can enter into and to which it can retreat from this relation. 
Because this self-center does not need this relation to exist, it follows 
that it creates itself, as much as it becomes the source of all creation by 
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virtue of its life-giving capacity. But yet again, as the sole source of 
creation it can only give birth to something that is already part of it by 
means of separation, or by reuniting itself with such a part. It is thus 
never actually in relation to anything else, but merely with itself as it 
recreates itself, at will. 
 
This is not an entirely accurate account of all aspects of the theories of 
musubi, interdependence, or phusis. Nonetheless, by drawing on them 
to develop the notion of passivity, passivity as the center of the self, 
and this center as characterised by a fundamental relation, I argue there 
are aspects of them that resonate with an egoistic and self-same 
resolution to the difference of self and other. A crucial argument in 
defence of the existence of a distinct self and other, and therefore a 
relation between them, can be drawn from the distinction between the 
knowing ego and a different kind of self, that is central to Levinas’s 
thought, ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, and Zen alike. As 
indicated in Chapter Three, this is different from a self defined by its 
‘grasping … its thoughts and aims, … its desires, and … its entire 
mental construction’ (Deshimaru, 2012, pp. 100-101). On the hither 
side of the conscious knowing self is another self that appears through 
passivity, as a passivity, and as such, as a self in relation to something 
other. 
 
In addition to this, I argue that its existence is ascertained in the 
imperative that the practitioner is meant to go beyond any self-
centered notion or practice of passivity and return to the world to ‘help 
all living beings’ through and as passivity (Okumura, 2012, p. 5). 
Placing this as the first of the four vows taken by a practitioner 
embarking on the Buddhist path after leaving home, further emphasises 
the indispensable role of the relation to the self as passivity and its 
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continuous practice. By no means exclusive to Zen, this perspective is 
implicit in the ‘life-giving’ and, by extension, helpful aspirations of the 
martial arts, however selective their life-giving may be. And despite all 
terminological evidence that suggests its radical opposite, it is also 
integral to the ‘self-transformation’ aspired to in the ancient 
philosophical practices engaged by Hadot, and that ‘consists precisely 
in being attentive to others’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 108). 
 
Among the arguments against a misinterpretation of relation as a 
capacity of the self is already its understanding as the ‘original creative 
principle’ of the universe, as with musubi, or phusis (Friday & Humitake, 
1997, p. 68). Thus understood it is far more accurate to speak of relation 
as a force distinct from self and other, fundamental to maintaining a 
space between them even if it brings them together to produce 
something new and distinct from them. This sense of musubi is 
certainly also supported by the notion that a Budo practitioner, or 
practitioner of passivity ‘gains capacities’ through a destituting process 
of letting go, rather than through a process of accumulation. If and how 
such a non-capacity might be conceived and converted into a more 
active practice is an issue I will revisit in greater detail in the following 
chapter. At this point, it is critical to note that relation is not a capacity, 
and it is precisely its not being a capacity that affirms and defines its 
fundamental place in the center of the self as passivity.     
 
The Buddhist concept of interdependence similarly teaches that ‘no 
single ideological explanation by itself can encompass the total range of 
causes’ contributing to any one single effect (Leighton, 2009, p. 191). A 
closely matching view is also expressed in the Stoic assumption that 
‘the world is a place full of chains of cause and effect that play out in 
ways we often cannot understand or change’ (Vitale, 2012b, p. 3). At 
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least according to these isolated statements, both Buddhist and Stoic 
philosophies are opposed to the possibility of identifying an all-
encompassing singular phenomenon as the sole, non-relative, linear 
source of causation. Rather, they present theories of complexity that 
single out the self as separate from, and in the midst of an infinite 
plurality of relations and relatives distinct from it. They further 
emphasise that this distinction cannot be undone, as all possible 
causative factors are unknowable, and therefore not identifiable as one, 
but infinite and infinitely separate from the self.  
 
This infinite separation of self and other implies three crucial issues for 
this research. The first of these is that the primary defining 
characteristic of the relation between the self and one or more others is 
that they are inassimilably separate. Although seemingly simplistic, the 
difficulty with this separation is how it is to be maintained conceptually 
and, as I will argue later, practically. The second crucial issue is that the 
relation is not a capacity of the self, or an option. There is no 
fundamental intentionality. Thirdly, relation is fundamental to the self, 
that is, prior to its active, ontological and epistemological capacities 
and accumulations. As primary characteristics of the fundamental 
relation, these preliminary considerations appear to perpetuate the 
initial impression that there is close to nothing that can be identified as 
a self. Contrary to this, in the following I draw out the way in which 
these characteristics point to a different conception of self. 
 
My analysis and juxtaposition of Zen, Budo, and Hadot is undoubtedly 
biased in its insistence on resonances and overlaps, especially within a 
Levinassian perspective that refuses assimilation. This raises the 
question whether their coherence is viable in determining practices 
that extend understandings of physiotherapy. The seeming irresolvable 
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difference of infinite separation—passivity of a fundamental relation—
and capacity or intention as practice of a self remains.  
 
This irresolution is central to the difficult question as to how passivity 
as physical therapy traverses to professional physiotherapy practice. 
That the embrace of paradox and ‘the simultaneous existence of 
opposites’ is considered an outstanding hallmark of Zen further 
compounds this issue (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 64). As a result, it is not only 
possible to find arguments for one or the other view of the issues 
juxtaposed here in Zen philosophy, but also the claim that both ‘you 
and I are the same thing and I’m not you and you’re not me’ (Loori, 
2002, p. 128). Rather than trying to resolve this issue at this point, I 
turn to a Levinassian perspective to reiterate the characteristics of the 
fundamental relation identified thus far in less ambiguous terms and 
draw out their relevance to an otherwise self. 
Proximity and causation – toward subjectivity 
The inassimilable separation between self and other, and the infinite 
distance of the other are central arguments of Levinas’s philosophy, 
evidenced both in the title of Totality and Infinity – An Essay on 
Exteriority and numerous sections of it explicitly related to the notions 
of separation and exteriority (Levinas, 1969). In his “Translator’s 
Introduction” to Otherwise than Being, Alphonso Lingis reiterates 
Levinas’s view of the fundamental relation in exactly these terms, as a 
relation to something ‘infinitely remote’ (xxv), a ‘contact with the 
irremediably exterior’ (Lingis, 1998, p. xix). Similarly, a distance forever 
out of reach is also implied in Rosenzweig’s reference to ‘the Star’ to 
which a self finds itself in relation (Rosenzweig, 2002, p. 417). 
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This escalation of the distance between self and other is critical to 
locate the other as entirely out of reach in a way that ‘escapes 
apprehension … exceeds comprehension’ (Lingis, 1998, p. xix). As 
pointed out earlier, this unintelligible excess of the other is the central 
aspect of Levinas’s work, related to his critique of ontological and 
epistemological grounds. Its critical import lies in being the defining 
element of the separation between self and other, and the other’s 
intangible resistance to the ontological and epistemological grasp of 
the knowing ego, the ego’s defining capacity that reduces the distance 
between self and other. The insurmountable distance between self and 
other thus situates the fundamental relation out of reach of the self and 
its capacities, and the other as that, which is and ‘comes to me from the 
exterior’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 51).  
 
This radical exteriority means that a self can neither choose to be in this 
relation, nor choose how it can be in such a relation. Rather, the relation 
to exteriority exposes the self precisely as a passivity, defenceless with 
regard to it. In its defencelessness, the self is always already in a 
relation that precedes any relation it could have with itself, precedes 
the self and its being, where being (ontology) refers to identity as a 
being (epistemology), and identification of the being of the world. Not 
being able to be without it, the relation to exteriority is not only of 
fundamental relevance to the self, but the fundamental condition of its 
existence. Relation to exteriority is ‘what first constitutes it in-itself’ 
(Lingis, 1998, p. xvi). Levinas’s insistence on exteriority, unknowability, 
and passivity hence results in a restitution of all creative capacity to the 
relation with the other. And because this relation is a movement that 
comes to me from the other, we can finally say that ‘I exist through the 
other’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 114). 
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To say that the self is a passivity is thus not to negate it, but to affirm, 
the self, fundamentally, as a self-in-relation. It is not an undoing, but ‘a 
defence of subjectivity’, however a subjectivity ‘founded in the idea of 
infinity’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 26). It does not mean that subjectivity does 
not have an inside, the ‘thought and interiority’ of a self (Levinas, 1969, 
p. 104), or being, but that the very center of this inside is a ‘locus finally 
created by this movement of alterity’ (Lingis, 1998, pp. xvi). The 
passivity of my being through the other defines this interiority-of-self 
precisely as my relation to something radically exterior, and locates this 
interiority in radical proximity to my self, not just at, but as the 
‘innermost sanctum’ of my self-center (Rosenzweig, 2002, p. 417). 
 
The distinction of self-centre and exteriority is critical to Levinas’s 
understanding of the radical proximity of the relation itself, though 
language almost fails in coming to terms with these notions. To say 
that it is just proximal to, or at the center of the self, could imply that it 
stands next to something else, and is therefore secondary, even if it 
were equivalent to other elements standing next to it. At the same time, 
to describe it as the center of the self could also be misleading if it were 
mistaken to imply that it is of the self, which would yet again revert to 
solipsistic non-relations.  
 
More synonymous with its timely precedence, the radical proximity of 
the relation at/as my center suggests that it ‘subtends the structure of 
space’ by being closer to me than any space I can inhabit and define as 
my self (Lingis, 1998, p. xxviii). It is, on the one hand, a ‘closeness 
without distance … the most extreme immediacy, proximity closer than 
presence, obsessive contact’, even to the point of being ‘sensuous’ as it 
touches me in my innermost self (Lingis, 1998, pp. xix, xvi). And on the 
other hand, this proximity is not ‘fusion’, but the very ‘contact with the 
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other’, infinite exteriority, that distinguishes me as a separate self 
(Levinas, 1998b, p. 86).  
 
Levinas’s work and terminology resonate with this notion of a 
fundamental relation at the center of the self that provided the opening 
for the present chapter. Such understanding of the fundamental 
relation provides further support for the practice and understanding of 
self-inquiry and the de-velopment of the self-center as a path toward 
an otherwise relation with the other via a corresponding understanding 
of the self. Adding to Zen, Budo, and Shiatsu, I argue that Levinas’s 
philosophy expresses the fundamental structural constitution of the 
relation and center more sharply than these. In juxtaposing and 
combining them, I have argued that the self is not defined by its 
cognition and capacity, but more fundamentally and ‘before … an 
exercise of options is possible’, as a passivity in relation (Lingis, 1998, 
p. xxi). The self is in a relation that is, firstly, a relation to something 
infinitely separate; secondly, a relation with regard to which it is a 
passivity, due to its incapacity with regard to this insurmountable 
distance; and, thirdly, this relation is the source of existence as a 
separate self, hence defining fundamental subjectivity as ‘subjection to 
the force of alterity’ (Lingis, 1998, p. xxi). 
 
To engage in the cathartic destitution of the self to passivity is thus not 
to engage in a solipsistic practice with no relation to any other, but to 
re-establish the self in relation, a foundation radically different from 
the theories and practices of contemporary physiotherapy, which are 
grounded in cognition and capacity. While this distinction provides a 
very general direction, it neither says how exactly the self is 
characterised in this relation, nor how it can provide a foundation for 
the development of an otherwise understanding of the professional 
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identity and practice of the physiotherapist. In the following sections I 
thus turn to these questions and explore the fundamental structure of 
the self in direct application to the development of a novel 
understanding of the physiotherapist.  
 
The self in relation 
To some extent, the transition from the previous to the present section 
of this chapter parallels Levinas’s thematic transition from an 
exploration of the fundamental relation in Totality and Infinity, to an 
exploration of the self as it is structured in this fundamental relation in 
Otherwise than Being (Levinas, 1969, 1998b). It may seem that this 
transition also continues the inward movement of the present study, 
from physiotherapy as a study and practice of and for others, to a 
practice and study of the self and its fundamental structure. Following 
Levinas’s definition of the fundamental relation as ethics, or the 
fundamental ethical relation, Critchley and Bernasconi referred to 
Levinassian ethics as describing ‘the structure of ethical subjectivity’ 
(Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 20). Given this redefintion of 
subjectivity as relational or ethical, transition from an exploration of 
the fundamental relation to the fundamental structure of the self thus 
marks an outward turn of this inward course, rather than its continuing.  
 
Simply put, because all that the self is at this fundamental level is what 
it is in relation, any further exploration of its fundamental structure is, 
simultaneously, an exploration of the ways that its structure is in 
relation to the other. It is due to this inherent relevance to the other 
that the characteristics that define the self and its structure as ethical 
in a Levinassian sense are not only meaningful, but even familiar to the 
professional identity and practice of the physiotherapist. I further argue 
that the fundamental structure of subjectivity in a Levinassian sense 
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resonates with the way that the self-in-relation is understood across my 
other philosophical sources. Their respective theories regarding the 
fundamental structure of the self-in-relation are, consequently, equally 
familiar to physiotherapy. I thus explore the fundamental 
characteristics of the self-in-relation or ‘the structure of ethical 
subjectivity’ in direct application to physiotherapy and the professional 
physiotherapist (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 20). 
Existing professionally 
To say that the self exists through the ‘contact with the other’, that 
‘subjectivity is opened from the outside, by the contact with alterity’, is 
to say that the self is ‘called up’ by the other (Lingis, 1998, p. xxi). 
Beyond reiterating that the self is always already in relation because it 
exists through the other, I argue that this variation of terms opens a 
possibility to refer to the self as vocation, ‘a calling’, or ‘being called’ 
according to the etymological root of the term (Harper, 2017r). This 
alternate wording immediately brings Levinas’s understanding of the 
fundamental structure of the self into the vicinity of a terminological 
genre familiar to physiotherapy, yet in doing so, implies a fundamental 
revision of its terms.  
 
In the case of vocation, for example, colloquial usage may conflate the 
meaning of vocation and that of profession, though their etymological 
roots express a difference between them that is noteworthy. 
Specifically, profession in its etymological sense implies a ‘public 
declaration’ in the active, verbal sense, on the side of the person 
making a declaration (Harper, 2017m, 2017n). Applied to 
physiotherapy, it would thus mean that to be a professional is largely 
the result of conscious choice, or act and, in the present sense, a self-
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positing statement. Whereas, the notion of vocation invokes the sense 
of a calling that precedes and grounds any such possibility.  
 
To say that the self is a vocation thus reiterates the idea that it is in a 
relation with regard to which it is passive, but which is also the source 
of its existence. On the one hand, this does not undo the possibility of 
eventually taking, or declaring one’s profession in a sense that might 
appear to render this more fundamental level irrelevant. On the other 
hand, I argue that to ground this profession on the foundation of a 
vocation also suggests a considerable revision of what it means to take 
up a profession, or be a professional. 
 
Understanding the self as vocation reiterates that what is fundamental 
to my role and practice as a physiotherapist is not self-identified 
professional knowledge, intention, identity, or practice, but my relation 
to the other. In this sense, the fundamental relation is not just that 
which ‘grounds, rather than supervenes on, the practices of medicine’ 
as argued by Clifton-Soderstrom (2003, p. 455). Rather, the 
fundamental relation is also that which grounds the self of the 
practitioner of medicine, or physiotherapy and, precisely in doing so, 
provides the foundation for any possible subsequent practice.  
 
The structure of self-as-vocation also reiterates and highlights the 
fundamental passivity of the self. To be called up as a self and, in this 
sense, follow one’s calling is not a matter of choice, but the 
fundamental, passive condition of the self. Building on the initial 
exploration of listening as a practice of passivity in Chapter Three, 
vocation-as-self also identifies listening, and listening in an obedient 
sense, and even obedience as defining characteristics of its 
fundamental structure. Without the possibility to choose whether or 
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not to be this calling, the self as passivity in relation is also always 
already structured as listening and ‘an obedience before the order has 
been understood, comprehended, even synthetically formulated for me’ 
(Lingis, 1998, p. xvii). 
 
There is an interesting parallel to this understanding of the self as 
listening and obedience that can help elucidate its implications for the 
physiotherapist. It is found in the term otonashi-no-kamae that is used 
as an alternative for mugamae, Kashima Shinryu’s stance or ‘position of 
pure, unlimited potential’ discussed in Chapter Three in the context of 
letting-go of the self and its place under the sun (Friday & Humitake, 
1997, p. 72-76). Among the many translations of otonashi are ‘silent’ 
and ‘obedient’, which, if combined with the other two words of the 
compound (roughly, kamae: stance, or posture; and no: of) result in its 
translation as ‘silent posture’ or ‘stance of obedience’ (Friday & 
Humitake, 1997, p. 72-76).  
 
In comparison, the etymological root of the Latin oboedire includes ‘to 
listen’, ‘hear’, ‘pay attention to’, and ‘give ear to’ (Harper, 2017k). With 
this in mind, it becomes possible to translate a ‘silent posture’ still 
more explicitly into a ‘listening posture’. Given that this sense of 
posture actually refers to an underlying sense of self, we arrive at the 
self as a (posture of) listening, and in this fundamental structural sense, 
as a listening without choice, the self as obedient listening. 
 
Already in the sense of paying attention, or giving ear to, obedience 
invokes a sense that exceeds the self as listening in a purely auditive 
sense. Even more evident in its meanings as to ‘be subject’ and to 
‘serve’, obedience reiterates that listening is already part of the 
structure of subjectivity, the way that the self is subject. Because this 
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structure is one of service, this subjection implies that the fundamental 
relation to the other, as well as the fundamental structure of the self in 
relation, is one of subservience. That this structure coincides with 
listening, in turn, renders listening, paying attention, or giving ear to 
the other into the first form of service, and thus identifies the self as 
subject to the other as the service of listening. 
 
Of particular interest to the therapeutic professions, the etymological 
meanings of obedience closely resonate with the etymology of the 
Greek term therapeuein that similarly translates to ‘attend, do service, 
take care of’ (Harper, 2017p, 2017q). Following from the above, the first 
therapeutic service, or, medically speaking, the first response provided, 
consists in listening to the other. Still more radically, because this 
listening is not an active possibility, but a structural characteristic of 
the self, it means that to exist as a self means to be called forth by the 
other to be for-the-other. In other words, because listening is not just a 
characterisation of its passive relation with regard to its existence, but 
already a service, and in this sense a response to the other, the self is 
‘called up or provoked to respond to alterity’, in the sense of already 
being this response in its passivity (Lingis, 1998, p. xxi). 
 
For Levinas, both subjection and responsibility were defining elements of 
the fundamental, ethical structure of the self, and especially the notion 
of responsibility became one of the most central themes of his work, 
equally present in both of his two preeminent publications (Levinas, 
1969, 1998b). At its most moderate level, it encompasses both my 
responsibility for ‘the situation in which I find myself, and for the 
existence in which I find myself’ (Lingis, 1998, p. xiv). Considering the 
relative lack of choice with regard to existence, to be responsible for 
one’s own existence might already seem rather excessive, yet Levinas’s 
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notion of responsibility goes beyond this. It includes not only 
responsibility for the other, but even responsibility for the ‘responsible 
moves of another’ and ‘the very impact and trouble with which he 
approaches me … I am responsible for the very faults of another, for his 
deeds and misdeeds … the pain he causes me’. And finally, this is not 
only the pain ‘he’ causes me but the pain ‘he’ causes to anyone else, 
and even for all futures and the time beyond my death, which although 
it ‘will mark the limit of my force’, will do so ‘without limiting my 
responsibility’ (Lingis, 1998, p. xiv). 
 
It is this excessive description of responsibility that underlies the 
dismissal of Levinassian philosophy as ultimately impossible to apply. 
Though this is based on a misunderstanding that neglects his 
description of responsibility as a defining characteristic of the 
fundamental structure of the self. Just like the fundamental relation 
itself, as one of the central characteristics of the fundamental structure 
of subjectivity, responsibility ‘precedes any relationship of the ego with 
itself’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 119). According to the space subtending order 
to the fundamental relation, any characteristic of the self-in-relation, 
including here, responsibility, is fundamental to the self in both a 
spatial and temporal sense. With both the structure of space and time 
identified as categories of the conscious, knowing ego, responsibility 
according to Levinas belongs to an order outside of either of these 
(Lingins, 1998, p. xix). In his own words, ‘this responsibility appears as 
a plot without beginning’ and is in this sense, anarchical, ‘an obligation, 
anachronously prior to any commitment’ (Levinas, 1998, pp. 101, 135). 
 
Anarchy is commonly understood as political or prior-to-politics, but 
Levinas’s notion of anarchy is considerably different from either of 
these. Though it does not exclude them entirely, its primary relevance 
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remains its indication of the anachronous precedence of the relation 
and the fundamental structure of the self prior to the common 
ontological and epistemological categories of being and time. In 
Levinas’s understanding, ‘anarchy is not disorder as opposed to order’, 
because ‘disorder is but an order, and what is diffuse is thematizable. 
Anarchy troubles being over and beyond these alternatives. It brings to 
a halt the ontological play’ and signifies the primordial ‘persecution’ of 
the self with the other in relation to which it is this ‘passivity beneath 
all passivity’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 101).  
 
In other words, it is through its anarchical origin that responsibility can 
be considered as a defining element of the structure of the self as a 
passivity in relation, as it is ‘in responsibility’ that ‘the same, the ego, is 
me, summoned [and] accused as unique in the supreme passivity of one 
that cannot slip away without fault’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 135). Consonant 
with the fundamental relation, it is in its anarchical responsibility that 
we can identify the self as—fundamentally—‘structured as the-one-for-
the-other … provoked, as irreplaceable and accused as unique’, but in 
this structure simultaneously separate as discussed before (Levinas, 
1998b, p. 135). Rather than an exacerbation of Levinas’s conception of 
responsibility, its anarchical, structural incidence thus means that 
responsibility ‘is already in act’ in the self, as a fundamental condition 
and the fundamental structure of its existence (Lingis, 1998, p. xiii).    
 
Levinas’s work thus presents a significantly different alternative to 
perceiving the passivity of the self as a nothingness devoid of meaning 
and purpose. Understood as as self-in-relation, passivity strongly 
affirms existence as subjectivity, or self. Due to its being called forth by 
the other—listening and responding to the other—this self is neither in 
a place of, nor on its own. Turning from the outside in, only to find a 
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relation to the outermost outside in my innermost sanctum, this 
innermost now reveals itself as not even mine. Effectively, the self is ‘in 
exile in itself. That is, driven, from the outside, into itself, but not 
finding a home, a position, a rest in itself’ (Lingis, 1998, p. xxxi).  
 
The word I means here I am, answering for everything and 
everyone. Responsibility for the others has not been a return to 
oneself, but an exasperated contracting, which the limits of 
identity cannot retain … The self is on the hither side of rest; it is 
the impossibility to come back from all things and concern 
oneself only with oneself … I am summoned as someone 
irreplaceable. I exist through the other and for the other 
(Levinas, 1998b, p. 114).  
 
In summary then, to be, or exist as a subject is both to have already 
listened and, in the passivity of this listening, also already to have 
responded to the other. I have argued that this response could be 
understood as an original profession, in the etymological sense of an 
acknowledgement of one’s vocation. Because this response takes place 
in the passivity of one’s obedient listening, it remains of an order prior 
to the wilful declaration and effort with which one takes on a profession 
in the active sense underpinning contemporary professional healthcare 
theory and practice. The resulting understanding of the term profession 
thus distances and effectively dispossesses it from its common usage 
and appropriation in contemporary therapeutic professions. Contrary to 
these, it identifies the self-in-relation as professional, and its 
fundamental profession as being a therapist for the other.  
Existing physically 
Going back to the notion that ‘subjectivity is a subjection to the force of 
alterity’, Lingis further suggests that the self is a ‘being exposed to 
being wounded and outraged’ by the other (Lingis, 1998, pp. xxi, xviii). 
The description of this force of alterity in such intensely discomforting 
   181 
terms has two closely related critical purposes in the context of 
Levinassian thought. The first of these lies in the strength with which it 
reiterates that to be created as a self-in-relation also means to be 
created by the ‘contact with the other’, and in so doing, that this 
contact is physical (Levinas, 1998b, p. 86). Physicality is also implicit in 
the notion that the self is created from its center outward, as much as 
the center of one’s body as the locus of this creation implies a 
physicality of its contact and the center of the self as physical structure. 
Without this physicality, neither listening nor response to the other 
would be possible, regardless of whether they are conceived of as 
auditory phenomena, or not. 
 
That creation of a self as physical body is an exposure and being 
wounded, further reiterates that its physical structure is not of its own 
making, but what is given to it in relation to another with regard to 
which it is a passivity. Levinas thus referred to the self as vulnerability, 
sensibility, and susceptibility, to further emphasise the fundamental 
passivity of its existence. As self-in-relation, susceptibility or 
sensibility are the basic form of its relation to the other, but this 
sensibility is not to be conceived as an act, or active sense-capacity in 
the conventional sense, but precisely the vulnerable, passive 
susceptibility, or sensitivity to a contact that can neither be avoided, 
nor managed. As ‘the ethical relation takes place at’ this ‘level of 
sensibility, not at the level of consciousness’, the ‘Levinassian ethical 
subject is’ also to be understood as a fundamentally ‘sensible’ rather 
than conscious subject (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 21). 
 
Such understanding of the self as a primordially vulnerable sensibility, 
always already wounded by the other, is crassly opposed to heroic 
notions of the self commonly aspired to in the martial arts. Though far 
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less foregrounded, I argue that a similar notion of the self as a 
subjectivity defined through its being thrown ‘back upon its resources’ 
is nonetheless implicit in their terms for role-allocation in the context 
of training with a partner (Lingis, 1998b, p. xxi). Specifically in Aikido, 
the person defending is often referred to as nage, the thrower, deriving 
derives from the Japanese verb nageru, meaning to throw. Contrary to 
this, the presumable attacker is called uke. Coming from the verb ukeru, 
this term means to receive, accept, get, catch, answer, undergo, most 
frequently in reference to the throw received in response to an attack 
(Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 102; Krenner, 2016, pp. 56-57).  
 
The role of uke thus encompasses both an initial attack and the 
receiving of the technique or throw in response to it. Referred to as 
ukemi, the compound term for this role combines the term uke with mi, 
meaning both body and person (Krenner, 2016, pp. 56-57). While there 
are certainly many more ways in which the term ukemi can be 
translated, I argue that even this general sense resonates closely with 
Levinas’s perspective of the constitution of the self. This becomes 
particularly visible in the combination of terms coming together in its 
translation as to receive one’s body or receive oneself. As such, it 
approximates the sense of the body as the structure in which one is 
given self, as much as the receiving of one’s physical self is as a result of 
a ‘movement that comes from without’, a relation and contact that 
figures as the other’s throwing of myself into my body (Lingis, 1998, p. 
xvii).  
 
Though this is a brief engagement with the ways in which self and other 
are understood in their relation as training partners and opponents in 
the martial arts, I argue that it supports and further elucidates the 
notion of the self as a being singled out in its body, subject in its 
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physicality. Called forth and thrown into this body, it is ‘this materiality 
and this passive condition’, hair, skin, flesh, bone, and marrow (Lingis, 
1998b, p. xxiii). Though not the primary terminological choice for 
Levinas in his description of susceptibility, I argue that this sense of 
physicality is nonetheless retained in: the vigour of the contact with 
which the self is created in relation; the notion of proximity that locates 
this contact in the most radical inside of the self; and the notion of 
listening and response, as both of these are either dependent, or at least 
intimately related to the physicality of the self. 
 
In Chapter Three I argued that the physical dimension of physiotherapy 
is usually associated with three elements considered characteristic of its 
professional practice: It is inscribed in its focus on the improvement of 
clients’ physical structure and function; which should, in turn, be based 
on its understanding through the hard, physical evidence of biomedical 
science; and these finally, also provide the knowledge-base for physical 
therapeutic modalities such as physical exercises, the use of physical 
agents such as water, air, or electricity, or manual therapeutic 
interventions.  
 
In conjunction with these, the body of the therapist is a taken-for-
granted physical agent in their accumulation and delivery. It is used in 
service of theoretical and practical instruction regarding physical 
exercises, administering physical agents to a client’s body, or using 
hands to apply massage, or other manual techniques. To consider the 
self as a physical profession, as I have suggested here, however, anchors 
understanding of the therapist as a physical agent at an even more 
fundamental level, as a passivity in relation prior to intentional practice 
and its use in the context of physical therapies.  
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Existing therapeutically 
Levinas considered the ontological and epistemological movement of 
the knowing ego, beginning with its self-identification, as violence 
toward otherness. He further described that this self-identifying 
claiming of its own place under the sun exposes the self ‘as the usurper 
of the place of the other’ and even ‘the whole world’ (Levinas & 
Kearney, 1986, p. 24). I argued for a first therapeutic measure to 
counter this violence, suggesting that it might consist in a practice of 
letting-go and thus detracting from being ‘a subsistent entity or 
moment of Being’ (Lingis, 1998, p. xvi).  
 
The question that presents itself now is whether the place and practice 
of physical therapy as I have outlined here risks returning us to such a 
usurpation, to the self becoming a subsistent entity or moment of 
Being? While it nonetheless remains true that ‘it is in taking place of 
another’ in its physicality ‘that subjectivity first comes to inhabit 
space’, the first point of difference to conventional conceptions of self 
is that subjectivity is called forth into this physicality by the other and 
therefore does not claim this physical space by a movement of its own 
(Lingis, 1998, p. xxix). Being called forth to listen and respond to the 
other in its physicality, the space of its physicality is also not for itself, 
not its own place under the sun, but for the other. In other words, the 
initial taking place of another, effected through the fundamental 
physicality of the self, is an essential component of its responsibility, 
the fundamental shape of listening and responding to the other. 
 
To express the otherwise signification of taking the place of another in 
one’s physicality, Lingis consequently argues that ‘to be responsible … 
is to put oneself’ in the place of another (Lingis, 1998, p. xiv). Read in 
isolation, this could yet again seem to resonate with another notion 
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prevalent in many martial arts and referred to as irimi (Krenner, 2016, p. 
139). The term irimi commonly refers to entering into an attacker’s 
approach to disrupt the full development of the attack and apply a 
defensive, or preemptive counter. Though the exact way, place and time 
of entering depend on a broad variety of factors, a common conception 
of it is to take the attacker’s place, or the place so required to be taken 
beforehand. The prevalent understanding of irimi thus defines it as an 
active capacity of the self, and as the ideally successful result of one’s 
taking initiative and action, one that serves the achievement of its goals 
and objects, irrespective of how malevolent or benevolent these may be. 
 
From a Levinassian perspective, putting oneself in the place of another 
cannot be for the self and can ‘not to be conceived actively, as an 
initiative’ (Lingis, 1998, p. xxiii). As part of the fundamental structure 
of ethical subjectivity, Levinas refers to it as substitution, and devotes 
an entire chapter of Otherwise than Being to the analysis of this central 
notion and its implications for the self (Levinas, 1998b, p. 99). In his 
sense, substitution is a characteristic of ‘this materiality and this 
passive condition’, the fundamental physical structure of the self 
(Lingis, 1998, p. xxiii).  
 
That substitution is passive again reiterates that it is neither an 
intentional act, nor a willed initiative or product. Substitution is not for 
the self, but prior to its forms of conscience, knowledge and 
understanding. As the fundamental form of responsibility, substitution 
implies that both listening and responding are different to knowing and 
understanding. To acknowledge the other in a Levinassian sense is 
precisely to be understood as an a-knowledge-ment, ‘a form of 
recognition—acknowledgement of a claim, an order, which is even 
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constitutive of subjectivity—a summons to arise to be and to present 
oneself’ prior to oneself and one’s capacities (Lingis, 1998, p. xiii). 
 
What is critical to this presenting oneself to another, listening and 
responding to the other in my physicality, is that it does not reduce the 
distance to the other. Rather than ‘reflecting upon the other’ and thus 
reducing the distance between them, the physicality of the self 
underscores the ‘non-subsumptive relation’ with the other (Critchley & 
Bernasconi, 2002, p. 12). The principal acknowledgement is one of ‘the 
other’s separateness from me’, and it is the failure to acknowledge this 
‘that can be the source of tragedy’ according to Levinas (Critchley & 
Bernasconi, 2002, p. 26).  
 
Of critical import to physiotherapy, as the physical acknowledgement of 
the separation between self and other, subjectivity is effectively ‘a 
support called up’ by the other and for the other (Lingis, 1998, p. xxi). 
This notion of support is critical for a further understanding of Levinas’s 
conception of the self as substitution, and a sense of putting oneself in 
the place of another that precedes a more violent taking of this place. In 
a more literal and etymological sense of the word, his understanding of 
support references it as an aid from below, a holding up, or carrying  
from underneath (Harper, 2017o). Hence, the subjectivity of the self, 
it’s being created by and thus thrown under the other as a sub-ject, 
converts into a physical substitution for the other, a physical sub-
stance ‘supporting the other’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 136).  
 
This idea of the self as a physical support for the other is not exclusive 
to Levinassian philosophy. It also resonates, for example, with the 
notion that the practice of zazen is itself ‘the most effective and helpful 
effort’ (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 132). Seemingly paradoxical from the 
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perspective of an active therapeutics, the rationale behind this claim 
lies precisely in the idea that the self, in the most fundamental passive 
physical structure and functioning of its posture and breathing, is 
already the actualisation of an acknowledgement of all interdependent 
existences.  
 
Similarly, both the concept and practice of tenchijin, translating to 
heaven-earth-human, reiterates this sense of self as a physical support, 
and further elicits another critical component of the notion of support. 
In the modern martial art Aunkai, its practice as a distinct exercise is 
considered part of the greater project of ‘returning to our natural state’ 
(Akuzawa, 2007). Specifically, it  consists in a movement whereby the 
practitioner goes from a natural standing position, to one distinctly 
identifiable as if supporting something above one’s head, then a similar 
position in relation to the ground, and back to the initial stance 
between these with the palms pressed against each other at the chest.  
 
Applied to the present context, it could be said that by assuming its 
natural standing between heaven and earth, the self presents itself as a 
support for both heaven and earth, a physical substance providing 
material support for the world and its various forms of existence. Its 
physical support consists, precisely, in ensuring their separation from 
and thus their non-subsumptive relation to each other, and to the 
practitioner, with the practitioner’s body as the substance between 
them. In its substantial guarantee of separation, relation, distance and 
difference with this material body, the self provides and is not only 
physical support, but also company for the other.   
 
The notion of company is pertinent here for a number of reasons. 
Originating in the Latin com, with, and panis, bread, and thus 
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referencing a sense of sharing food with another, it emphasises the 
physicality of the self and the service it provides to the other (Harper, 
2017c). In relation to the notion of the companion, it also relates to 
another etymological meaning of the therapist that ties in with the 
other fundamental characteristics of the self-in-relation developed thus 
far.  
 
As one of a variety of terms used for servants or slaves in ancient 
Greece, the term therapon reiterates that the therapeutic standing of 
the self ‘is not chosen’, for ‘if there had been a choice, the subject 
would have kept his as-for-me’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 136; LSJ, 2015). In 
addition to this, it was also used to denote a squire, henchman, or 
companion in arms, as well as a servant of God, or worshipper, thus 
identifying the therapon as neither a paid worker, nor a slave, but a 
servant compelled to accompany and support another by a sense of 
duty and companionship, regardless of standing or recompense (LSJ, 
2015). To be a therapist thus retains the sense of passivity that 
identifies the self as a professional prior to its own intentions and 
activity and, at the same time, as a friendly or beneficient physical 
support and company. 
 
In the following chapter, I turn to the analysis of this professional 
physical support and company to explore its potential conversion into 
professional practice in a more conventional sense. Specifically with 
regard to the fundamental support and company provided to the other 
through the professional, physical self, I refer to and explore their 
potential practice as accompaniment, a term borrowed from Alphonso 
Lingis’s Community of those who have nothing in common (Lingis, 1994). 
In closing this chapter, I emphasise that the physicality of a body is the 
passive instance of this fundamental professional physical therapy of 
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accompaniment, consisting in simultaneously and inseparably 
providing support for alterity, and the company of relation. In slight 
variance to Levinas and Rosenzweig, I emphasise the central role of a 
physicality that they make more implicit than explicit. That is, that this 
very body is already the Here I am that is uttered well before one’s 
mouth is opened and vocality becomes a figure of speech (Levinas, 
1998b, p. 114). ‘The Law I recognise is’ thus not ‘first formulated in my 
own words of obedience—the Here I am’ as concrete utterance, but in 
the Here I am of this material body, hair, skin, flesh, bone and marrow 
(Lingis, 1998, pp. xxxiv-xxxv).  
 
In understanding the self as support and company for the other, though 
this support and company as ‘a passive effect’—the structure of the self 
as passivity called forth by the other—lies the source and strength of 
Levinas’s philosophy for a radically novel and potentially stronger 
foundation for therapeutic theory and practice (Lingis, 1998, p. xxx). 
Based on this ‘radical reversal from cognition to solidarity’, the self as 
passivity called-forth by the other presents a radically different notion 
of self as physical therapy of company and support (Levinas, 1998b, p. 
119).  
 
It is precisely by uncovering the ethical, or in the present sense, 
therapeutic relation and structure of the self as fundamental that 
Levinas is able to confirm the Ridiculous dream that ‘evil is’, indeed, not 
‘the normal condition of people’ (Dostoyevsky, 2001, p. 284). Rather, it 
is material goodness, or ethics. As I have tried to show here, this 
fundamental condition, goodness and structure of the self can 
consonantly be referred to as physical therapy, not only by drawing on 
Levinas, but also the other sources explored in this thesis. 
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I have wrestled with the following statement considerably but, keeping 
in mind that Levinas was as much a phenomenologist as he was a 
thinker of ethics, I disagree with the notion that response-ability, or 
physical therapy as I have put it here ‘is not our ultimate metaphysical 
essence’ and further, that ‘it only is a possibility’ (Biesta, 2004, p. 323). 
More in line with my other sources, I have argued for professional 
physical therapy of passivity and accompaniment as a metaphysical 
essence of the self, albeit not in the sense of it being independent or 
unchanging. Rather, it is the solidity and solidarity of a substitution 
that provides support and company, or connection for the other and, in 
so doing, a certain stillness in support of the other’s ongoing motion or 
infinite otherness, yet a stillness called forth through the infinitely 
other, and thus itself subject to ongoing motion and change.  
 
This stillness at my very center, the fundamental structure of the self-
in-relation, is professional physical support and company for the other. 
I am through the other, but in being through the other, I am also a 
professional physical therapist providing support and company for the 
other, not as the result of my knowledge, skills, and capacities, but as 
the fundamental condition of my material body—hair, skin, bones, 
flesh, and marrow. Rather than presenting a threat to the professional 
standing of physiotherapy, I argue that the notion of the self as a 
professional physical therapist presents a defence for it by anchoring 
this professional identity at a more fundamental level. Located in the 
very structure of the self, physical therapy for the other is irrevocably 
fundamental to it and the irrefusable source and reason for its 
professional standing. 
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In summary 
In the present chapter I explored the self as a passivity and its relevance 
to a novel understanding of the professional physical therapist. I began 
with a critique of passivity and the self thus understood to engage in its 
more detailed analysis and further development. I argued that passivity 
is not an aim or end, but an indispensable theoretical and practical 
waypoint that opens to the rediscovery of the relation to the other as 
the fundamental center of the self, and from there, the recognition of 
the fundamental characteristics of ethical subjectivity.  
 
I argued that these fundamental characteristics, or structure of the self 
can alternatively be referred to in terms especially familiar to 
physiotherapy, that is, as professional physical support and company 
for the other. Called forth by the other, as physical substance providing 
support and company, or accompaniment for the other, the self is 
fundamentally speaking, a professional physical therapist. I finally 
argued that this understanding of the self and its relation to the other 
provides a novel foundation for physiotherapy practice, entirely 
different from its conventional ontological and epistemological 
grounds. It establishes physical therapy as fundamental profession and 
the physical therapist as fundamental and even indispensable 
healthcare practitioner.  
 
This definition of fundamental profession extends the undermining of 
professional identity and practice as understood in contemporary 
physiotherapy that concerns this research to the point of questioning 
the justification and existence of physiotherapy as a profession beyond 
this fundamental level. This is further amplified by the fact that the 
structure of the self is neither of its own choice, nor making and, 
consequently, the fundamental physical therapy that it provides is not 
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so much its practice, but its passive effect. In the following chapter, I 
explore if and how this passive effect might nonetheless be converted 
into an active and professional practice, with a particular view toward 
practices pertinent to the relation between a therapist and client. 
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Chapter Five  
Passivity and Accompaniment as Physical Therapies 
 
What the face of the other asks for is not the inauthentic and 
inauthentifying solicitude with which I substitute my skills for 
his, take over her tasks for her, view the landscape for him, 
formulate the answers to the questions in her stead. He does not 
seek his or her contentment in the content that will satisfy his 
needs and wants, which I can supply from my place and my 
resources and with my skills – the contentment which, when he 
has been displaced by me and disburdened of his own tasks, will 
leave him only the weight and depth of the inorganic. In seeking 
the support of my upright stand on the earth, the agile 
luminousness that shines in my eyes, the warmth in my hands, 
the ardour in my face and the spirituality in my breath ... The 
other seeks the contact and the accompaniment (Lingis, 1994, 
pp, 131-132).  
 
Introduction 
In Chapter Three I developed a range of practices of passivity and 
argued for them as a possible expansion of contemporary 
physiotherapy. Due to their destituting effect on their practitioner, I 
further argued that the letting go of therapeutic practice, knowledge, 
intention, and self, suggest passivity as not only an objective for 
practice, but also the only remaining characteristic of the self in their 
following. In Chapter Four I then explored this notion of the self as 
passivity in greater detail, to discern its potential implications to the 
development of an otherwise understanding of the self, the other, and 
their relation in physiotherapy.  
 
Over the course of the chapter, I further described how continued 
practice of passivity reveals the fundamental structure of the self as 
being characterised by its relation to the other, and in this relation as a 
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professional physical therapy of passivity and accompaniment for the 
other. I concluded that this contributes a novel and understanding of 
physical therapy, the physiotherapy profession, and the physical 
therapist that reinforces the fundamental role of physiotherapy, by 
relocating and anchoring its professional identity can calling in the 
fundamental relation and structure of the self. Finally, I also pointed 
out that such a relocation and redefinition of physiotherapy as 
fundamental is not without problems and risks undermining 
professional physiotherapy practice and the role of physiotherapy as a 
profession. That is, as fundamental profession and service, physical 
therapy is neither a practice of the self, or even its choice, but its 
passive effect.  
 
In the present chapter, I explore if and how this passive effect might be 
converted into an active, and even professional practice, and do so with 
a particular view toward practices applicable in the relation between a 
singular therapist and client. I begin this exploration with an 
examination of Levinas’s vehement claim that the conversion of ethics 
into practice is not possible, and a similar argument brought forth in 
the context of Zen. I respond to these by arguing that a partial 
conversion of fundamental physical therapy of passivity and 
accompaniment into practice might be possible after all, and explore 
how it could be achieved throughout the remainder of the chapter. 
Specifically, I do so by developing an exemplary range of professional 
physical therapies of passivity and accompaniment and, with these, a 
foundation for the development of practices into the future. This 
entails an expandsion of the practices of passivity developed in Chapter 
Three; a further exploration of the importance of their physical 
practice, and in extension physical therapy as developed in Chapter 
Four; and finally, by building on the notion of accompaniment drawn 
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from the opening quote to this chapter from Alphonso Lingis’s book 
The community of those who have nothing in common (Lingis, 1994). 
Beyond structure 
Levinas’s position regarding the conversion of ethics into practice is 
grounded in the fact that ‘substitution is a passive effect’, and 
therefore, ‘one does not succeed in converting into an active initiative 
or into one’s own virtue’ (Lingis, 1998, p. xxxi). The reasoning behind 
this rather categorical argument lies in the atemporal, aspatial, 
unintentional precedence of the fundamental relation, and the 
structure of ethical subjectivity discussed in the Chapter Four. Due to 
this precedence, ethics forever escapes the grasp of the ontological and 
epistemological actions, intentions, and capacities of the knowing ego, 
thus rendering the conversion of ethics into practice fundamentally 
impossible.  
 
In the philosophy and practice of Zen, the simultaneous passivity and 
efficacy of the self is implied in the belief that ‘the most effective and 
helpful effort is zazen’ (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 132). Yet this practice is a 
radical practice of passivity, both in its letting go to the point of ‘total 
destitution’, and its physical form, reducing its practitioner to nothing 
but breath and posture (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 101). Given this radicality, 
it would seem that it is impossible to replicate the passive effect of 
zazen in any more active movement, let alone any more complex 
activity or professional practice.  
 
A sense of impossibility is also embedded in the four principal vows 
that a practitioner takes upon leaving home and embarking on the 
Buddhist path. Closely resonating with Levinas’s description of 
excessive demand of the other and resulting excessive responsibility of 
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the self, each of these vows is defined by an implicitly unachievable 
task. In the first vow, for example, the practitioner may state: ‘sentient 
beings are numberless; I vow to save them’ (Okumura, 2012, p. 15). It is 
thus the immensity of the task that initially defines its completion as 
infinitely out of reach, because ‘if sentient beings are numberless, we 
cannot possibly save them all’ (Okumura, 2012, p. 15).  
 
At the same time, the Buddhist vows also provide a more hopeful 
outlook, insofar as they explicitly emphasise the need to help, and thus 
the possibility to do so however imperfectly. I will explore the different 
ways in which this need and opening are described in the context of Zen 
a little later in the chapter. Regardless of their exact definition and 
approach, however, it is the window of opportunity that the vows open 
up that motivates their taking and pursuit as a way to help all beings 
(Okumura, 2012, p. 15). 
 
Despite his repeated emphasis of its fundamental impossibility, over 
the course of his work Levinas also made an ‘increasing… attempt to 
traverse the passage from ethics to politics’, or ethical practice in the 
present sense (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 24). Most significantly, 
Levinas explored this traverse in relation to justice, politics and, what 
he referred to as ‘the third party’ of the relation, or simply the third 
(Levinas, 1969, p. 305). For the present purpose however, I will 
primarily draw on his less foregrounded exploration of the ‘little acts of 
goodness’ to argue for a traverse from ethics to practice closer to the 
one-on-one relation between therapist and client (Critchley & 
Bernasconi, 2002, p. 27). Whether it is attempted in the clinical relation 
between therapist and client, or a broader, and thus political context, 
this traverse from ethics to practice builds on the hitherto developed 
understanding of ethics and the fundamental structure of the self.   
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In a translation of these to the context of physiotherapy, I have argued 
for passivity and accompaniment as the fundamental, therapeutic 
structure of the self, and proposed that this understanding and its 
actualization is arrived at through the self-practices of passivity. I have 
thus far only alluded to the potential of these practices to be 
therapeutic for the other in passing. In this chapter, I continue their 
exploration to discern their therapeutic potential more distinctly, and 
how they, and the subsequently developed notion of self might support 
the development of other professional physical therapies. I specifically 
draw on conceptions of helpful and therapeutic action from Zen, 
Shiatsu, and other sources, and argue that they closely resonate with 
Levinas’s little acts of goodness (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 27).  
 
Because the development of more active practices of passivity and 
accompaniment is a traverse from ethics to practice, in the following, I 
argue that the study and practice of the fundamental structure of the 
self, its recalling and re-embodiment, already constitutes its first step. 
As argued in the preceding chapters, this is done through the 
theoretical and practical physical, philosophical exercises practices of 
passivity. I revisit the purpose of the various practices of passivity to 
highlight their inherent therapeutic effects and argue that these are 
intimately familiar and relevant to physiotherapy.  
 
Fundamental for the traverse from ethics to practice is that passivity, 
both as an objective for practice and a fundamental characteristic of the 
self always already involves a form of doing and effect as implied in the 
etymological root of the term practice that derives from the Greek 
prassein, prattein meaning to do, act, or effect. As doing and effect, it is 
always already in relation to something outside the self in its out-doing 
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(from Latin ex, out; and facere, to do). Having described its fundamental 
effect as providing company and support to the other that it is in 
relation to, I thus argue that the practices of passivity are inherently 
always already therapeutic for the other.  
 
Following the critique of passivity and its subsequent analysis in the 
previous chapter, I have thus far emphasised that this physical therapy 
presents a problem to the conventional, professional understanding 
and practice of physiotherapy. On a, in a sense, applied level, to identify 
it as fundamental so closely overlapping with that which is commonly 
considered central to the physiotherapy profession, it questions the 
possibility to claim physical therapy as its exclusive arena. And on the 
fundamental level explored in this chapter, it additionally questions the 
possibility to be converted into an active practice altogether. Given that 
this conversion is necessary for any application of it beyond the 
fundamental, it is this issue that needs to be addressed to begin with. 
Precisely what I am arguing here in its regard, as that which gives its 
potential resolution its first direction, is that the fact that the practices 
of passivity are nonetheless practices, effective, and therapeutic, thus 
laying a foundation for their, at least partial conversion into 
professional therapeutic practices. 
 
That the traverse from ethics to practice is not only possible, but also 
necessary, is also implied in the notion that passivity and its practice is 
‘not a sure harbour, or a place of retreat’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 136). The 
other does not call me forth so that I can rest in the effects of my 
passive existence, but to provide it with support and company. It thus 
fundamentally ‘calls for and demands goodness’ of me, a demand that 
in itself requires me to exit out of my self, and thus go over and beyond 
my passivity (Lingis, 1998, p. xxi). Being ‘on the hither side of rest’ and 
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unable to ‘come back from all things and concern oneself only with 
oneself’, means to be fundamentally called, and even forced to do, act 
and practice (Levinas, 1998b, p. 114). To be a professional in the sense 
discussed in Chapter Four thus already implies that there is not only a 
need, or ‘ethical demand’ for ethical subjectivity, but in it, always 
already a demand for ethical practice (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 
28). 
 
Further, if to be a professional means to be called forth, and called to 
practice, then to be a professional also means that the self is called 
forth in such a way that it can provide goodness, and even has capacity, 
choice, and cognition. Because it already provides a particular kind of 
goodness in its passivity however, the self is not only called forth to 
provide goodness in ways that exceed its fundamental service of 
support and company, but in ways grounded in it. The self is therefore 
not called to practice or ‘business as usual’, but to an attempt to 
underpin its practice and ‘social interactions … by ethical relations’, or 
simply, ethics (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 13). 
 
Yet, there is ‘no guarantee that people will respond, no mechanism that 
can make us respond’ to the call of the other, in a way that is congruent 
with our fundamental, ethical subjectivity (Biesta, 2004, p. 323). To be 
given choice and possibility, therefore, brings a particular difficulty 
with it, that Levinas also referred to as a Difficult Freedom (Levinas, 
1990). It is the freedom and ability to choose, aspire, act, or practice 
ethically, according to our fundamental structure as the professional 
physical support and company for the other, or choose not to do so, and 
thus relate to the other in a way that reduces and restricts all otherness.  
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It has been argued that ‘what constitutes us in our subjectivity, is the 
way in which we - you and I as singular beings respond’ (Biesta, 2004, p. 
323). Building on my exploration of ethical subjectivity however, I 
would rather argue that we always already respond ethically in and 
through our fundamental, passive structure, and are given further 
response-ability in and with this structure. The way in which we can put 
this subject-ability to function is not constitutive but depends on our 
constitutional, physical ability to respond, whether we choose to or not. 
The fact that this ability is equally fundamental to subjectivity as the 
passive physical support and company always already provided for the 
other, creates the possibility for practice in a sense approximating the 
fundamental structure of the self as a passivity in relation, regardless of 
how difficult, insufficient, or even unachievable it may be.  
 
In summary, I argue that while it is strictly speaking impossible to 
convert the fundamental structure of the self as a passive, professional, 
physical company and support for the other into active therapeutic 
practices, there is nonetheless a marginal possibility for a traverse from 
ethics to practice. In the context of justice, politics, the little acts, and 
other conceptions of helpful action, I argue that this possibility is 
already implied in the practices of passivity and the fundamental 
structure of the self as physical therapy of passivity and 
accompaniment. In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the possible 
traverse from ethics to practice in greater detail as I explore a range of 
corresponding practices and an approach to their ongoing 
development.  
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Passivity in practice  
Having developed the practices of passivity in Chapter Three, the 
principal purpose of picking up on them here is to stress their 
inherently therapeutic effects for the other, and their particular 
proximity to professional physiotherapy in both form and effect. The 
central element of the critical perspective leading to their initial 
development, and underpinning this entire thesis, is that ontology, 
epistemology, and the specialized, theories and practices of 
physiotherapy buit upon them enact an inadvertent, yet momentous 
violence against ‘all forms of otherness’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, 
p. 11). This violence consists in restricting and reducing the infinitely 
other to the ontological and epistemological categories and capacities 
of the self. Building on the argument that it also ‘occurs whenever I 
limit the other to a set of rational categories, be they racial, sexual, or 
otherwise’, I particularly focused on health and sickness as exemplary, 
therapeutic and diagnostic categories that highlight how this 
epistemological violence occurs in healthcare and physiotherapy more 
specifically (Beavers, 1990, p. 3). To additionally highlight its particular 
relevance to physiotherapy, I finally referred to this violence as an 
incapacitation and immobilisation, thus identifying it as, even literally 
opposed to the definitional aims of the profession.  
Mobilisation and rehabilitation 
Despite my initial focus on them as self-practices for the professional 
therapist, I implicitly alluded to the simultaneous effect they have on 
the client-other from whom this professional self, and its intentions, 
knowledge, and practices are now, at least momentarily withdrawn. 
Corresponding to the terms used to describe the ontological and 
epistemological violence against the other in relation to physiotherapy, 
this effect could also be referred to as a rehabilitation and mobilisation. 
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It is precisely in this sense then that the practices of passivity can be 
thought of as therapeutic practices for the other. 
  
To say that they are therapeutic practices is not to forget that they are 
not active practices aiming at the mobilisation and rehabilitation of the 
other in the conventional sense. Rather, this mobilisation and 
rehabilitation is a passive effect that can not be intended, as this would 
render it active again. With infinite mobility, and in this sense capacity 
(or ability) being the fundamental condition of the other rather than 
the self, they are, strictly speaking, also not an effect contingent on the 
aid of the therapist, nor a condition that can be affected by the 
therapist at a fundamental level. Yet what I am suggesting here is that 
their practice might aid in reducing the disregard of this fundamental 
otherness in professional physiotherapy, and thus, provide a support 
for otherness in daily life and practice beyond the fundamental. 
 
Already in their initial exploration, I considered a variety of forms for 
the four, broader practices of passivity. Amongst others, the variations 
discussed for the letting go of practice, knowledge, intention, and self 
included examples like: rigorously hesitating, not speaking, sitting 
(meditation), not grasping, listening, the limitation of desires, and the 
acceptance of ageing, sickness, and death. By further considering 
physical practices for flexibility, relaxation, awareness, I tried to 
highlight that most of these practices either: overtly require a physical 
engagement on the side of the practitioner; involve the body of the 
practitioner in more implicit ways; or at a minimum, have alternate 
variations emphasising either the intellect or the body of the 
practitioner.  
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The first thing to be stressed here in addition to this is that particularly 
the overtly physical variations of these practices also alters our physical 
relation to the other, for example, as we withdraw our ‘exploring, 
manipulating, and expressing hand’ (Lingis, 1994, pp. 30-31). Having 
identified them as therapeutic, this then is also marks them as not only 
physical, but always already physical therapies for the other. Rather 
than dissecting how each of their practice coincides with a change of 
our physical relating to the other in this simplistic sense however, in 
the following I focus on other characteristics that identify them as 
physical therapies of passivity, and their further effects and advantages 
as such. 
Anamnesis 
Because the practices of passivity have the peculiar effect of rendering 
their practitioner passive, to the point of leaving nothing but passivity, 
in Chapter Four it was necessary to explore the meaning of this 
passivity for the practitioner. Going through passivity in this manner 
led to a recognition of the relation to the other as fundamental to the 
self, and the fundamental structure of the self as not just a passivity, 
but also accompaniment for the other. With this in mind, I now propose 
that a purpose of the practices of passivity is to recall and ideally re-
actualize this fundamental condition. 
 
In the first instance, this parallels the argument that ‘unlike the 
natural scientist … the [Levinassian] philosopher … does not claim to 
be providing us with new knowledge or fresh discoveries, but rather 
with what Wittgenstein calls reminders of what we already know but 
continually pass over in day-to-day life’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, 
p. 7). In the context of Levinassian philosophy, that which is passed 
over in day-to-day life is ethics, the ethical relation to the other, the 
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other’s infinite otherness, the totalization enacted by the knowing ego 
and its ontological and epistemological categories and capacities, and 
the fundamental structure of subjectivity as for-the-other, or as I have 
rephrased it, as professional physical therapy. Simply put, the reason 
that we need reminders of these is because we forget, if ever think 
about the fundamental condition of our existence. The practice of 
philosophy thus figures as a practice of anamnesis insofar as it 
‘reminds us of what is passed over in the naïvety of what passes for 
common sense’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 7). 
 
The more fundamental reason for our forgetfulness highlighted in 
Levinassian philosophy is that the fundamental relation and structure 
of the self are ‘not conceptualizable’ (Bergo, 2007, p.13). Our amnesia  
is not so much the loss of a memory of something once known, but of 
something that cannot be known, and it is hence that ‘we forget’ and 
‘carry on, in our respective worlds, motivated by our desire for mastery 
and control’ (Bergo, 2007, p.13). To counteract our ‘forgetfulness of the 
other’ and our fundamental condition, the practice of philosophy, as 
one of the possible practices of anamnesis must, therefore, attempt to 
describe and express this unknowable as best as possible (Critchley & 
Bernasconi, 2002, p. 19). 
 
In Chapter Two, I mentioned that Levinas’s philosophical work presents 
a particular methodological challenge to the present study. Though 
more broadly speaking, this is a challenge to philosophy and 
philosophical writing in general, which is inescapably bound to a 
language that perpetuates and is underpinned by an ontological and 
epistemological relation to otherness (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 
8). Especially after Derrida highlighted how Totality and Infinity has not 
been successful in overcoming the challenges to philosophy raised in it, 
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Levinas increasingly tried to resolve it, eventually making it a 
predominant theme in Otherwise than Being (Derrida, 1978; Levinas, 
1969, 1998b).  
 
In the present thesis, I have not been able to follow the implications of 
this problem in the direction explored by Levinas in the latter 
publication. One of the limitations of the present study is therefore that 
it similarly falls short of its resolution at the level of its language and 
structure. I will revisit this issue briefly in Chapter Six, and point out 
how the study might have nonetheless achieved to overcome this 
problem in another way.    
 
To explore alternate possibility for its resolution, it was nonetheless 
critical to identify the notion of philosophy as a practice of anamnesis 
and its prevalence across the traditions in focus here. Resonance to it 
can, for example, also be found in the genre of philosophical writing 
referred to as hypomnemata and discussed by Hadot. Delineating ‘the 
notes one takes for oneself’, Hadot argued that this kind of writing 
precisely constitutes a ‘mnemotechnic exercise’ (Hadot, 2009, pp. 57, 
90). More specifically, the purpose of writing these ‘memory aids’ in the 
ancient Greek and Roman philosophical schools was to learn and ‘call 
to mind’ their ‘key precepts’ with greater ease, to more readily draw on 
them as necessary in one’s daily life (Hadot, 2010, pp. 176-177; Sharpe, 
2011, p. 4). 
 
Whilst each school had particular idiosyncrasies, Hadot emphasised 
that the philosophical schools of ancient Greece and Rome all taught 
and practised the acceptance of ‘reality as it is’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 136); 
the present moment as a consequence of ‘seeing things’ as they are, ‘in 
a constant state of metamorphosis’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 136). In extension, 
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the practice of physics began with the study of the universe, or nature 
as it is, though with the aim to identify that which is natural and align 
with it, beginning with ‘the elimination of desires’ that contradict the 
natural order of the universe (Hadot, 2009, p. 100). The practice of 
philosophy through the writing of hypomnemata could thus be 
understood as directed at remembering the fundamental condition of 
oneself, the world, and one’s relation to it. In physiotherapy, this could 
consist of simply including the study and practice of philosophy into 
professional education at all stages, via reading, writing, and dialogue 
and, in the present context, particularly reading, writing, and dialogue 
about ethics. That such inclusion of philosophy would be beneficial to 
therapists and clients alike via a broadening of theories and practices, 
has already been argued by various authors and follows parallel 
developments in nursing and other healthcare professions (Dahl-
Michelsen & Groven, 2017; Gibson & Martin, 2003; Nicholls & Gibson, 
2010).  
 
As pointed out earlier, the ‘realisation and understanding of the 
fundamental principles of the Universe’, is an equally central concern in 
martial traditions like Kashima Shinryu, Aikido, and the Zen tradition 
(Friday & Humitake, 1997, pp. 157-158). Consequently, a large amount 
of oral instruction has been collated ‘into written documents’ in various 
forms (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 139). The purpose of writing these 
overlaps with the practice of hypomnemata, insofar as their purpose is 
‘to provide students with memoranda that would jog their memories 
and/or further their studies’ (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 143). 
 
That the need to remember is not just born out of an inadvertent 
recognition of an insufficient memory, but out of the fact that this 
forgetting can have dire consequences, is particularly evident in the 
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martial arts where it could lead to the loss of life in the most extreme of 
cases. Though it could be argued that the purpose of anamnesis in this 
context is egocentric, even at a superficial level this could be argued to 
widen if one’s memory is used for the protection of others. Extending 
further beyond this, within the martial traditions, Zen, Shiatsu, and the 
philosophical schools of ancient Greece and Rome alike, one can find 
the shared belief that being ‘out of sync’ with our fundamental nature 
‘produces suffering’ both for ourselves and others (Vitale, 2012b, p. 3). 
 
Albeit in different terms, Levinas’s dedication to Otherwise than Being, 
highlights that the purpose of anamnesis is not to recover some 
inconsequential memory, but expressly to prevent people ‘of all 
confessions and all nations’ from becoming ‘victims of the same hatred 
of the other man’ that has marked the atrocities of the World War II as 
much as any other war (Levinas, 1998b). The ultimate purpose of 
anamnesis is thus to inspire another kind of action and practice based 
on this memory, and it is hence that Levinas writes that ‘a relaxation of 
essence to the second degree’, that is, to our fundamental condition of 
passivity and accompaniment, ‘is needed for the little cruelty our hands 
repudiate’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 185). From the very beginning, then, the 
practice of anamnesis is motivated by a concern to reduce harm and 
suffering, and is, hence, always already a therapeutic practice that 
would enhance physiotherapy practice by inspiring such reduction. 
 
Further, given that forgetting and being out of sync with our 
fundamental condition produces suffering, the practice of anamnesis 
reduces this suffering by facilitating our bringing ‘our nature into sync 
with that of the world’ (Vitale, 2012b, p. 3). This notion is shared, in 
differing degrees, across Daoism, Shinto, Zen, Shiatsu, Budo, the 
martial arts, and even ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. Hadot 
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consonantly writes that practice of physics should ultimately translate 
into a desire, or even effort of ‘harmonizing oneself with its 
movements’ (Hadot, 2006, p. 183). In many of the martial traditions, it 
is similarly thought that ‘man must conform to the world, like water 
flowing along the contours of the land … [placing ] one’s will in the 
service of the cosmos, not vice versa’ (Amdur, 2014, p. 325). Finally, in 
the context of Shiatsu, it is equally though that to ‘live harmoniously 
means to follow the movement of nature and the interaction of heaven 
and earth as fully as possible’ (Kawada & Karcher, 2009, p. 23). 
  
If ‘our society doesn’t live in accordance with nature’, then the central 
question that follows is: How we can ‘go back to nature’ and our 
fundamental condition and ‘recover from this human sickness’ 
grounded in its forgetting (Okumura, 2012, p. 76)? Roman Emperor and 
Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius, for example, suggested that one 
should ‘think often of the bond that unites all things in the universe, 
and their dependence upon one another’ (Aurelius in Cave, 2012, p. 
335). Aside from this variant of the philosophical practice of anamnesis 
and in following Hadot’s critique of the ‘tendency to emphasise the 
theoretical, abstract, and conceptual’ inherent in certain strands of 
philosophy, I argue that it is pertinent to consider possibilities less 
exclusively focused on thinking, writing and language (Hadot, 2002, p. 
274). 
 
More overtly than in the writings of Levinas and Hadot, one can find in 
Zen, Budo, and Shiatsu, an emphasis on the integration of intellectual 
and physical practice, and the argument that a ‘student’s involvement 
in each sphere is ongoing’, or at least should be (Friday & Humitake, 
1997, p. 160). Specifically, this is emphasized because ‘the unity of 
theory and practice’ is thought to ‘ add up to more than the sum of its 
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parts’ (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 138; Ushiro, 2008, p. 3). What is 
additionally critical to note, and further distinguishes these approaches 
from those suggested by Levinas and Hadot, is that they consequently 
and more overtly build on the assumption that what they describe as 
natural, or fundamental can be studied and practised ‘intimately, 
through both body and mind’ (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 28).  
 
Before moving on to any more specific practices, it is worthwhile to 
note that the connection of mind and body is also increasingly 
acknowledged and studied in contemporary physiotherapy. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, this already visible in the ways in which its 
aims are framed, encompassing physical, psychological, emotional, 
social, and environmental factors and wellbeing alike (WCPT, 2017). 
Attempts to improve and orient physiotherapy practice accordingly 
further illustrate the growing recognition of the link between mind and 
body and its importance, as, for example in the case of the recent 
interest in movement health, or ‘movement for life’ (PNZ, 2017; 
Sahrmann, 2014). Advocated as a system-framework for the future 
physiotherapy, ‘Movement Health’ arguably aims at facilitating the 
development of ‘movement choices, and possession of a greater range 
of strategies to achieve movement outcomes … available to the CNS’, 
where the latter represents a somewhat biomedical reference to the 
mind, and movement is understood as a capacity of the body (McNeill 
& Blandford, p. 154).  
 
With the CNS as a central component of what is thought of as ‘mind’ in 
the context of physiotherapy, the concept of movement health implies 
at least some recognition of a connection between the mind and body, 
even if it remains close to a biomedical understanding. Similarly, the 
recent formation of a PNZ Special Interest Group on Physiotherapy in 
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Mental Health, and the organisation of the first WCPT Special Interest 
group conference on Physiotherapy and Mental Health give further 
evidence that the connection between mind and body is gaining 
attention in the profession (http://www.wcpt.org/ioptmh). A further, 
more overt example for this that additionally exhibits that broader 
understandings of what might be referred to as ‘mind’ are already being 
explored. Specifically, an approach integrating physiotherapy and 
psychotherapy has recently been found to enable ‘patients to reflect 
upon bodily as well as emotional reactions, and these reflections helped 
the patients to see how body and soul are inter-related’ (Ekerholt et al., 
2014, pp. 5-6).  
 
There are many more examples that could be drawn on to further 
exemplify the growing recognition and exploration of the relation of 
mind and body for this. More important than amassing a list of them 
and discerning the minutiae of their differences however, is the simple 
evidence they provide for this growth in interest in physiotherapy 
research and practice. It is also for this reason that I argue that martial 
and healing traditions like those of Zen, Aikido, and Shiatsu, have much 
to offer to physiotherapy, given their far longer history of theorising 
and practising mindbody connections.  
 
Additionally interesting to physiotherapy, these traditions exhibit a 
resonant preference for physical practices as a means actualizing the 
‘oneness of mind and body’ that they consider as part of the natural, 
fundamental condition of the self (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 153; 
Ushiro, 2008, p. 18). This preference is clearly visible in the common 
emphasis that a ‘student’s path must begin with physical training’ 
(Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 101); that ‘it all starts with the body’, and 
specifically, with ‘being aware of the body and the breath’ (Chadwick, 
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1999, p. 261). Though with such a preference of physical practice ‘the 
question naturally arises’ how it is justified, or why, as for example in 
the case of zazen, it is so distinctly ‘necessary to sit with legs folded, 
facing the wall’ (Nonomura, 2008, p. 291)? 
 
In response to his own question, Nonomura doubts ‘whether anyone 
could put the answer into words’, and argues that ‘only … sitting for 
oneself’ enables the answer to eventually come ‘welling up in one’s 
blood and bones’ (Nonomura, 2008, p. 291). His answer is, in fact, 
emblematic of two widely held assumptions across Zen, Budo, and 
other related traditions. Akin to Hadot’s critique of philosophy, the first 
of these is that there is a tendency to overemphasise the intellect and 
theorizing in daily life. More decidedly than Hadot however, the second 
assumption is that the fundamental condition of nature, self, and other, 
is ‘not something we can understand merely with our intellects’, if at all 
(Okumura, 2012, p. 64).  
 
In Levinassian terms, the fundamental condition of the self is 
‘meontological’, a ‘primary mode of non-being (me-on)’ that cannot be 
grasped through intellection, ontology, and epistemology (Levinas & 
Kearney, 1986, p. 24). As argued in Chapter Four, this primary mode is 
closely related to physicality, insofar as the physical existence of the 
self precedes its ontological and epistemological thematization, and is 
hence, even a condition of cognition and language. It is for this reason 
then, that it is thought that ‘one hears differently when one hears in the 
doing’ as argued by Rosenzweig (Rosenzweig, 2002, p. 471). In 
reference to Zen, Budo, Shiatsu, and related traditions, that our 
fundamental condition is inherently physical, and this physicality is 
otherwise than knowledge and being in its first instantiations, also 
   212 
provides the grounds for their preference of physical practices of 
anamnesis.   
 
Of critical import to the present exploration, it is also on this basis that 
I propose physical practices as a particularly feasible approach for the 
traverse from ethics to practice. This is especially because the traverse 
from ethics to practice is always already realised in the physicality of 
the self and the physical therapy it provides prior to its traverse in any 
active sense. In the martial tradition of Kashima Shinryu, this 
understanding is evident, for example, in the conviction that to practice 
the movements proposed by the school already means to embody ‘the 
fundamental rhythms of the universe’ (Friday & Humitake, 1997, p. 
157). Proper execution and physical practice alone is consequently 
considered ‘sufficient to guide students to’ both the ‘realisation and 
understanding of the fundamental principles of the Universe’ and is 
thus a physical practice of anamnesis (Friday & Humitake, 1997, pp. 
157-158). It should be noted though that the preference for physical 
practice does not imply ‘that doing necessarily results in hearing and 
understanding’ (Rosenzweig, 2002, p. 471). Friday and Humitake 
therefore explicitly write that training, or physical practice alone 
‘should be sufficient’ for this purpose, rather than is sufficient (Friday 
& Humitake, 1997, pp. 157-158). 
 
Despite this precaution, the assumption that one cannot understand 
one’s place in the universe in an intelligible, or conscious level in 
entirety nonetheless remains central to this tradition (Friday & 
Humitake, 1997, pp. 157-158). Rather, understanding is conceived as a, 
otherwise than knowledge and being, physical embodiment of the 
fundamental structure of the self, and its realisation in this sense. 
Further, the belief that physical practice can mimic or embody 
   213 
‘fundamental principles’ also grounds the distinct focus on spiraling 
movements in both Kashima Shinryu and Aikido as these are thought to 
reflect the ‘ultimate natural law or rhythm of nature’ and its spiraling 
movement ‘similar to an eddy in the flow of a river’ (Friday & 
Humitake, 1997, p. 68; Uchiyama, 2004, pp. 99-100). Echoed in Goethe’s 
theory of the ‘genesis of forms’, the spiral thus gives further shape to 
the physical practice of anamnesis across these and a range of other 
martial traditions that focus on the execution of particular, spiralling 
movements, or the recognition and better adherence to the spiral 
patterns inherent in their techniques (Hadot, 2006, pp. 218-225). 
 
To some extent, this resonates with physiotherapy, insofar as reference 
to spirals can be found in theory and practice alike. The assessment and 
treatment approach of Proprioceptive Neuromuscular Facilitation (PNF) 
developed by a physician and a physiotherapist in the 1940-50’s, for 
example, similarly focusses on the practice of spiralling movements 
with particular parts of the body, or the body as a whole. Following an 
analysis of the anatomy of bone structure, muscular alignment, and 
movement observation, this is grounded in the assumption that 
spiralling movements are the most natural, efficient and functional 
movement patterns (Knott & Voss, 1956; Sandel 2013). PNF practice 
thus focuses on retraining the nervous system and musculature to 
follow these natural patterns. A more recent example can be found in 
considerable interest in research and practice relating to connective 
tissue (i.e. fascia). Here again, the spiral distribution of tissues is 
investigated as the basis for fundamental anatomical patterns thought 
to govern healthy movement, and deviation from these as causes of 
dysfunctions and bodily pain (Myers, 2014; Schleip & Baker, 2015). 
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Rather than attempting an analysis of these and similar approaches in 
greater detail, the general familiarity of physiotherapy with physical 
practices and spiralling movements and structures, and its consequent 
resonance with other approaches emphasising these, might at least be 
indicative of a possibility to reconsider physiotherapy practice in 
relation to anamnesis as developed here. Thus far, anamnesis is 
primarily considered as a part of a broader approach to assessment and 
diagnosis and more colloquially referred to as ‘history taking’ in 
contemporary physiotherapy (WCPT, 2014, pp. 5-6). As such, it is even 
thought that it can itself ‘provide the diagnosis in the majority of cases’ 
(Brukner and Kahn, 2009, p. 109). Though precisely this understanding 
keeps its in the framework of a cumulative, ontological, and 
epistemological practice that inflicts that violence against the other 
that a practice grounded in fundamental ethics seeks to reduce. 
 
In this sense, anamnesis rather refers to physical and intellectual 
therapeutic self-practices of passivity that facilitate the practitioner’s 
recall of the fundamental relation and structure, prior to professional 
identity and practice in the conventional sense. Effected through the 
letting go of practice, knowledge, intention, and self, its benefit for the 
other consist in not reducing and limiting ‘limit the other’ to the 
epistemological categories (Beavers, 1990, p. 3). Rather, it is to loosen 
their immobilising grasp, and in this way mobilise and rehabilitate the 
other’s infinite otherness, or motion. The additional advantage of, 
particularly physical therapies of passivity as I have proposed in this 
section, lies in their more readily facilitating a sensible, that is physical, 
way to ground physical therapy in our equally physical fundamental 
condition as such. 
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Physical needs 
To develop other active, ethical, therapeutic practices, that can be 
practised on the basis of the sensible memory of the fundamental 
structure of the self, we can summarize that its key characteristics, 
developed over the last three chapters are that: 
 
v the self is a passivity; 
v that its passive, fundamental structure can alternatively be 
referred to as a professional physical support and company;  
v that it is defenceless against the relation, or contact of other, 
subject ‘to the force of alterity’ (Lingis, 1998b, p. xxi); 
v that rather than threatening its existence, this force is creative 
insofar as it instatiates it in itself; 
v that is instantiated as a distinct physical sub-stance both defined 
as and capable of providing physical company and support for 
the other; and 
v that the fundamental ‘level of sensibility’, or physicality of the 
self, precedes and is other than its consciousness, cognition, and 
capacity (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 21). 
 
What I now propose in addition to this, is that both the physicality of 
the self and the visceral proximity of the contact that creates it, 
simultaneously suggests a physicality of the other. Though critically, in 
following fundamental ethics, the physicality of the other differs from 
that of the self, and must do so to prevent its sameness or assimilation. 
Where, then, are its points of difference? The first point of difference is 
precisely the other’s creative, physical capacity discussed in Chapter 
Four that sets it apart from the passive sensibility of the self. Seemingly 
paradoxically, the second of difference is grounded in the exposure of 
calling, and in extension, its need for the physical support and company 
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provided by the self. It is this need that, in a Levinassian sense, reveals 
it as ‘not only remote like a height and a majesty that commands, but’ 
simultaneously, ‘a nakedness and destitution that calls for solicitude’ 
(Lingis, 1998, p. xxii).  
 
Specifically, Levinas referred to the face as the fundamental ‘way in 
which the other presents himself’ to me, and by extension, to the 
fundamental relation, as a face-to-face encounter (Bergo, 2007, p.13; 
Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 12). To ensure that its otherness is not 
forgotten in that which allows me to recognise this as a face like my 
own, Levinas repeatedly emphasised its infinite height and distance 
that likens it to a star according to Rosenzweig’s imagery. In his own 
words, the face is the ‘way in which the other presents himself’, but a 
way continuously ‘exceeding the idea of the other in me’ (Levinas, 
1969, p. 50). 
 
What is crucial to the present exploration however, is that the reference 
to the face that ‘looks upon me’ nonetheless invokes a familiarity that 
also allows me to recognise the other as ‘the always nearest’, a 
concrete, recognizeable, and palpable materiality (Rosenzweig, 2002, p. 
471). In this sense, the other is also the concrete living being that I 
encounter, face-to-face, in each new moment, situation, time and 
space. In revealing its face ‘a surface of the elemental’, that other also 
revealed itself as a physical structure ‘made of light and shadows, of 
carbon compounds, earth … liquidity … air and warmth’ (Lingis, 1994, 
pp. 131-132). 
 
Rather than giving up its infinite otherness from me in this 
resemblance in this revelation, precisely its distinct physicality 
underscores its inassimilable separateness, not unlike my own 
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physicality supports and avouches our separation. Without ever giving 
up its overbearing strength and infinite otherness, the physicality of the 
face reveals the other as ‘exposed to being wounded and outraged’, and 
in so doing, as a vulnerability not entirely unlike, yet wholly other than 
myself (Lingis, 1998, p. xviii). It is this fundamentally physical 
vulnerability, that further underscores that the other needs my 
company and support, and these are to be physical, first and foremost:  
 
The face of the other is a surface of suffering, upon which her 
sensitivity and susceptibility and her vulnerability and mortality 
are exposed to me … the place where the elemental addresses, 
appeals and requires, the involution in enjoyment which makes 
one’s own eyes luminous, one’s hands warm, one’s posture 
supportive, one’s voice voluble and spiritual, and one’s face 
ardent. The face of the other is the place where the elemental 
surfaces to make demands on the elemental resources in which 
the enjoyment of my life is immersed (Lingis, 1994, pp. 131-
132). 
 
Levinas consequently refers to giving ‘the other … the bread of one’s 
own mouth and the coat from one’s shoulders’ as principal ways to 
provide material sustenance for the other, thus additionally 
emphasising that the fundamental needs of the other are physical 
(Levinas, 1998b, p. 55). From this perspective, it could be argued that 
providing food, shelter and clothing equally constitute physical 
therapies. One the one hand, this further supports the argument for 
physical therapy as a fundamental and indispensable therapeutic 
practice. On the other hand however, it drastically accentuates the 
problem that raised by an understanding of physical therapy as 
fundamental as developed in this thesis: that is, physical therapy is not 
only always already provided by everyone through their body, but even 
more practically, that by everyone who provides material sustenance for 
another, via food, shelter, clothing, or other means.  
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Though this poses a considerable problem to conventional approaches 
to the profession’s ‘protection of the title’, I argue that it also presents 
a meaningful possibility to reconsider its current boundaries and 
territorial claims (PNZ, 2015; WCPT, 2015d). The critical analysis and 
development of this possibility requires an additional, in-depth 
exploration of the current boundaries that exceeds the limits of this 
thesis. Having engaged in it to some extent, but finally decided to 
exclude it from this thesis, I will briefly comment on this field in the 
conclusion of the thesis and the discussion of its limitation. In the 
following, I therefore continue to focus on the development of other, 
novel approaches to physiotherapy practice in addition and extension 
to those developed so far. 
 
Accompaniment in practice 
Having argued that the other is also physical in a distinct sense, and 
that the other’s needs are physical in a way that calls forth and on the 
fundamental structure of the self, I propose that it is possible to 
describe both the other’s infinite otherness, or motion, and the physical 
accompaniment of the self as its fundamental physical needs. In the 
introduction of the notion of accompaniment as a fundamental physical 
therapy, I pointed out that this is also where the problem of a loss of 
professional identity, status, and boundaries in the common sense is 
grounded at a fundamental level. What I now propose in seeming 
contradiction to this is that the recognition of accompaniment as a 
physical need of the other simultaneously opens the possibility for the 
development of other professional physical therapies. In the following 
sections, I focus on two particular possibilities that I refer to as 
activities of daily life, or everyday practices, and therapeutic touch, or 
contact. Their discussion further highlights the difficulty of describing 
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and defining practices of accompaniment in advancement. Yet 
paradoxically, it also highlights how they might be designed, or rather 
practiced, in the moment in which they are called for. In this sense, the 
discussion draws out an approach to the ongoing development of 
further practices of accompaniment.  
Activities of daily life 
In Chapter Three, I argued that, in Zen practice, all activities of daily 
life are thought of as opportunities to engage in a practice of 
impermanence and focus on the present moment (Okumura, 2012, p. 8). 
Given that what is realised through these practices is also one’s 
fundamental relation to all other existences, all activities of daily life 
can equally be referred to as practices of anamnesis, reminding and 
realigning the practitioner with her fundamental structure as a self in 
relation. Given that the passive, physical effect of this structure is 
company and support for the other, we could argue that they are 
simultaneously also physical therapies of accompaniment.   
 
Beyond their purely passive effect however, I now additional argue that 
they may also be considered practices by which the practitioner can 
learn to provide accompaniment more actively. In Zen practice, eating 
and digestion, for example, are thought to be reminiscent of the 
dependence of the self on the world that surrounds it, as well as the 
need to support it, even if it were only for its own sustenance. Manual 
labour is likewise considered ‘an integral part of Zen life, no less 
important than sitting itself’ precisely because it constitutes a practice 
of passivity and accompaniment in the present sense (Nonomura, 2008, 
p. 195). That is, cleaning – as an exemplary form of manual labour – 
allows practitioners to understand that they ‘must take care of [their] 
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surroundings before [they] use them’, and thus inherently, practice 
being of service to others (Chadwick, 1999, p. 65).  
 
In my experience, monastic life in the Zen tradition, and all the 
activities of daily life that this involves, can be perceived as extremely 
regulated, with virtually all activities involving highly specific and pre-
defined routines. From this perspective, one might thinkg that what 
one is to do to provide company and support in any given situation can 
follow this precedent and be pre-determined and form part of a rigid 
systematic. I believe that this is a misreading however, and even 
practices underpinned by particularly routinized movements, are rather 
supposed to alert the practitioner to a range of critical requirements, 
that make it possible to realize a therapeutic practice of 
accompaniment.  
 
The first of these ingredients is highlighted in the following quote in 
relation to the practice of bowing, which is equally considered a central 
activity of daily life across Zen, Shiatsu, and the Japanese martial arts 
alike. Specifically, bowing ‘makes the point, physically, that there are 
two’ (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 126). In other words, the principal 
active ingredient is the same that underlies the passive effect of 
accompaniment: the practitioners physical structure, and the presence 
of this structure in his inter-action with the other, that acknowledges 
‘the other’s separateness from me’, thus providing him with physical 
company and support (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 26).  
 
The evident problem with this understanding is that this therapeutic 
ingredient is still relatively passive. To some extent, this is also the idea 
behind it, building on the notion that the maximally reduced, physical 
practice of zazen – focussing on nothing but one’s posture and 
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breathing – already effects a company and support for all living beings 
in each new moment. Though at the same time, the emphasis on 
mundane practices and activities of daily life as being of equal 
importance as zazen, is grounded in the importance placed on inter-
acting with and in the world, and doing so on a daily basis, rather than 
pointing to inadvertence and complacency. Rather than suggesting that 
everyday practices need to be done differently, I argue that their 
understanding as physical therapies of accompaniment encourages 
practitioners to attempt the conversion of the passive effect of zazen 
into all actions of daily life as a more active ingredient; promote the 
idea that it is desirable to do so anywhere and at any time; and provide 
guidance on how this might be achieved.  
 
More specifically, this guidance is given precisely in the instruction to 
pay attention to one’s body, breath and posture as in the practice of 
zazen. Thus, what is becomes possible for the practitioner during their 
own activities of daily life, is to provide company and support for the 
other by being fully present in mind and body, paying attention to their 
body, breath, posture, and movements. It is primarily because such 
focus is not easily realized then, that we ‘sometimes … have to escape 
from society’ to receive and practice this with greater focus, so as to 
once again ‘re-enter’ society ‘more profoundly and more effectively’ 
(Deshimaru, 2012, p. 136). 
 
Support for the notion of the therapeutic practitioner’s activities of 
daily life as physical therapies of accompaniment can also be found in 
the writings of Hadot and Levinas. Despite reservations about such a 
conversion, it is critical to note that Levinas argued that ‘goodness is 
possible’, and even exclusively possible ‘in everyday, ongoing life’ 
(Morgan, 2011, p. 16; Robbins, 2001, p. 217). For his part, Hadot argued 
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that ancient Greek and Roman philosophy was first and foremost ‘the 
practice of everyday life’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 102). In daily life in all of its 
forms, a practitioner of philosophy was to learn about the fundamental 
nature of the self, the other, society, and the universe. And it was in 
daily life, that the philosopher was to practice and apply these insights 
and theories, including being of service to others based on an insight 
into the fundamental relation of all existence (Hadot, 2002, p. 38). 
 
The WCPT defines activities of daily living, or ADLs, as client’s ‘daily 
self-care activities required to function in the home and/or outdoor 
environment’ (WCPT, 2014, p. 4). They are considered either basic 
activities like ‘dressing, eating, mobility, toileting and hygiene’, or 
instrumental activities, which are ‘not fundamental to functioning’, but 
allow ‘an individual to live independently’, including for example 
shopping, housekeeping, managing finances, preparing meals and using 
transport (WCPT, 2014, p. 4). In other words, contemporary 
physiotherapy practice understands and defines ADLs as actions of 
clients, and in the context of rehabilitation, therapeutic goals for clients 
that are to be achieved with the help of professional practice. 
  
In expansion of this understanding, the perspectives provided by Zen, 
Hadot, and Levinas, open the possibility for activities of daily life as 
both passively effective, and active physical therapies of 
accompaniment to be practised by the therapist. Such inclusion of ADLs, 
for example, the practitioner’s cleaning and cooking into 
physiotherapy’s professional practices would constitute a broadening of 
the profession’s fundamental theories and practices. Yet if this were all 
that was to be gleaned from their alternate contextualization, it could 
be argued that their integration is of little value, if not detrimental to 
professional physiotherapy. It implies that any action could be referred 
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to as a physical therapy, or that anyone can and always does practice 
this kind of physical therapy, even when they are helping someone 
clean and cook, or where they facilitate an ability to do so. This could be 
considered to overlap with social work. Contrary to this, in what 
follows, I argue that the ‘everyday-ness’ of ADL’s thus understood also 
implies that other practices can be developed and engaged in that are 
more distinctly discernable as professional physical therapy practices. 
Beyond everyday practices 
The first way in which identification of everyday practices as both 
passive and active physical therapies of accompaniment enables to 
development of further variants to them lies in identifying attention to 
the practitioner’s body, breath, and posture as a condition for their 
practice as physical therapies. Further, according to Zen philosophy, 
helping not only can, but must take many forms if helping ‘all living 
beings’ is aspired to (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 132). That is, because all of 
these beings are different from each other and different in each 
moment, ‘a whole toolbox of methods is required’ to help them 
(Deshimaru, 2012, p. 132). Referred to as ‘upaya, skilful means’, the 
large variety of tools in this toolbox is illustrated in figures like the 
bodhisattva of compassion, the medicine Buddha, and the concept of 
the bodhisattva more generally speaking (Loori, 2002, p. 116). 
 
The bodhisattva of compassion, for example, is commonly depicted 
with 1,000 arms, to point to the infinite variety of ways in which 
compassion can be enacted; whereas the twelve vows of the medicine 
Buddha, include helping others by providing food, shelter, and clothing, 
helping the oppressed, healing deformities, helping people follow vows 
and precepts, and even helping them study and practice Buddhist 
philosophy and its way of life (Thanh & Leigh, 2001). Similarly, having 
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taken the bodhisattva vows, the Buddhist practitioner is meant to help 
all beings in a variety of ways. These could be ‘material offerings, which 
might include not only goods but also anything that comes from the 
body such as work, help, a word, or a gesture’, or by ‘offering the 
dharma’, that is, the philosophical and practical teachings of 
Buddhism’, and even by ‘offering peace, non-fear, [and] confidence’ 
(Deshimaru, 2012, p. 122).  
 
Apart from advocating for an infinite variety of practices for helping 
others, their particular wording emphasises that they are indeed meant 
to be helpful, or in the present sense, therapeutic, as much as their 
effective use is considered beneficial or ‘helpful conduct’ (Dogen, 2007, 
p. 41). Their particular variety also provides support for the integration 
of mind, bodily, and even environmental approaches into therapeutic 
practice. What is especially relevant to physiotherapy, however, is that 
the use of hands to depict this variety – as well as the foregrounding of 
physical offerings –highlights the fundamental relevance and 
preference of physical therapies. 
 
Next to these practical implications, the most critical feature of skilful 
practice relates to the underpinning understanding of impermanence 
and interdependence. Simply put, the variety of helpful practices is 
necessary because no one other thing or moment is ever the same, and 
arises subject to an infinite variety of continuously changing 
conditions. Rather than prescribing a concrete array of tools, the variety 
implied in their everyday-ness of helpful practice, therefore, highlights 
the impossibility of their prescription, or predetermination, or at least 
the difficulty and risks involved in their overly constricting 
predefinition. 
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In contrast to the health behaviourism that has gained popularity in the 
growing prominence of health promotion in recent years, Cohn argued 
that ‘everyday practices’ defined as ‘locally situated and composite’ 
practices ‘contingent on a whole variety of social and material factors’, 
are fundamentally different to the historically biomedical approach to 
psychology that are too closely associated with positivist healthcare 
paradigms (Cohn, 2014, p. 160). In contrast to the desired predictability 
and reductivism of biomedical healthcare, Cohn argues that ‘it is 
perhaps impossible and even undesirable to try and identify when 
exactly an action starts and when it ends, or the extent to which one 
action is distinct from another. [This] also potentially resists the search 
for causal explanations, in the form of identifying determinants’ as 
discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis (Cohn, 2014, p. 160). 
 
The emphasis on everyday practices, therefore, points to an underlying 
difficulty, or even impossibility, in any attempt to predetermine or 
predefine therapeutic practices. Building on the critical perspective 
underpinning this thesis I argue that such a predefinition is, strictly 
speaking, contrary to fundamental ethics. As Critchley has noted, 
Levinas does not ‘provide us with what we normally think of as an 
ethics, namely a theory of justice or an account of general rules’ 
(Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 27). His reason for not doing so, is 
precisely because any such predefined, general rules for practice, as 
much as any predefined practices, rely on ontological and 
epistemological categories and capacities, which disregard the 
unknowable, unforeseeable, and even unaccountable factors that would 
need to be acknowledged and supported in each singular case and 
moment.  
 
   226 
This, in turn, means that it is not possible to establish being without 
rules as a general rule, and thus, also that it is possible to develop 
specific rules and practices after all, so long as they are not considered 
as general or generally applicable to all other situations, times, and 
places. Building on this possibility, in the following I explore how 
therapeutic touch could be understood and practised as a physical 
therapy of accompaniment. Through the exploration of touch as an 
exemplary, I finally discuss what guidelines for physiotherapy and its 
further development might be derived from the theories and practices 
developed throughout this thesis.  
Contact 
Given the central role of physical contact, and in extension, therapeutic 
touch in physiotherapy, to explore how it can be understood as a 
physical therapy of accompaniment is particularly pertinent to the 
profession. In the opening quote to this chapter from which I have 
borrowed the term accompaniment, Lingis’ describes that ‘the other 
seeks the contact and the accompaniment’ alike (Lingis, 1994, p. 131-
132). Building on the theories and practices developed thus far, an 
exploration of contact as a physical therapy of accompaniment is 
additionally crucial because it is intrinsic to the fundamental relation 
between self and other, is fundamentally physical as such, and finally, 
an as fundamental need of the other as food, shelter, clothing, and 
accompaniment.    
 
Through their gradual development I have argued that providing 
company through listening, being present, listening, being mindful, 
being-with, paying attention or bearing witness can themselves be 
considered both physical practices, and more specifically, physical 
therapies of accompaniment. It could therefore be argued that to 
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understand and practice accompaniment in their way presents another 
potential broadening of physiotherapy theory and practice. And indeed, 
drawing on Levinas, it has been argued that ‘it is by means of 
attentiveness, listening, and hearing, that a doctor provides company… 
to the sick or ailing other’ (Burcher, 2012, p.13).  
 
Yet evidently, neither listening nor therapeutic touch are exclusive to 
physiotherapy, though especially the latter is commonly considered 
emblematic of the profession, having been part of a quartet of practices 
that have defined physiotherapy for over a century (these being 
massage and manual therapy, exercise, water-based therapies and 
electrotherapy). What is nonetheless interesting about listening as 
discussed so far, is that it resonates closely with the way in which 
therapeutic touch could be considered and practised as a physical 
therapy of accompaniment.  
 
To explicate how this is the case, it is worthwhile to note Levinas’s 
mention of ‘the caress of a consoler’ as a form of touch that ‘does not 
promise the end of suffering, does not announce any compensation, 
and in its very contact, is not concerned with what is to come 
afterwards’ (Levinas, 1978, p. 93). On the basis of an understanding of 
materiality as ‘one’s maternal sustenance for another’, it is in many 
ways a notion of maternal, or parental relation that provides the 
inspiration for Levinas’s description of the caress, and more specifically, 
of this caress as a specific form of material support (Lingis, 1998, p. 
xxii). Lingis picks up on this notion, and writes that ‘the hand that 
caresses is not investigative, does not gather information, is not a sense 
organ … does not apprehend or manipulate; it is not an instrument … 
does not communicate a message’ (Lingis, 1994, pp. 30-31).  
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Both Levinas and Lingis, therefore, address aspects of therapeutic touch 
that have historically been beyond the scope of physiotherapy. In 
radical contrast to conventional notions of physiotherapy, their 
conception of touch is not motivated by the desire to end suffering, 
investigate, gather information, manipulate, communicate a message, 
of function as an instrument in any other way. Having excluded all of 
these elements however, one must ask what kind of touch this is 
supposed to be, and can it hold any future relevance to physiotherapy? 
 
Some solutions to these questions are indicated in specific aspects of 
Shiatsu. Resonance with the notion of the caress can be found, for 
instance, in the writings of Yuichi Kawada of Yoseido Shiatsu, who 
argued that ‘maternal affection’ is ‘the centre’ of Shiatsu (Kawada & 
Karcher, 2009, pp. 3-4). Shiatsu teacher Akinobu Kishi argued that ‘we 
do not have to push, pull, manipulate and adjust’, that ‘pressure is not 
the point’ (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 150). And, the founder of Tao 
Shiatsu, Endo Ryokyo, recommended that one should ‘try to be relaxed 
and not to feel that “you” have to be responsible to “do” something, as 
this creates tension and a feeling of heaviness’ (Endo, 2008, p. 35).    
 
These instructions provide some direction for the practice of a kind of 
touch that is perhaps closer to traditional physiotherapy, but also calls 
for its practices to be extended revised in a sense proximal to Levinas’s 
understanding of the caress. If we are not to push or pull, nor 
manipulate or adjust, for example, we could say that we are not left 
with nothing, but a kind of neutral touch in terms of pressure, but 
nonetheless a skin-on-skin contact. Similarly, if the contact is not to be 
heavy, a range of light forms of skin-on-skin contact become possible.  
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Not seeking to do something further challenges the therapeutic practice 
of touch in a sense akin to the practices of passivity. Specifically, the 
instruction that touch should be ‘natural, easy’ and ‘without any 
attachment or interest’ further underscores the necessity for relaxation 
and passivity as characteristic of this kind of contact (Kishi & 
Whieldon, 2011, pp. 80, 116). To let go of one’s attachment, practice, 
knowledge, and self, precisely implies that passivity and its practices 
are fundamental to the practice of touch as an ethical therapeutic. 
Lingis consonantly writes that the ‘hand that caresses … advances … 
aimlessly … not knowing what it wants to say, where it is going, or why 
it has come here. In its aimlessness it is passive’ (Lingis, 1994, pp. 30-
31). 
 
In Shiatsu, it is thought that it is precisely through this kind of passive 
contact, ‘without any attachment or interest … that [what] is 
impossible through just using technique becomes possible’ (Kishi & 
Whieldon, 2011, p. 116). But if the main characteristic of our contact is 
passivity, then we have to wonder what it is that is impossible through 
just using technique, yet becomes possible through this passive contact. 
Having argued that ‘pressure is not the point’, Kishi further argues that 
this technologically impossible, passive ‘contact is the point’ (Kishi & 
Whieldon, 2011, p. 150), that ‘the real meaning of touch is making 
natural, easy, human contact’ (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 80). Rather 
than ‘simultaneously providing acquaintance, observation and 
treatment’ however, I argue that to make such natural contact means to 
provide therapy through acquaintance, or accompaniment (Kawada & 
Karcher, 2009, p. 8).  
 
In Kishi and Whieldon’s terms, ‘human contact is the most spontaneous 
form of medicine’, and the primary reason it can be called medicine is 
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that ‘the body wants…resonance’, or in the present sense, that physical 
therapy of accompaniment (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 106). We can 
see the same emphasis in the application of Levinas’s writing to 
psychotherapy and narrative medicine, where medicine is considered 
that which occurs when ‘we release the sufferer from his agonising 
isolation and solitude’ (Marcus, 2010, p. 63). Here, we ‘combat the 
isolation’ and ‘end the solitude of illness’ (Burcher, 2012, p.13). By 
freeing the other from the agony of isolation and solitude with our 
physical company and support ‘we are not treating a problem’ but 
precisely, providing ‘maternal affection’ (Kawada & Karcher, 2009, pp. 
5, 8). 
 
In approaching Shiatsu in this way, freeing the other from the agony of 
isolation and solitude is not so much aimed at ending a suffering, but at 
opening ‘a space between practitioner and patient’ (Kawada & Karcher, 
2009, p. 8). Levinas describes this as a situation in which the other is 
‘transported “elsewhere” by the movement of the caress, is freed from 
the vice-grip of “oneself”’ and ‘finds, “fresh air”, a dimension and a 
future’ (Levinas, 1978, p. 93). The therapeutic benefit of this passive, 
physical contact and accompaniment; this fresh air and opening toward 
the future, thus constitutes a remobilisation and rehabilitation of the 
other and their otherness in the sense developed throughout this thesis. 
Practised as such then, touch can be function as a physical therapy that 
is not grounded in the self, knowledge and capacity of the professional 
therapist, but through their retraction, is grounded in the other 
(Levinas, 1978, p. 93). 
 
In reference to the concluding comments in Chapter Four, what the 
mother provides for her child beyond mere contact is a moment of rest 
and stillness; thus ‘heart and spirit are happy when they return to their 
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natural state, just as the child is happy when it lets itself sink into its 
mother’s arms’ (Modified from Tenbreul, 2011, pp. 22-23)3. What this 
stillness makes possible then is the necessary relief needed by the child 
to let go of the mother again and venture out into the world by itself, 
knowing, that it can always fall back on its mother’s company and 
support. The need for company, momentarily satisfied through the 
stillness of the accompanying contact, gives way to and supports a 
return to motion until rest and company are needed again. The stillness 
and centre of the self, developed through its self-retreatment via the 
practices of passivity, is not something for the self, nor a place of rest 
and retreat from the self, but for the other.  
 
In concluding my exploration of touch as an exemplary practice of 
accompaniment, I propose such an approach to it as the foundation for 
physical therapies, using skin-to-skin contact as a way ‘to accompany 
another human … and support them to walk the path and find new 
solutions’ (Rappenecker, 2003, p. 4). This means that those techniques 
involving therapeutic touch that already exist and are widely used in 
physiotherapy, e.g., manual therapy, massage, PNF, are always already 
physical therapies of accompaniment prior to any other effects they 
aspire to. It also means that, within the limits of what is possible given 
the current framework of physiotherapy practice, it might be possible to 
explore ways this inherent aspect of touch could be further 
accentuated, for example, by letting go of such alternate effects, or 
goals beyond accompaniment where it appears feasible. Recent 
developments in pain science and persistent low back pain might offer a 
window of opportunity in this regard. These indicate that it is less the 
                                                   
3 ‘Herz und Geist sind gluecklich wenn sie zu ihrem urspruenglichen Zustand 
zurueckkehren, so wie das Kind gluecklich ist, wenn es sich in die Arme der Mutter 
fallen laesst’ (Tenbreul, 2011, pp. 22-23). 
   232 
(re)positioning of one vertebra on another that is relevant to the 
reduction of pain, as much as a combined physical and 
behavioural/psychological approach. Though further research would be 
necessary to explore this assumption (Lee et al., 2015; O’Keefe et al., 
2016).        
 
The practice of physical therapy 
Beyond the provision of physical company and support by means of 
therapeutic contact, what other approaches to physiotherapy might be 
coherent with fundamental ethics as passivity and accompaniment?  
What kind of practice might grounded in an otherwise fundamental 
ethics?  
 
Firstly, it could now be argued that whatever I do to help another, I do 
with my body, and more specifically, the full investment of my 
undivided physical and mental presence. This is not just any kind of 
physical presence, but one that is inseparably related to a passivity as 
developed throughout this thesis. Building on the argument that 
‘sustained effort’ might make it possible to extend passivity ‘into daily 
life’ I propose the practices of passivity are indispensable for the 
traverse from ethics to practice (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 94).    
 
The notion that passivity is fundamental to ethical action, and in 
extension, therapeutic practice, can also be found in Hadot’s argument 
that ‘one must…do good, as it were, unconsciously’ (Hadot, 2009, pp. 
108-109). And further, that ‘goodness supposes total disinterestedness; 
it must be, as it were spontaneous and unreflective, without the least 
calculation, without the least self-complacency. Goodness must be an 
instinct: one must do good as the bee makes its honey and seeks 
nothing else’ (Hadot, 2009, pp. 108-109). Hadot’s descriptions thus 
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closely resonate with the way that therapeutic touch is understood in 
Shiatsu, that is, as a ‘spontaneous’ kind of touch (Kishi & Whieldon, 
2011, p. 110). It further overlaps with the notion that compassion, or 
helpful practice, is realised when it ‘manifests itself…without effort, 
without searching, without a desire to understand or obtain anything. 
Unconsciously, naturally and automatically’ (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 94).  
 
Finally, all of these descriptions also resonate with what Levinas 
referred to as the ‘little acts of goodness’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, 
p. 27). Levinas developed this term following a reading of Vasili 
Grossman’s novel Life and Fate, which he generally, frequently 
mentions as a source of inspiration (Morgan, 2011, p. 16; Robbins, 
2001, p. 217). Significantly, the little acts of goodness the only ‘acts 
that Levinas qualifies with the adjective ethical’ (Critchley & 
Bernasconi, 2002, p. 27). They are, in his own words, ‘all that is left to 
humankind … the sole positive thing’ (Robbins, 2001, pp. 89, 120). 
Briefly mentioned in my discussion of activities of daily life as practices 
of accompaniment, Levinas considered the little acts of goodness to 
take place in ‘everyday, ongoing life’ (Robbins, 2001, p. 217), and 
further, as ‘everyday and quite banal acts of civility, hospitality, 
kindness and politeness’, thus identifying them as essentially 
‘therapeutic’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 27).  
 
In addition to being therapeutic, these practices support Levinas’s 
general emphasis on ethics as material sustenance, and are thus, by 
extension, of fundamental importance to physical therapists. He 
additionally argues that they take place ‘outside of every system, every 
religion, every social organisation’ (Robbins, 2001, p. 218). This would 
suggest, then, that they cannot belong to any one singular profession or 
professional organisation: they are literally unprofessional and 
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unobtainable as part of orthodox, regulated physiotherapy practice. 
Being outside of every system further means that they are not 
systematizable, suggesting that they cannot be premeditated, neither 
originate in, belong to, or thematized by the ontological and 
epistemological capacities of the self. Rather, according to Levinas, 
they are ‘absolutely gratuitous, unforeseen’ (Robbins, 2001, p. 89), to 
which we might add unintentional, disinterested, unconscious, 
spontaneous, and natural, belonging to the order of passivity and 
coming to the other through the passivity of the self. 
 
Throughout this chapter I have argued that to practice passivity is 
simultaneously to practice accompaniment. This is firstly the case in 
the sense that accompaniment is the passive effect of my physical 
presence. But physical therapies of accompaniment also call for an 
active effort and deliberate practice on the part of the practitioner: 
especially in relation to therapeutic touch. Quintessentially, then, this 
approach to therapeutic practice reveals an inseparable relationship 
between physicality, passivity and accompaniment.  
 
The critical point in arguing that passivity and accompaniment are 
fundamental physical needs and therapies, as well as fundamental 
characteristics of an approach to the professional practice of physical 
therapies, lies in the seemingly paradoxical engagement in passive, 
unintentional, physical company and support as explored throughout 
this chapter as the foundation for professional practice. Clearly 
expressed in the Zen tradition, it is exactly such a foundation, ‘when 
our mind is nowhere and everywhere’ that ‘we can react very naturally 
to whatever happens’, that our practice can develop and manifest itself 
as ‘a natural, spontaneous, automatic response’, thus approximating 
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the traverse from ethics to practice (Collins, 2012, p. xvi; Okumura, 
2012, p. 40). 
 
When we bear witness … right action arises by itself. We don’t 
have to worry about what to do. We don’t have to figure out 
solutions ahead of time. … Once we listen with our entire body 
and mind, loving action arises. Loving action is right action. It’s 
as simple as giving a hand to someone who stumbles or picking 
up a child who has fallen on the floor. We take such direct, 
natural actions every day of our lives without considering them 
special. And they’re not special. Each is simply the best possible 
response to that situation in that moment (Glassman, 2014). 
 
Building on this approach, I argue that ‘right action’ arises as a natural, 
spontaneous response when we bear witness with our entire body and 
mind, when we provide passive physical company and support for the 
other. At this moment, or situation, we can respond to the call of the 
other and be moved by them in a way that guides and directs our 
actions and practice according to their needs; without these having 
been defined in advance. Thus, the quintessential characteristic of this 
approach to physical therapy is that my practice should be professional, 
that is, following the call of the other and the specific needs expressed 
in it. 
 
The surfaces of the other, as surfaces of susceptibility and 
suffering, are felt in the caressing movement that troubles my 
exploring, manipulating, and expressive hand … a surface where 
the informative forms soften and sink away as it advances, where 
agitations of alien pleasure and pain surface to meet it and move 
it. The hand that caresses does not apprehend or manipulate; it 
is not an instrument. … It advances repetitively, aimlessly, and 
indefatigably ... In its aimlessness it is passive, in its agitation it 
no longer moves itself; it is moved by the passivity, the suffering, 
the torments of pleasure and pain, of the other (Lingis, 1994, pp. 
30-31). 
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The notion that to be moved by the other and the other’s needs is 
fundamental to ethical practice, raises two final challenges that need to 
be addressed before closing the present chapter. The first of these is 
that being moved to practice, ultimately means that ‘healing … is not a 
product of self-ability’ and ‘is never personal’ (Endo, 2008, pp 136-138). 
Rather, healing in the sense that is provided in the fundamental 
relation, comes through me, but from the other. In a critique of 
common understanding and use of points and meridians in traditional 
Chinese medicine and Shiatsu, it has been argued that they would be 
better understood as the places and points ‘where your partner wants to 
be touched’ (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 98). This implies that the 
invention and identification of specific methods and practices are in the 
hands of the other, and that the specific methods and ways in which 
physical therapy is offered are defined by the client, and not by the 
professional therapist. Thus, the therapist’s presence and ongoing 
relevance are determined by the fact that the other is still calling for 
physical therapy. 
 
The second challenge is an extension of an issue implicit in the 
fundamental structure of the self, discussed in Chapter Four. Building 
on the argument that the self is instantiated through the creative 
contact of the other, it is that we are in touch with – and touched by – 
the other, long before we can object to it, or ourselves, choose to touch 
the other. In a Levinassian sense, we can describe this as a ‘sensuous 
contact and closeness’, due to the intense and unsolicited proximity of 
the creative, and the therapeutic contact of the other (Lingis, 1998, p. 
xxii).   
 
Quite contrary to this, Nicholls & Holmes have argued that it was 
precisely the regulation of ‘the inherent sensuality of physical contact 
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between practitioners and patients through rigid taxonomies and 
regimentation’ that has played a critical role in the historical 
development of the profession and the boundaries that distinguish it 
from other ‘non’-professionals (Nicholls & Holmes, 2012, p. 456). 
Because of the need to distinguish it from prostitution, early methods 
of legitimization and professional discipline included the minimization 
of contact between female masseuses and male clients and the 
exclusion of men from registration (Nicholls & Cheek, 2006, p. 2342). 
Evidence of this heritage can still be found in the fact that 
Physiotherapy New Zealand continues to refer to professional 
boundaries primarily in the context of ‘sexual boundaries in the 
patient-physiotherapist relationship’ (PNZ, 2012c). Further definition 
of these ‘sexual boundaries’ as ‘the edges between a professional 
therapeutic relationship and a non-professional or personal 
relationship between a physiotherapist and the person in their care’, 
means that a certain intimacy in contact, is critical to the separation of 
the professional from the non-professional (PNZ, 2012c, p. 1). 
 
That it is possible to separate the professional from the non-
professional on the basis of a regimentation of touch is precisely what 
is contested by an understanding of the relation between self and other 
as fundamental. This understanding challenges the conventional notion 
that the boundaries between self and other can be controlled in such a 
way. Especially troubling to a profession that has built its self-image 
and status so intently on this control, it presents a challenge to its 
understanding and approach to the boundaries between self and other 
by highlighting a contact between them that precedes the possibility of 
any conscious, intentional, and professional control.    
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This is not to say that suddenly everything is possible and boundaries 
around intimate contact are of no importance. Following the argument 
that the ‘disciplinary technologies adopted by the profession’ and ‘it’s 
heavily disciplined approach to touch’ are ‘now constraining’ its further 
development, it merely presents one possibility to reimagine these 
constraints (Nicholls & Holmes, 2012, p. 454). Specifically, 
understanding the nature of the relation and contact between the 
therapist and client, effects a further loosening of contemporary 
conceptions of professional boundaries that is necessary for their 
broadening and redefinition.  Secondly, it presents a different view of 
contact that can contribute to the development of ‘new therapeutic 
possibilities’ regarding the practice of physiotherapy (Nicholls & 
Holmes, 2012, p. 454). 
 
These possibilities involve new understandings of physical therapeutic 
practice in general, and physical therapeutic touch in particular.  It is to 
acknowledge that ‘the connection between the [physiotherapist] and 
patient is based on a form of intimate contact, which crosses the usual 
borders of physical, personal, and emotional privacy’ (Surbone, 2005, p. 
3). And on this basis, it is to consider physiotherapy as precipitated, 
defined, guided, and grounded in the fundamental contact and relation 
to the other. This possibility presents, perhaps, the most radical shift in 
the foundation of physiotherapy, because it situates passivity and 
accompaniment as a foundation for physical therapy, and therewith, 
relocates the source of its practice into the hands of the other. 
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In summary 
Over the course of this chapter, I have explored and argued for passivity 
and accompaniment as physical therapies, both in their fundamental 
efficacy, and as practices and effects requiring an active effort on the 
part of the practitioner. I further argued that they additionally point to 
an approach to practice that requires us to become open to the 
fundamental need and call of the other. Building on the understanding 
of fundamental ethics explored throughout the study, in its strictest 
sense, active ethical practice can only come from this unconventionally 
intimate contact, and our passive openness to be moved by it. Such an 
approach to practice, as well as the exemplary practices explored in the 
present chapter, might be considered a physical therapy of passivity 
and accompaniment, and as such, inaugurate a traverse from ethics to 
practice.  
 
This is not to say that such a physical therapy would resolve all 
problems and ailments, nor that it comes without problems itself. In 
the following, I thus conclude the thesis by pointing out some of these 
issues alongside the strengths and limitations of the critical 
perspective, the theory and practice of physiotherapy, and the 
methodological approach developed throughout the study. Taking these 
into account, I primarily highlight the original contributions and 
implications for physiotherapy theory and practice, and indicate 
potential directions for future research. 
 
Whatever further possibilities for physical therapeutic practice we 
might seek and develop however, it is, perhaps, easy to be tempted to 
think that to provide good support and company to another is firstly 
easy, and secondly insignificant. That it appears easy to provide might 
well be a result of our familiarity with practice and our confidence in 
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applying our skills and knowledge in the relation to our clients. As 
indicated in Chapter Four however, ‘it is the easiest of all and just for 
that reason the hardest’ (Rosenzweig, 2002, p. 472). That is, it is our 
familiarity and habituation to know and do that might simultaneously 
be the greatest obstacle to the more passive approach to practice 
proposed in the present study. Yet precisely because passivity and 
accompaniment are the very foundation of our self and practice for the 
other, they are also ‘not the last then, but the first’ (Rosenzweig, 2002, 
p. 472). And finally, because they are the first, I propose that if we were 
to truly provide company and support to others, that physical therapy 
of passivity and accompaniment, then this would not be so little at all, 
but quite possibly the most.  
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Chapter Six 
Physiotherapy in Practice 
 
Evil arises in the honoured belief that history can be tidied up, 
brought to a sensible conclusion … Evil is not the inclusion of 
finite games in an infinite game, but the restriction of all play to 
one or another finite game (Carse, 1986, p. 108). 
 
Introduction 
Often in this thesis I have emphasised literature that addresses 
physiotherapy’s diverse practices in terms of now being a time for 
change and improvement in something basic or fundamental to 
physiotherapy. Such change could and should embrace three key arenas 
that I have aimed to address in this thesis: (i) the critical review of 
physiotherapy’s underpinning theories and practices, (ii) the 
integration and further development of novel approaches to research, 
and (iii) the development of new models for its delivery based on a 
consideration of hitherto unexplored perspectives and practices. In the 
present study I have sought to explore and further develop 
contemporary physiotherapy theory and practice by drawing on a range 
of philosophical, practical, and therapeutic traditions with which I have 
long been engaged, and intuited to hold great potential of this purpose.  
 
Autoethnography was my methodological point of departure. I adapted 
it to the present study by informing it with notions drawn from my 
philosophical and practical sources, most ostensibly the works of Pierre 
Hadot and Emmanuel Levinas. This consolidated the two key aims for 
this study, giving substance to the three arenas mentioned above: 
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v To develop, substantiate, and evaluate a critical perspective 
building on Levinas’s notion of fundamental ethics, initially 
applied to contemporary physiotherapy and its theories and 
practices of self and other.  
 
v To develop, substantiate, and evaluate novel physiotherapy 
practices based on an expanded understanding of fundamental 
ethics, resulting from the conjunction of Levinas’s work with the 
other philosophical and practical traditions in focus here. 
 
The conjunction of autoethnography with fundamental ethics and 
Hadot’s approach to the study of philosophy as a way of life additionally 
facilitated the development of two related areas needing to be 
addressed methodologically in this thesis to achieve its aims. Especially 
developed within Chapters One and Two, these were: 
 
v The comparative critique of contemporary physiotherapy and its 
theories and practices of self, other, and their relation, from the 
perspective of fundamental ethics. 
 
v The comparative, critical exploration of contemporary 
physiotherapy, Levinassian ethics, Hadot’s philosophy as a way 
of life, and the philosophies and practices from Zen, Aikido, 
Shiatsu, and other related Asian traditions to develop an 
otherwise approach to physiotherapy theory and practice. 
 
This conclusion initially presents a summary account of the chapter 
developments of the thesis in the context of distilling the thesis 
findings and original contributions to the field. It does so beginning 
with a broad section, “Passivity and Accompaniment in Physiotherapy” 
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presented in four parts. The first of these, “Ethics in Physiotherapy,” 
focuses on critical limitations to its theories and practices of self and 
other from a perspective that expands on Levinas’s fundamental ethics. 
The second, “Physical Therapy in Practice,” addresses the difficult 
question of physical therapies after the ethical destitution of the 
epistemic and ontological grounds of physiotherapy. I also present 
limitations of this study and discuss whether and to what extent it has 
been successful with regard to its aim, in light of its original 
contributions to physiotherapy theory and practice. In the two 
subsequent parts, “Subjection to Everything: Approaching 
Physiotherapy” and “Beyond Physiotherapy,” I delineate potential 
areas for future research and consider a range of potential implications 
and contributions made to fields beyond physiotherapy, in particular to 
other healthcare professions, to other philosophical, practical, and 
therapeutic traditions drawn on in the present study.  
 
In a second broad section, “Passivity and Accompaniment in 
autoethnography,” presented in two parts, “Ethics in autoethnography” 
and “Autoethnography as Physical Therapy,” I initially address the 
difficulties and limitations in working with autoethnography arising 
from its encounter with fundamental ethics in relation to qualitative 
research in general. I then propose a solution to these limitations found 
in a different reading and practice of autoethnography that builds on 
the understanding and approach to physiotherapy, keeping in mind 
that further research is required. A third section, “Overview of 
Findings,” presents a summary of findings, followed by a concluding 
comment, “In Conclusion,” alluding to the somewhat paradoxical or 
allusive distinction made by Levinas between saying and the said 
(Levinas, 1998b). 
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Passivity and accompaniment in physiotherapy 
I begin the presentation and discussion of the thesis contributions with 
a summary conclusion of the thesis deployment of a gradually 
expanded Levinassian approach to subjectivity, knowledge and 
otherness.  This is developed in two complementary sections, the first 
of which focuses on critical theoretical implications while the second 
focuses on practice as physical traverse from an otherwise than being. 
Ethics in physical therapy 
This Levinassian engagement was developed in tandem with the 
presentation of the work of Hadot on philosophy itself as essentially a 
way of life rather than theory building. This aspect of life practice in 
relation to self and other enabled the introducing of a range of non-
western therapeutic practices of the self. Each of these, and all in 
resonance, sustained a challenge to physiotherapy’s grounding in 
medical science, objectivity and evidence-based research. My entry 
point was the definitional aim of physiotherapy: ‘to provide services that 
develop, maintain and restore people’s maximum movement and functional 
ability’ (WCPT, 2016a). Under the following ten headings I present my 
key concerns.  
 
(i) A challenge to evidence-based diagnoses 
In close conjunction with definitions of health and sickness related to 
this aim, and those of biomedicine more generally speaking, 
commencing in Chapter Three I addressed physiotherapy’s 
epistemological grounding in the ontological claim for a single, 
objective reality, resulting in its phenomena exhibiting consistency, 
thus allowing for observation, measurement and, quantification (Grant 
& Giddings, 2002, p. 14; Nicholls, 2009a, p. 527-528). Knowledge 
arrived at by means of scientific observation and experimentation 
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provides the evidence-base necessary to manipulate a given 
phenomenon. As a result of its claim to objectivity, physiotherapy is 
able to support the claim and development of universal, or 
generalizable practices ‘applicable to all people irrespective of their 
health condition’ (WHO, 2002, p. 3).    
  
With a treatment methodology defined in terms of diagnosis, aetiology, 
prognosis, and treatment characteristic of biomedicine, physiotherapy 
is further grounded in a fundamental relation defining observer and the 
observed, consistent with its ontological and epistemological 
framework. That is, the scientist, or clinical practitioner stands in 
relation to a world, a phenomenon, or person fundamentally defined 
according to this framing. Understanding of a subject-self and object-
other consequently identifies the former as the one who gains and 
applies this knowledge, and the latter as the known-about and acted-
upon. The physiotherapist is consequently someone who ‘will use their 
in-depth knowledge of how the body works, combined with hands-on 
clinical skills, to assess, diagnose and treat your symptoms’ (PNZ, 
2017).  
 
(ii) A Levinassian challenge 
Following Levinas, I argued that these theories and practices exhibit a 
relation to otherness that is characterised by ‘reducing all forms of 
otherness’ to the ontological and epistemological categories and 
capacities of the knowing ego (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 16). By 
describing this relation as a movement or activity ‘of comprehension … 
grasping and seizing’, whether conceptual or manual, Levinas 
emphasised that ontology and epistemology thus engaged reduce the 
distance between the other and the self until ‘their opposition fades’ 
and they become the same (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 15-16; 
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Levinas, 2011, p. 126). Precisely this transmutation of all otherness into 
the same, or self-same, is what he criticized as the fundamental, or 
‘first act of violence’ (Beavers, 1990, p. 3). Referring to it in different 
terms, this ‘evil’, or violence ‘occurs whenever I limit the other to a set 
of rational categories, be they racial, sexual, or otherwise’ (Beavers, 
1990, p. 3; Field & Levinas, 1993). 
 
 (iii) Pathologies and norms 
To further emphasise this violence in physiotherapy, contradicting its 
purported aims at a fundamental level, I briefly paraphrased 
Canguilhem’s analysis of The Normal and the Pathological as these terms 
are understood in medical science (Canguilhem, 1989). Neither term 
represents ontological reality, but rather epistemological construction 
relying on artificially ‘establishing constants or invariants’ and their 
‘metrical determination’ (Canguilhem, 1989, 221). Contrary to this, 
Canguilhem argued for a perspective closely resonating with Zen and 
other strands of Asian thought, evident also in ancient Greek 
philosophy: There is no evidence of constants or states, such as health 
and sickness, but rather, life presents itself as ongoing motion, 
movement, differentiations and change (Okumura, 2012, p. 83; 
Chadwick, 1999, p. 81; Hadot, 2002, p. 136). 
 
(iv) An inherent violence 
In drawing together critiques of evidence-based objectivity in 
therapeutic practices, violence fundamental to claims in knowing the 
other, and radical doubt as to the constancy and consistency of 
phenomena, violence and definition of ‘sickness’ reveal themselves as 
‘the restriction of all play to one or another finite game’ (Carse, 1986, p. 
108). It is a definitional matter of making someone incapable and, to 
that end, ‘an act of tyranny and … an act of scorn’ that consists in 
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‘limiting the freedom of another person’ (Pessoa, 1997, p. 103). In 
Levinassian terms, this is a limiting of freedom to be other, suppressing 
the other’s fundamental and infinite otherness. In terms more familiar 
to physiotherapy, it is limiting fundamental and infinite freedom of 
movement both theoretically and practically.  
 
(v) Fundamental ethics 
Redefining harm and sickness in this way thus presents a fundamental 
critique of ethics when the foundations are ontological—related to a 
fundamental question of being—or epistemological—related to a 
fundamental question of the knowing of beings. Ethics is thus 
derivative of either the existence of a knowing self or the knowing of 
that self, or both. As such, this critique is not exclusive to any particular 
field or profession and, in Levinas’s case, was primarily directed at a 
particular philosophical tradition. Contemporary healthcare—including 
physiotherapy—is defined by such ontological and epistemological 
grounds such that our professional categories of health and sickness, 
and our more specialized diagnostic and therapeutic aims, theories and 
practices are subtended by a fundamental violence whose recourse or 
corrective is fundamental ethics.    
 
Strictly speaking, this critique implies that the profession’s foundation 
and everything built upon it is fundamentally violent, unethical even. 
In more constructive terms, the primary contribution of this critical 
perspective emphasises the dissonance between its fundamentally 
ethical, therapeutic aspirations—‘to provide services that develop, 
maintain and restore people’s maximum movement and functional 
ability’—and the theories and practices implemented to further define 
and achieve them (WCPT, 2016a). 
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(vi) Turning inward 
Further elucidation of a Levinassian critique of fundamental ethics 
attempts to answer questions as to whether we are ‘duped by morality?’ 
as Levinas once posed it (Levinas, 1969, p. 21), or in Dostoyevsky’s 
terms, whether ‘evil is the normal condition’ of people (Dostoyevsky, 
2001, p. 284). With respect to this research, this questioning asks 
whether a theory and practice of physiotherapy might be possible that 
more closely approximates its fundamental ethical, therapeutic aim. As 
the very motivation for this study is premised on a hope or intuition 
that would affirm this, the second question posed by this critique was 
how this physiotherapy might be conceived and put into practice. My 
initial approach to these questions was to follow the radical 
implications and secondary contribution of this critical perspective, 
that is, the proposition to momentarily pause all therapeutic study and 
practice of the other, and redirect a focus toward the self in search for 
alternatives.  
 
These were to be found in the two crucial notions of ‘passivity’ and 
‘accompaniment’, developed especially from a working through Levinas 
and Hadot, though equally in thinking physiotherapy more 
fundamentally and essentially as physical therapies.  
 
(vii) A dimension of otherness 
Following the critique of ontology and epistemology, it would be 
difficult to speak of my emergent theoretical developments as 
ontological, and strictly speaking, inaccurate to refer to them as 
devising a theory, or theoretical, epistemological construct. I touched 
on this in the closing of Chapter Four and have ultimately reverted to 
using the term theory for simplicity’s sake, but in a flexible, largely 
interchangeable sense with a range of alternative terms. Closer to 
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Hadot’s work, one might think of it as an existential theory, or 
philosophy of existence, but the term can also be found in commentary 
on Levinas (Hadot, 2009, p. 130-132; Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 
27). Similarly, resonating with Hadot’s ideas, but still closer to Zen and 
Daoist philosophy, it could also be referred to as ‘Way of Life’ in an 
existential sense. Levinas himself alternated between terms like 
meontology, metaphysics and, ultimately, ethics to describe a 
‘condition’ other than being and knowledge, and more fundamental 
than ontology and epistemology, thus leading to his famous claim that 
‘ethics is first philosophy’ (Biesta, 2004; p. 323; Critchley & Bernasconi, 
2002, p. 6; Levinas, 1969, p. 300; Levinas & Kearney, 1986, p. 30). 
 
Despite its difference to ontology, as a theory of existence, it 
nonetheless consists of philosophical perspectives regarding the world, 
or other, the self, and their relation, and it is these perspectives that 
make it possible to refer to it as fundamental ethics. As I have shown 
throughout this thesis, the central characteristic marking its difference 
to ontology and epistemology according to Levinas, is that the other 
and the ethical relation ‘cannot be reduced to comprehension’ other 
than ‘by falsely imagining oneself occupying some God-like position 
outside of that relation’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, pp. 8, 15). 
Whatever knowledge I might claim of the other, there always remains a 
dimension of otherness that I simply cannot know and that is 
‘ultimately refractory to intentionality and opaque to … understanding’ 
(Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 8). 
 
(viii) Passivity is not nihilism 
I introduced the notion of passivity initially in Chapter Two, and 
developed its Levinassian understanding in Chapter Three. Within 
Chapter Four I explored the notion of passivity in greater detail, 
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arguing for it as the fundamental structure of the self, thereby defining 
the fundamental structure to ethical subjectivity (Levinas, 1998b, p. 
54). Specifically, the self finds itself always already in a relation with 
regard to which it is without defence, passive, and from which it cannot 
escape. Precisely what marks this relation as not only different to 
ontology and epistemology, but fundamental ethics, is that to find itself 
in this relation to the other means that it is that through which the self 
comes to exist, is identified as a self and singled out in its subjectivity. 
Because it gains its ‘identity by’ the goodness of this ‘pure election’ I 
further referred to this calling as the source of its professional standing 
and professionalism (Levinas, 1998b, p. 145). Already by itself, passivity 
thus contributes to an entirely novel perspective of professional 
identity and professionalism different from their common 
understanding based on conscious, intentional self-identification and 
practice, and fundamental to these insofar as it precedes them. 
  
(ix) A physical profession 
With the notion of vocation, understood in a Levinassian context, the 
self—as a professional—is called-forth by the other, finding itself 
characterized as responsibility. This self is ‘obsessed with 
responsibility’ because its existence is grounded in it’s hearing of—and 
in this sense already its response to—the call of the other. Essentially 
the self is ability to respond (Levinas, 1998b, p. 55). As this is always 
necessarily and inevitably a response to the other, the self is 
fundamentally structured as service, or therapy for the other. 
     
Yet this passive structure and ability-to-respond are fundamentally 
physical, defining and shaping a self’s susceptible and ‘sensuous 
nature’, its ‘occupancy of place’ and ‘material incarnation’ (Lingis, 
1998, pp. xxix, xxii). The subject is singled out in space to ‘exist as a 
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body’ and this occupancy of space is both its first response, as well as 
the organ with which it responds to the other (Levinas, 1969, p. 117). 
Given that its responsibility for the other takes place ‘on the surface of 
the skin, at the edge of the nerves’, the self is a professional physical 
therapy (Levinas, 1998b, p. 15). 
 
(x) Accompaniment 
Referencing a notion from the work of Alphonso Lingis, I referred to 
this fundamental service provided by the self as accompaniment 
(Lingis, 1994, p. 132). The response of a self’s physicality ultimately 
consists in ‘supporting the other’, and specifically, the other’s physical 
subsistence and fundamental otherness (Levinas, 1998b, p. 136). That 
this support is given through and sustained on physical separation from 
the other implies that it ‘inaugurates a society’ and thus the 
fundamental structure of the self is also one of company for the other 
(Levinas, 1969, p. 104). This also implies that the fundamental 
accompaniment provided by the physicality of the self does not reduce 
the distance between self and other, but instantiates and enforces this 
distance or separation.  Due to the resonance invoked in Levinas’s 
words and to continue exploring its potential application to clinical 
practice, I argued that the fundamental structure of the self could be 
referred to in terms particularly familiar to physiotherapy:  as a 
professional physical therapy of passivity and accompaniment.  
 
In Chapter Four, I concluded that this fundamental structure 
contributes an entirely novel alternative to contemporary conceptions 
of physical therapy and its foundations. As an alternate understanding 
of physical therapy grounded in passivity and accompaniment this 
presents a defense of physical therapy as fundamental profession prior 
to its contemporary, ontological and epistemological foundations. This 
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indispensable professional standing and identity of the physical 
therapist is grounded in the very skin, bones, flesh, and marrow of the 
self, rather than in a therapist’s knowledge and skills. This questions 
the current understanding of professional status and practice. Physical 
therapy as passive effect is ‘provided’ by a self irrespective of its own 
choice or intention, in spite of any relation it could have to itself by way 
of consciousness, experience, knowledge or capacity. This is an effect 
that can, strictly speaking, not be converted into an active practice.  
Physical therapy in practice 
With this second part I aim to bring to summary conclusion not so 
much the critical foundational ethical imperative as outlined in the 
initial part, as much as the full implications of the somewhat 
paradoxical engagement with how passivity as fundamental relation is 
constitutive of practice. I engage with this, again across the key 
chapters of the thesis, in twelve summary points. 
 
(i) From passivity to practice 
To explore the potential conversion of a fundamental physical therapy 
of passivity and accompaniment, I drew on the philosophies and 
practices of Zen, Budo, and Shiatsu, as well as gaining support from 
Levinas and Hadot. The partial traverse of passivity into active practice 
might well be achieved, this conversion presenting an opening to 
potential avenues for professional physical therapy practices. 
Specifically, I developed a range of exemplary practices that expand and 
contribute to the current therapeutic toolbox of the profession. In this 
there are the physical therapies of passivity—the letting go of practice, 
knowledge, intention, and self, thus effecting anamnesis, mobilisation 
and rehabilitation—and the physical therapies of accompaniment—
ADLs and contact. Through the exploration of these practices I was able 
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to outline these physical therapies of passivity and accompaniment as 
approachs to physiotherapy practice and its further development. 
 
(ii) The toolbox unpacked 
As early as Chapter Three, I began to explore potential avenues for 
practice subsequent to my initial critique of contemporary 
physiotherapy’s ontological and epistemological foundations. 
Developing what I referred to as the practices of passivity, I described 
them in relation to (i) a letting go of practice, knowledge, intention, and 
the self, while (ii) continuously highlighting their close overlaps and 
relations. At that point, I primarily introduced them as practices to be 
engaged in by the physical therapist as an addition, or even foundation 
for his or her future professional practice. In this context, they are (iii) 
aimed at developing a novel understanding of the self, other, and their 
relation by means of anamnesis. Due to their practical nature and 
objectives, the practices of passivity simultaneously have a particular 
effect on their practitioners, rendering the therapist into passivity. 
 
(iii) Therapeutic self-practice 
This effect of rendering into passivity is also the first of three elements 
necessary for a practice to constitute what Hadot referred to as 
‘existential practices’: ‘voluntary, personal practices meant to … bring 
about … a transformation of the self’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 87). Practices of 
passivity contribute to an expansion of the profession’s current 
toolbox. They do so not only in their specific forms but also more 
generally by approximating physiotherapy practice to the original 
meaning of the Greek term askesis and its consonant use in ancient 
philosophy as encompassing both ‘exercise’ and ‘self-training’ (Hadot, 
1995, p. 128; Lamb, 2011, p. 564).  
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Integration of self-practice into professional physiotherapy practice in 
the present sense could contribute to: (i) movement away from 
conventional, interventionist approachs to physiotherapy as, 
exclusively, an ‘interaction between the physical therapist with’ a client 
or group, aimed at producing modifications in client health (WCPT, 
2015a); and (ii) movement away from the conventional distinction 
between client or lay person and professional physiotherapist, based on 
reciprocal knowing and not-knowing, applying scientific knowledge and 
clinical reasoning to assess, diagnose and manage human function 
(PBNZ, 2017). (iii) Moving away from these could contribute to the 
understanding and practice of physiotherapy as a way of life according 
to the second requirement necessary for a practice to be existential: 
That is, a practice that affects and effects ‘a total change of lifestyle, a 
conversion of [the physiotherapist’s] entire being’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 3). 
This could take place through the integration of the self-practices of 
passivity into professional physiotherapy education, ongoing 
development, and daily clinical practice, in addition to extant practices, 
as well as through greater understanding of their fundamental and 
critical potentials for such transformation. 
 
That practices of passivity could be understood as this way of life and as 
an approach to physiotherapy also fulfills the third requirement 
necessary for them to constitute existential practices according to 
Hadot. That is, they are not only transformative with regard to the self 
and its life, but precisely through this, also transformative of its 
relation to others and the world at large in a way that is philosophical, 
ethical or therapeutic.  
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(iv) Toward the other 
Throughout the thesis, I have emphasised how the ‘care of the self is 
not at all a concern for well-being, in the modern sense of the term’ 
(Hadot, 2009, p. 107). Self-practice is not directed at an ‘ontological 
conatus’ but ‘from the first an ethical obligation … not a movement 
back upon oneself’ but toward the other (Lingis, 1998, p. xxxv). Self-
practices could function as physical therapies only insofar as it would 
effect: (i) a fundamental and physical mobilisation and rehabilitation of 
the other and the other’s otherness from the ontological and 
epistemological grasp of the self; and (ii) an anamnesis of a practitioner 
to a physical memory and actualization ‘of what one really is’ (Hadot, 
2009, p. 107). Because this fundamental condition or nature of the self 
consists in providing physical company and support for the other, this 
self is simultaneously physical therapies of passivity and 
accompaniment. 
    
Precisely due to its fundamental physical nature, physical practices are 
especially well suited for recollection and actualization of this self-
constitution, and thus, a conversion of this passive effect into a 
therapeutic practice and life. As Levinas argued: ‘only a being that eats 
can be for the other’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 74).  
 
(v) Food, shelter, and activities of daily life 
On this basis, with Chapter Five I explore a further range of physical 
therapies of accompaniment. To ‘give sustenance to another’ equates to 
providing physical therapies. There are a number of consequences from 
this: (i) provision of food, shelter, and clothing could be considered in 
terms of physical therapy (Levinas, 1998b, p. 55; Lingis, 1998, p. xxii); 
(ii) Much as this could be argued to overlap with social work, 
psychology, occupational therapy and related professions in a way that 
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would warrant further investigation with regard to the crossing of 
extant professional boundaries and problems arising from this. Though, 
the more radical implication is that virtually all activities of daily life, 
whether practiced by those customarily defined as clients or therapists, 
could be understood to always already function as physical therapies of 
accompaniment, and additionally be practised as such; (iii) These two 
possibilities both contribute to a broadening of physiotherapy theory 
and practice, through a revision of the profession’s conventional 
understanding of activities of daily life as merely client’s ‘self-care 
activities required to function in the home and/or outdoor 
environment’, and as such, therapeutic goals wherever they can no 
longer be practiced by a client (WCPT, 2014, p. 4).           
 
Such inclusion of ADLs as accompaniment amplifies the radical 
challenges presented to contemporary physiotherapy throughout this 
study, broadening or even undoing its boundaries by considering 
anyone’s mundane activities such as eating or cleaning as, in 
themselves, always already physical therapies for others. (iv) Contrary 
to this radical undoing, I have highlighted physical contact, and in 
extension, therapeutic touch, as a variant practice of accompaniment 
and an equally fundamental physical need of the other. It is also here 
that a crucial justification for professional physiotherapy beyond that 
which is fundamentally always already provided, or provided by other 
professions can be found (Lingis, 1994, p. 132). (v) I thus turned toward 
the development of physical contact as a physical therapy of 
accompaniment as an approach to the further development and 
practice of physiotherapy based on passivity and accompaniment.   
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(vi) Skin to skin 
Considering the central role of touch in contemporary physiotherapy 
and its predominantly manual approach to therapeutic practice, I argue 
for therapeutic touch as a practice of accompaniment that not only 
realizes the traverse from ethics to practice, but even skin to skin. 
Particularly in drawing on the philosophy and practice of Shiatsu, it is 
described as a touch that is not characterized by pushing, pulling and 
adjusting, but is ‘without any attachment or interest’, unconscious, 
‘natural, easy’, relaxed, and spontaneous (Deshimaru, 2012, p. 94; 
Kawada & Karcher, pp. 3-4; Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, pp. 80, 108, 116, 
150). In Levinassian terms, Shiatsu employs a touch that is not based on 
knowledge, ‘does not promise the end of suffering … is not concerned 
with what is to come afterwards’ (Levinas, 1978, p. 93). It ‘is not 
investigative … does not apprehend or manipulate; it is not an 
instrument … does not communicate a message’ but ‘advances … 
aimlessly’ (Lingis, 1994, pp. 30-31).  
 
Given that to even consider, let alone practice, therapeutic touch in this 
way might appear radically antithetical to contemporary physiotherapy, 
such a Levinassian thinking of touch is not a wholesale alternative, or 
to be considered as replacement. Rather, it is to suggest that, at a more 
fundamental level prior to its specific forms and applications in 
contemporary physiotherapy, this kind of passive accompanying 
‘contact is the point’ (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 150). That is, what 
identifies this ‘spontaneous’ practice of contact as a ‘form of medicine’ 
is precisely that it provides the ‘resonance’ or accompaniment that ‘the 
body wants’ at a fundamental level (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 106). 
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(vii) Fresh air and motion 
More specifically with regard to its potential role in the context of 
healthcare practice, it is firstly through the practice of this kind of 
physical therapy that ‘we release the sufferer from his agonizing 
isolation’ and ‘end the solitude of illness’ (Burcher, 2012, p. 13; Marcus, 
2010, p. 63). Secondly and consequently: ‘that which is impossible 
through just using technique, becomes possible’ (Kishi & Whieldon, 
2011, p. 116). That is, the other is mobilized from the agony of a past 
that is perpetuated as present and restrictive of the other’s ongoing 
motion and infinite otherness. This other is ‘transported “elsewhere” ... 
finds, “fresh air”, a dimension and a future’, (Levinas, 1978, p. 93). 
Different to, but not entirely contrary to conventional understandings 
of physiotherapy, it is precisely in this future that the other finds a 
magnification of movement and functional ability, including the 
possibility to seek further support and physical therapies. 
  
The ways this kind of contact opens a space for the invention and 
application of further practices also outline how a physical therapy of 
passivity and accompaniment can provide the foundation for the 
further development and practice of professional physiotherapy. This 
possibility presents, perhaps, the most significant contribution that this 
thesis makes to physiotherapy: A professional practice of physiotherapy 
grounded in, defined, and shaped by the other and our fundamental 
relation and contact to the other. This constitutes a traverse from 
physical therapies to physiotherapy. 
 
(viii) Clinical practice and all the other others 
Evidently, to consider, and even more so to integrate this kind of 
physical therapy as the foundation for daily clinical practice would 
involve addressing a range of difficulties and obstacles in its way. One 
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of the central challenges noted by Levinas and briefly mentioned in 
Chapter Five relates to the issues surrounding what he referred to as the 
Third (Levinas, 1998b, p. 157ff.). Briefly put, what is at stake here is 
how it might be possible to provide such an intimately personal service 
to the other, in the sense of its taking place in the relation between the 
self and a singular other, in light of the many others who are 
simultaneously calling forth the self and calling for its company and 
support. 
 
Crucially, we are never only in relation to one other, but rather ‘in the 
proximity of the other, all others than the other obsess me … The other 
is from the very first the brother of all the other men’ (Levinas, 1998b, 
p. 158). In terms closer to Zen: ‘sentient beings are innumerable’ 
(Okumura, 2012, p. 15). The simplest example for this in the context of 
daily clinical practice would certainly be the next client(s) in the 
waiting room. Given that professional physiotherapy practice does not 
only entail ‘patient/client care’ but also ‘health management, research, 
policy making, educating and consulting’, further others necessarily 
also include other physiotherapists and healthcare professionals, 
physiotherapy students, research participants, government officials, 
and the public at large (PBNZ, 2017). 
 
What is so crucial about all of these others, and the second critical 
element noted by Levinas, is that they are also singular others, that ‘the 
third party is other than the neighbour, but also another neighbour, and 
also a neighbour of the other, and not simply his fellow’ (Levinas, 
1998b, p. 157). The problem of the multiplicity of others is thus that it 
is a multiplicity of ‘equally’ singular others that presents a further 
problem because they are all ‘equally’ calling for my undivided 
attention and support. It is precisely for this reason that ‘the 
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responsibility for the other … which until then went in one direction … 
is troubled and becomes a problem when the third party enters’ 
(Levinas, 1998b, p. 157).  
 
(ix) Business as usual? 
The very description of this alludes to the heart of this problematic, 
insofar as the multiplicity of others makes it necessary to refer to them 
in comparative terms, such as ‘equally’ other. This ultimately regards 
and relates the other(s) from an ontological and epistemological 
perspective, using the categories and capacities of ontology and 
epistemology. In Levinas’s own words, ‘the entry of the third party 
highlights that Justice is necessary’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 157). It ‘calls for 
control, a search for society, the State, comparison and possession, 
thought and science, commerce and philosophy, and outside of 
anarchy, the search for principle’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 161). Yet this 
principle will always and inevitably enact and perpetuate that 
fundamental violence to the unknowable and incomparable otherness 
of the other to which the entirety of the present thesis has sought to 
formulate an alternative.  
 
This obstacle of the third could be thought to nullify the entire ground 
of my thesis in its traverse from passivity to physiotherapy insofar as it 
implies that we have no other choice but to use our ontological and 
epistemological categories and capacities, and that this is even the 
necessary, ethical thing to do in light of our responsibility to all others. 
In the context of Zen, it is similarly though that ‘even though we live in 
the reality that is beyond discrimination, we have to discriminate in our 
day-to-day lives. We have to decide what is good or bad … we have to 
make choices’ (Okumura, 2012, p. 55). Yet, neither Zen philosophy, nor 
Levinas suggest that these choices are ethical in the strict sense 
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presented here, and that we are merely to return to ‘business as usual’ 
(Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 13). 
 
(x) In the service of ethics 
Contrary to this, Levinas argues that ‘politics left to itself bears a 
tyranny within itself’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 300). If ultimately ‘both are 
simultaneously necessary for the constitution of a just polity’ (Critchley 
& Bernasconi, 2002, p. 25), it is necessary to ensure that ‘justice and 
politics … serve ethics’. In other words: ‘ethics… must regulate the 
political order’ (Nortvedt, 2003, p. 30). In exploring possibilities for 
applying Levinassian ethics to the ‘concrete clinical and problematic 
reality of healthcare’ and to ‘counteract the violence of distribution’, 
Nortvedt argued that ‘nursing and medicine need to shelter their core 
values associated with caring for the particular patient under their 
responsibility’ (Nortvedt, 2003, pp. 31, 32). Suggesting that one way of 
doing so might entail ‘a more thorough specification’ of these ‘core 
values’ and ‘some restrictive limits to the devaluation of relational care 
within professional contexts’ he tentatively provides a range of 
examples to show how this might be done (Nortvedt, 2003, p. 32). 
 
(xi) De-scription 
It could be argued that especially the concluding summation of the 
critical perspective and theory and practice of physical therapy 
developed throughout this thesis formulates similar examples to 
Nortvedt with a more specific view to physiotherapy. Crucially I have 
avoided foregrounding universal exemplars or imitative models or 
formulaic presentations in order to ‘illustrate’ my considerations. As 
noted by Nortvedt (2003), Levinas’s philosophy challenges the 
formulation of a ‘normative ethics’ at a fundamental level, thus any 
kind of universal norms or rules for one or another field of application 
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(p. 31). Especially in the last iteration of the findings of this study, that 
is, by describing how the physical therapies of passivity and 
accompaniment are less descriptive of particular practices, as much as an 
approach to practice, I have sought to end on a different note. That is, I 
aim to highlight that it might be possible to desist from overly specific, 
normative formulations of theories and practices in advance, but allow 
them to be formulated and reformulated on an ongoing, case-by-case 
basis in relation to this other, at this moment, and in this place. 
 
(xii) Physical therapy in practice 
What I have aimed to emphasise in this research is how, in Levinas’s 
terms, ‘my relationship with the other as neighbor gives meaning to’, 
and might shape, ‘my relations with all the others’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 
159). Rather than being clearly discernable and prescriptive, this is a 
deeply otherwise, and subjective foundation. Having argued that ‘the 
subject arises in the response to the other’s call’ it is a foundation that 
identifies ethics and physiotherapy, as much as any other practice as 
inalienably subjective, ‘entirely my affair, not the affair of some 
hypothetical, impersonal or universal I running through a sequence of 
possible imperatives’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 22). Beyond the 
benevolent-because-creative contact of the other, it is to introduce 
‘subjectivity … as the sole possible source of goodness’ in daily life and 
physical therapy (Levinas, 1969, p. 300).   
 
Subjection to all and everything: Approaching physiotherapy 
Distinct from Levinassian ethical subjectivity, physiotherapy practice 
has traditionally been developed on the basis of formulating best 
practice models and guidelines. My initial aim in embarking on this 
thesis was to arrive at similar notions of practice models. Though, I 
found this increasingly elusive, if not inappropriate, the more I 
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researched the topic. Consistent with this early motivation, if and how a 
physical therapy of passivity and accompaniment in this sense might be 
applied to the broader professional and clinical environment of 
physiotherapy has been a major interest of mine, and a crucial part of 
my motivation to embark upon the course of this study.  
 
Questions regarding the application of novel theories and practices are 
particularly pertinent due to the social, professional, institutional, and 
legal boundaries surrounding physiotherapy, the possibility to alter or 
move across them, and the ramifications of doing so through novel 
approaches. I have spent a considerable time researching, thinking, and 
writing in this direction, though in the last analysis, I have found this to 
be too much an additional field to be included in the present study. It 
comprises a second or secondary engagement focused not so much on 
the traverse from passivity to practice, as much as one focused on 
Justice and the Third. I aim to continue this research and publish on it 
in the near future.  
 
Inasmuch as Levinas’s primary focus has been the relation to the 
human other, it is debated how his ethics might ‘be capable of being 
extended to the multiplicity of human others, but also non-human 
beings, such as animals’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p.16; Calarco, 
2010). Despite this primary focus, Levinas described ‘the subjectivity of 
the subject, as being subject to everything’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 146). On 
this basis it is not only possible to identify the ethical relation and 
ethical subjectivity as the foundation of physical therapy, but it might 
also be possible to conceive a transition from physical therapy to 
physiotherapy as a practice for ‘all and everything’ in a sense closer to 
its etymological root (Lingis, 1998, p. xxxi; Harper, 2017l). 
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Beyond physiotherapy 
To ground physiotherapy in the ethical relation and subjectivity in this 
sense, and thus consider it as a practice that cannot be predetermined, 
but is invoked anew in relation to each and every particular other, 
client, time, and space, presents the culminating challenge to the 
professional boundaries and identity of contemporary physiotherapy. 
Though the question remains: Which, if any, of this thesis findings 
could be meaningfully and ethically applied, and thus significant to any 
instance, place, practice, or field outside of the very words of this thesis? 
Is it possible to broaden the boundaries of any one theory or practice by 
drawing on another at all?        
 
To provide an adequate answer would require an analysis of 
physiotherapy’s professional boundaries and its historical conditions 
leading to their contemporary structure and function. In the course of 
this thesis research I have undertaken a genealogy of physiotherapy’s 
emergence, especially from the mid-nineteenth century in Europe, the 
U.K. and the United States. Due to the extensiveness of this material I 
(reluctantly) excluded it from this present study. My aim is to extend 
research on concrete practices founded on passivity and 
accompaniment informed by this genealogical research.  
 
Though, in summary, I substantiate that: 
 
i) The profession’s current boundaries of practice are defined 
and enforced on the basis of the same ontological and 
epistemological theories and practices that define 
physiotherapy’s prescriptive knowledge base and legality;  
ii) They are therefore equally understood and enforced as 
restrictive and consistent; 
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iii) Yet the history and present configuration of the profession, 
much like that of the other traditions in focus here, reveal a 
considerable diversity, suggesting that ‘cultures change, they 
interact with other cultures and the indefiniteness resulting 
therefrom is reflected in their own worlds’ (Feyerabend, 2010, 
p. 287);  
iv) And hence, opposing restriction and consistency, there is an 
underlying condition of constant movement, change, and 
interaction with other professions, people, times, and places.  
  
I thus found my work on history and professional boundaries of the 
profession to be supporting of the argument that there is a need for 
change in physiotherapy on the basis of the critical perspective 
developed. This was additionally supporting for the argument that it is 
possible to call forth and change not only a practitioner, or person, but 
also entire theories, practices, and professions through their ‘encounter 
with other philosophical traditions’, theories, practices, people, times, 
and places, as this, in fact, is always already happening at a 
fundamental level (Kalmanson, 2010, p. 206). With regard to the 
findings of this thesis and their implications for physiotherapy theory 
and practice, this study thus presents:  
 
i) An argument for the ongoing development of new approaches 
that are not built on ‘hierarchical thinking … distinction and 
exclusivity’, but ‘on mutual appreciation … networking, 
cooperation and connectedness … complementary ways of 
thinking and working—across different professions … the 
patient … the familial system’ (Sottas et al., 2013, p. 20), and 
even ‘the whole history of a subject’ (Feyerabend, 2010, p. 
27);  
   266 
ii) A concrete approach for doing so, grounded in a practice of 
passivity and accompaniment;  
iii) And a novel approach to physiotherapy resulting from its 
encounter and conjunction with a range of other, personal, 
philosophical and practical traditions, theories, practices, and 
experiences.  
 
Such findings could be meaningful for other philosophical traditions, 
practices, healthcare professions, and practitioners. Having primarily 
focused on physiotherapy, I have kept inferences with regard to other 
healthcare professions to a minimum and their further exploration is 
another direction for future research. Nonetheless, this research 
contributes to studies regarding philosophy as a way of life, particularly 
where its actualization in modern, daily life is concerned, through its 
additional emphasis and exploration of physical practices. Hadot 
himself is slightly inconsistent in this regard as he frequently points out 
that ancient Greek philosophy and his own understanding of it were 
pervaded with a preference of mind over body. This is particularly 
obvious where even those exercises that entail the body, such as 
breathing exercises, are ultimately considered of ‘value, because they 
provoke a psychic effect’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 93), or allow the mind to ‘free 
itself from the body and travel in the Beyond’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 180). 
Building on the argument that it is particularly ‘in corporeality’ that the 
‘for the other, despite oneself’ yet ‘starting with oneself’ is grounded 
(Levinas, 1998b, p. 55), I argue that the physical therapies of passivity 
and accompaniment might prove a particularly feasible way by which 
philosophy can not only once again be a way of life, but be ‘therapeutic 
again’ (Vitale, 2012a, p. 1). 
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Further in relation to Hadot’s work and overlapping with elements in 
Zen, Budo, and Shiatsu, the stricter perspective with regard to the self, 
the other, and their relation presented by Levinas could be thought to 
contribute a substantial critique of these philosophical approaches and 
practices. That is, the Levinassian strictures highlight imprecisions and 
inconsistencies in their theories, practices, and terminology. I have 
already tried to point out a few cases where this particular encounter 
makes it possible to question the ethics of Zen, Budo, Shiatsu, and 
ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, for example, where a becoming 
one with the universe, or a pacification of conflicts through such 
sameness is concerned. The present study also makes a contribution to 
the debate concerning a practice of Levinassian ethics via its potential 
application to a specific field outside of philosophy.  
 
All of these somewhat tentative contributions have already had an 
impact on my personal understanding and practice of philosophy, 
Shiatsu, Zen, and Budo alike. A discussion of how this is the case is 
beyond the limits of the present study. As a result, further research is 
similarly warranted to ascertain auto-affective potentials to these 
domains. Especially in this context, my personal bias with regard to the 
philosophies and practices that I have drawn on from outside of 
contemporary physiotherapy has not only shaped the trajectory of the 
study, but also its findings. Particularly visible in my reading and 
writing of Asian philosophies and practices, it could be argued that one 
of the limitations of the present study is an insufficient degree of 
criticality with regard to them and their philosophical underpinnings. 
This is complex and I felt would have required extensive discussion. 
While most Asian philosophies and practices, understood in a global 
context, come under the sway of western grounds of ontological and 
epistemological framing, genealogically speaking, these traditions 
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cannot be said to have an ‘ontology’ in any western sense. As with 
Levinas, probing their foundational structures is difficult and further 
research warranted to bring a fuller account of contributions in this 
regard. 
 
Passivity and accompaniment in autoethnography 
This study contributes a twofold engagement with autoethnography 
resulting from the critical, comparative conjunction of the methodology 
with, primarily, Levinassian ethics and the work of Pierre Hadot initially 
discussed in Chapter Two. Particularly due to the challenges resulting 
from this encounter of autoethnography with Levinas and Hadot, I 
needed to focus on methodological issues and trialed a range of 
possible resolutions, one of which was to place exclusive focus on 
methodology rather than physiotherapy. In light of my original 
motivation, I decided though to move back toward physiotherapy as my 
decided focus. In closing, I nonetheless revisit some of these issues to 
provide an outline of the study’s tentative contribution to 
autoethnography studies, while keeping in mind that further research is 
required. These issues fall into two broad sections, the initial one 
engaging the challenge that a fundamental ethics presents to 
autoethnography. Levinassian ethics begs the question of the very autos 
of an ethnography implicating a self. The second concerns, perhaps 
more radically, autoethnography as physical therapy, in turn, as 
autoethnography.  
 
Ethics in autoethnography 
Paralleling the study’s contribution to the field of physiotherapy, this 
first contribution consists in a problematisation of approaches to 
autoethnography grounded in what are essentially the same ontological 
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and epistemological theories and practices. As argued by the small 
number of researchers exploring the conjunction of this methodology 
with Levinas’s work, its particular value lies in precisely this 
questioning and consequent search for an otherwise ethics in 
autoethnography (Dauphinee, 2010; Poulos, 2012; Roth, 2009; Wilkes, 
2009). More specifically, Levinassian ethics is ideal for questioning the 
autos of autoethnography, and in fact any methodology more generally 
speaking given that any methodology is grounded on the subject, 
directed by and at consciousness, knowing and knowledge, and all 
knowledge conceived of as representation of its ‘I think’ and ‘I will’. 
Against this background, autoethnography would in fact constitute the 
most violent, ontological and epistemological methodology where it 
supposes the self as all that can be known, and ultimately, a unitary self 
as all there is. 
 
I have generally found it too difficult, or even impossible to escape the 
ontological and epistemological requirements embedded in the broader 
culture of academic studies. In this context, the formulation of a 
research methodology, a predesigned path, the clear delineation of 
research methods, and criteria for scientific rigour are simply 
imperative. I thus described and defined the path I have taken in terms 
responding to the various aspects of these requirements in Chapter 
Two. These requirements are ultimately directed toward the 
formulation of knowledge, findings, as well as novel, original 
contributions relevant or significant to others. That is, requirements 
such as credibility, dependability, confirmability, and authenticity are 
directed at increasing and identifying truth that is transferable ‘from 
one context or group to another’ (Nicholls, 2009b, p. 645). Especially 
the ‘collection of data until no’ deviant, or negative ‘cases that are 
inconsistent … are found’ emphasises that theories generated through 
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qualitative research and its processes of induction ideally represent 
‘universal explanations’ of a given phenomenon or culture (Bryman, 
2012, p. 567). 
 
In much the same sense, Hadot’s historico-philological method and its 
methodological imperatives were directed at arriving at objective 
insights about ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, prior to their 
subjective, eclectic systematization and application in one’s life. 
Despite claiming to have been primarily focused on the development of 
a theory of existential practices, rather than a universal theory of 
existence, it is interesting to note that Hadot nonetheless argues that 
the exercises and ways of life he described could be considered 
constant, universal models, attitudes, and exercises (Hadot, 2002, p. 
278; 2009, p. 70; Hadot et al., 2005, p. 232). In his own words, this claim 
can be made because they overlap in their philosophical aims, and can 
be ‘found in various forms, in every civilization, throughout the various 
cultural zones of humanity’, across a multitude of ancient and modern 
philosophical schools and philosophers (Hadot, 2002, p. 278).  
 
For Hadot philosophical practices and ways of life can be considered 
universal because they can be ‘practiced independently of the discourse 
that justifies or councils them’ and they derive their value to the 
philosopher today from precisely this independence (Hadot, 2009, p. 
160). In relation to this value, he emphasises that they not only can, but 
also ‘must be detached from their antiquated cosmological and mythical 
elements’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 278, emphasis added). That is ‘in order to 
actualize a message’ from a given way or practice, ‘one must draw from 
it everything that marks its time. … One must attempt to isolate the 
inner reasoning, the concrete attitude it implies’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 68). 
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Hadot’s position is rather curious in light of his argument that 
‘philosophical discourses cannot be considered realities which exist in 
and for themselves, so that their structure could be studied 
independently of the philosopher who developed them’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 
6). That it is precisely this separation that perpetuates the 
foregrounding of the overly abstract, exegetical mode of philosophy 
about which he was so critical (Sharpe, 2011, p. 7). This enables the 
making of creative mistakes with regard to the mistranslation and 
misappropriation of philosophical theories and practices (Hadot, 1995, 
p. 75-76).  
 
Further analysis and resolution of these seeming inconsistencies in 
Hadot’s writing warrants future research beyond the limits of this 
study. From a stricter Levinassian perspective, it is neither possible nor 
ethical to oppose universal principles ‘to the face of the other, without 
recoiling before the cruelty of this impersonal justice’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 
300). ‘Peace’, that is, a desisting from the fundamental violence of 
thematization and assimilation ‘cannot be identified with the end of 
combats … with cemeteries or future universal empires’ (Levinas, 1969, 
pp. 305-306). It is, in other words, strictly speaking impossible and 
inconsistent to formulate particular theories and practices as findings 
and even less so as universal or generalizable fact, in a study that 
fundamentally aspires to greater openness, mobility and ongoing 
change in scientific and therapeutic practice.  
 
Ethics, or a physical therapy of passivity and accompaniment as I have 
tried to argue throughout this thesis ‘is otherwise than knowledge’ 
(Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 11). Because ethics is ‘something 
ultimately refractory to intentionality and opaque to … understanding’ 
it is ultimately not possible to formulate a theory or practice of ethics 
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(Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 8). And as Levinas further notes, it is 
impossible to achieve ‘transparency … in method’ (Levinas, 1998a, p. 
143); to take a view from anywhere outside the ethical relation, because 
it is that which grounds our existence at every moment (Critchley & 
Bernasconi, 2002, p. 14); to identify and represent one’s own identity 
(Lingis, 1998, p. xxxiv); and thus also to conclude upon any given 
subject, because this conclusion would represent the final reduction of 
otherness, which contrary to this reduction ‘signifies outside of all 
finality and every system’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 135).  
 
Autoethnography as physical therapy 
How then is it possible to conceive of autoethnography that resists the 
teleological, cumulative tendencies of this ‘digestive philosophy’ of 
ontology and epistemology in which ‘the other is assimilated to the 
same like so much food and drink’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 
16)? How could the comparative and conjunctive engagement of the 
present study be considered ethical, rather than a making-same that 
would consist in ‘eliding the differences’ between the traditions, 
theories and practices in its focus (Kalmanson, 2010, p. 205)? And 
finally, how, if ethics cannot be put into practice, is it possible to put 
ethics into words if within the ‘thematic, systematic discourse, 
discourse of being, philosophy seems to leave nothing irreducible’ to 
itself (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 19)? 
 
To respond to these questions, it should be clear that Levinas did not 
dismiss rationality and thematic language altogether, but understood 
them as necessary and unavoidable, in context of his discussion 
regarding the third. This is despite his argument that this translation 
into the language of ontology and epistemology will always be a 
betrayal of ethics (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 19). Yet to 
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paraphrase Rosenzweig: Even if ‘no one can do it’, it is also, ‘like 
everything that no one can do in theory, everyone’s task in practice. 
Everyone must translate, and everyone does’ (Rosenzweig, 1994, p. 47)  
 
With regard to the comparisons and conjunctions engaged in this study, 
this thus means that they are not to be read as amalgamations of 
different traditions, theories, and practices in a sense that would render 
them self-same. Rather, they represent an attempt to draw on a range 
of existing, ‘ideas related to’ the self, other, and their relation, apply 
them to physiotherapy theory and practice, and develop an approach 
distinct them and physiotherapy (Nicholls et al., 2016, p. 9). The 
primary issue at hand was never the production or contribution of an 
original, or novel knowledge, but the application of existing theories and 
practices to a particular profession. 
 
Further, the words composing this study could be understood as 
belonging to the genre of hypomnemata, as described by Hadot. They 
are ‘notes one takes for oneself’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 57), irrespective ‘of 
whether anyone else should read them’ (Sharpe, 2011, p. 6). Thus 
understood, autoethnography could be thought to function as a 
‘mnemotechnic … exercise that aims for better assimilation of the 
dogmas that determine a mode of life’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 90). As such, the 
focus of its practical, therapeutic contribution ‘to improve the human 
situation’ would not be on transforming the world and others in it, but 
the self of the researcher—in the hope ‘that what results from such a 
little thing is not, in fact so very little’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 281). 
 
This understanding of autoethnography makes it a mnemotechnic 
practice of passivity and accompaniment. As such, its practice would 
consist in, firstly, attempting to recognize where the researcher is 
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inflicting a ‘violence in the course of … writing and … representation’ 
(Dauphinee, 2010, p. 806), or attempting to ‘eliminate evil in others’ 
(Carse 1986, p. 108). Its practice would, secondly, aim to reduce this 
violence in a ‘remembrance of the other’, the fundamental relation to 
the other, and the fundamental structure of one’s ethical subjectivity 
(Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 19). 
 
Especially following Derrida’s deconstruction of Levinas’s unavoidable 
philosophical or metaphysical deployments of ontological and 
epistemological language to discuss and describe his critique and 
contrasting notions of ethics in Totality and Infinity, it was in Otherwise 
than Being that Levinas tried to account for this problem ‘by coining the 
distinction between the saying and the said (Critchley & Bernasconi, 
2002, p. 17; Derrida, 1978; Levinas, 1990, p. 295). In brief, the said 
refers to the thematic language of ontology and epistemology, as 
reflected, for example in the words, statements, or propositions of the 
present thesis, and ‘of which the truth or falsity can be ascertained’ 
(Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 18). Contrasting to this, the saying 
points to the underlying, ethical relation and relationality of the 
spoken, or written words that makes them possible, it is ‘the very 
enactment of the movement from the same to the other’ (Critchley & 
Bernasconi, 2002, p. 18). 
 
According to Levinas, the principal task of philosophy thus consists in 
going ‘back to that hither side, starting from the trace retained by the 
said, in which everything shows itself’, and it is this ‘movement back to 
the saying’ that he refers to as his method of ‘phenomenological 
reduction’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 53). As a result, Levinas developed a 
highly idiosyncratic language and mode of writing in Otherwise than 
Being that has been variously described as elliptical, spiraling, and 
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repetitive, in reference to his ‘attempts to avoid, or unsay, that Said by 
finding the Saying within it’, yet without ever undoing the said in 
entirety and completing the reduction (Critchley, 1999, p. 165). A 
crucial characteristic of his writing that energizes its ellipses, 
repetitions, and spiraling movements is what Levinas refers to as 
interruptions. It is these interruptions, themselves energized by ‘the 
ethical interruption of essence’ through the other (Levinas, 1998b, p. 
44), that make it possible to let ‘the saying circulate as a residue or 
interruption within the said’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 18). 
 
In consideration of Levinas’s encountering methodological problems of 
philosophy with regard to the question of a traverse from ethics to 
practice, one of the primary limitations of the present study is that I 
have, in its final iteration, desisted from the attempt to put its 
philosophy into methodological practice. That is, despite a range of 
attempts at this, I have ultimately not found a satisfactory way to 
express its subject matter in a language, form, and structure that would 
do its philosophy justice in a stricter sense. What I have attempted, 
instead, was to describe and develop a range of physical practices and 
therapies that could offer an alternative way to solve this 
methodological conundrum: practices that interrupt and reduce the 
said that our knowledge, intentions, practice, words, and hands might 
produce. These practices ultimately enact an ‘exposure—both corporeal 
and sensible—to the other person’ (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002, p. 
18). 
 
As far as this particular text—its written words—are concerned, I am 
left with two interrelated possibilities. The first of these is to 
discontinue and even retract them, particularly where they relate to 
discernable knowledge claims, truth, or findings, whether these be 
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unproductive or productive. This would be to say that none of what I 
have written here is intended to be prescriptive, or even propositional, 
and thus completely leaves decision with regard to its relevance or 
significance infinitely open. This would not be so different from other 
autoethnographies that aim less for transferability, as much as 
resonance, if at all, and indeed not so far from resonance in the sense of 
accompaniment developed here (Kishi & Whieldon, 2011, p. 106; 
Taylor, 2008, 182). In Hadot’s words, it would, at most, be a form of 
‘indirect communication’ that can ‘give a glimpse of and suggest’ an 
attitude, theory, or practice ‘that the reader has the freedom to accept 
or to refuse’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 147). 
 
This, in turn, implies that it is fundamentally, irrespective of its 
content, the enactment of an open dialogue. As Hadot noted, precisely 
dialogue is also the term used in ancient philosophy in reference to 
‘philosophical writing’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 54). Levinas did not approve of 
the term dialogue, and criticized Buber for its use due to the equality, 
symmetry, or sameness between self and other—the I/You dyad—that it 
implies (Buber, 2006; Levinas, 1996; Putnam, 2008). Despite their 
differences with regard to this term, it is interesting to note that Hadot 
also suggests that ‘a new ethic of philosophical discourse would have to 
be proposed’ in his critique of academic philosophy. This new, ethical 
discourse ‘would renounce taking itself as an end in itself … and would 
instead become a means to overcome oneself’ (Hadot, 2009, p. 60). 
 
It is true that, for Hadot, this overcoming consist in moving ‘onto the 
plane of universal reason’, but it is also the case that this plane or 
movement is characterized precisely by an ‘opening to others’ (Hadot, 
2009, p. 60). At least in appearance then, there is a certain kinship to 
Levinas’s ideas, for whom ‘the essence of this relationship’ between self 
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and other is what he refers to as ‘transcendence, the exit from oneself’ 
(Field & Levinas, 1993). Levinas’s language and style of writing thus 
presents an attempt to show, and I would add, also enact this 
transcendence, the exit from oneself and opening to the other in 
speaking and writing.  
 
Going back to the notions of eclecticism and coherence discussed in 
Chapter Two, I thus suggest that it might be possible to read this thesis 
as a narrative that gains its coherence through its relation to the other. 
That is, it is neither ‘aimed at fashioning a ‘‘self’’ in the sense that this 
would add up to a more or less coherent image or persona’ (Force, 2009, 
p. 544), nor at fashioning a knowledge, but as Montaigne would have it, 
‘an open way of speaking’ that ‘opens up another man’s speech and 
draws it out’ (Montaigne in Frost, 2009, p544). It would not be the 
‘communication of a said … but saying holding open its openness … a 
statement of the ‘here I am’ which is identified with nothing but the 
very voice that signifies’ (Levinas, 1998b, p. 143). It is to read, and thus 
conceive autoethnography as not about, but for the other, and in this 
sense, a physical therapy of passivity and accompaniment. 
 
Overview of findings 
This fourth section of the conclusion presents my findings as 
summaries, notwithstanding all that I have just emphasised concerning 
the discretion or even capability of pronouncing on something found.  
 
(i) A critique of ontological and epistemological theories and 
practices underpinning contemporary physiotherapy 
 
I suggest that this study contributes an original engagement with the 
theories and practices of contemporary physiotherapy through their 
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critical comparison with Levinassian ethics and a range of resonant 
sources. In Chapter Three, this takes place with a particular view to the 
way in which the ontological and epistemological foundations of 
physiotherapy shape its aim and therapeutic agency, or orientation. It is 
then continued in Chapter Four in relation to its extant understanding 
of what it means to be a professional, to work with the physical, and 
what constitutes physical therapy. 
 
(ii) An otherwise theory and practice of self, other, and their 
relation 
 
The thesis contributes an original engagement with the theories and 
practices of contemporary physiotherapy by offering an otherwise, 
fundamental theory of physical therapy. Having outlined some of the 
central philosophical notions and practices providing the focus for the 
study in its first two chapters, the development of this potential, 
otherwise foundation was the primary focus of Chapter Four. The 
developed theory draws on Levinas’s understanding of the fundamental 
relation between self and other, and the structure of ethical subjectivity 
(in this relation). By further contrasting and augmenting these with 
correlative notions from the work of Pierre Hadot, the Japanese martial 
arts, Zen, and Shiatsu, it consists of an original perspective of the 
fundamental structure of the self and its relation to the other that is 
deeply familiar to central notions of physiotherapy, yet reconfigures 
them at a fundamental level. 
 
(iii) A novel approach to physiotherapy practice informed by 
Levinassian ethics, Hadot, Zen, Budo, Shiatsu: Physical therapy of 
passivity and accompaniment. 
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In Chapter Three, I proposed an interim reorientation of physiotherapy 
as a beginning and means to explore an alternative approach, and 
concluded the chapter with an exploration of a range of corresponding 
practices for the physiotherapist. I developed the practices of passivity 
primarily by drawing on extant physiotherapy, Zen, Budo, Shiatsu, and 
ancient Greek and Roman philosophical practices, whilst continuously 
contrasting and correlating them to a Levinassian ethics and the notion 
of passivity. In Chapter Five, I continued this exploration to express 
how they could be understood and implemented as physical therapy 
practices—here in reference to their potential benefits for others. In 
addition I developed a range of further practices building on the notion 
of accompaniment borrowed from the writings of Alphonso Lingis and 
introduced in Chapter Four. I thus suggest that the present study also 
contributes a different view of extant physiotherapy practices and a 
range of additional ones that could be implemented, and further trialled 
and tested by physiotherapists and their clients.   
 
(iv) Physical therapies of passivity and accompaniment as an 
aperture to physiotherapy 
 
Having developed the notions and practices of passivity and 
accompaniment, I sought to outline how they present an aperture and 
approach to the on-going development of further physiotherapy 
theories and practices. By pulling together central elements 
characterising their practice, I considered how this could be a 
professional practice of physiotherapy grounded in, defined, and 
shaped by the other and our fundamental relation and contact to this 
other, at this moment, and in this place. This possibility presents, 
perhaps, the most significant contribution that this thesis makes to 
physiotherapy.  
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(v) Contributions beyond physiotherapy 
 
Outside of its primary context, I further suggest that this study 
contributes a modest, but nonetheless original engagement with its 
philosophical, therapeutic, and practical reference-field more broadly 
speaking. Its contributions and implications could be meaningful to 
other healthcare professions, their practitioners, and clients alike. As 
this is not a primary focus of the present study, this more clearly 
demarcates an area for future research. Insofar as the study not only 
comparatively engages physiotherapy with other traditions and their 
theories and practices, but as well these traditions in relation to one 
another, I further suggests that a range of inferences could be 
contributed with regard to these, but again, this has not been a primary 
focus of the study and warrants further investigation. 
 
(vi) A critique of ontological and epistemological approaches to 
autoethnography 
 
Finally, I suggest that this study contributes an original engagement 
with autoethnography resulting from the critical, comparative 
conjunction of the methodology with, primarily, Levinassian ethics and 
the work of Pierre Hadot. Separated into two parts, the first of these 
consists in a critique of autoethnography and its theories and practices 
of self, other, and their relation, where these are underpinned by the 
same ontology and epistemology as physiotherapy.  
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(vii) Autoethnography as physical therapy of passivity and 
accompaniment 
 
Having initially discussed the conjunction of autoethnography with a 
Levinassian ethics and the work of Pierre Hadot in Chapter Two, the 
second part of its contribution to autoethnography is an understanding 
and practice of autoethnography as a physical therapy of passivity and 
accompaniment. 
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In conclusion 
 
Goodness is produced as pluralism. The pluralism of being is not 
produced as a multiplicity of a constellation spread out before a 
possible gaze, for thus it would be already totalized, joined into 
an entity. Pluralism is accomplished in goodness proceeding from 
me to the other, in which first the other, as absolutely other, can 
be produced, without an alleged lateral view upon this movement 
having any right to grasp of it a truth superior to that which is 
produced in goodness itself. One does not enter into this pluralist 
society without always remaining outside by speech (in which 
goodness is produced)— but one does not leave it in order to 
simply see oneself inside. The unity of plurality is peace, and not 
the coherence of the elements that constitute plurality. Peace 
therefore cannot be identified with the end of combats that cease 
for want of combatants, by the defeat of some and the victory of 
the others, that is, with cemeteries or future universal empires. 
Peace must be my peace, in a relation that starts from an I and 
goes to the other, in desire and goodness, where the I both 
maintains itself and exists without egoism (Levinas, 1969, p. 
305-306). 
 
I began this study to explore my longstanding intuition that the 
conjunction of physiotherapy, Levinassian ethics, Hadot’s philosophy 
as a way of life, and the philosophies and practices of Zen, Budo, 
Shiatsu, presented a feasible and enriching opportunity for the further 
development of physiotherapy theory and practice. That drawing on yet 
unexplored philosophies and practices, and using new research 
approaches is particularly beneficial to reviewing, renovating, and 
addressing current challenges to contemporary healthcare. This has 
increasingly been echoed in the physiotherapy profession over the last 
decade. Taking an approach to autoethnography similarly informed by 
my philosophical and practical background enabled me to present a 
critique of a range of contemporary physiotherapy theories and 
practices, and develop a new approach to its understanding and 
delivery.  
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With regard to its fundamental assumptions and practices, I have 
shown the ways in which these assumptions contradict the original, 
therapeutic motivation underlying the profession by effecting and 
perpetuating a fundamental incapacitation and immobilisation, 
specifically by reducing the other and his or her otherness to its 
ontological and epistemological categories and capacities. I 
consequently sought to develop novel physiotherapy theories and 
practices that are closer to its original motivation, and are based on 
fundamental ethics and corresponding, alternative notions of the self, 
the other, and their relation. Referred to as passivity and 
accompaniment, I have shown how intimately these relate to physical 
therapies and, as such, provide a foundation for a consonant approach 
to the practices of physical therapies. 
 
Both the critical perspective and the novel theory and practice of 
physiotherapy developed in the present study make an original 
contribution to the profession. Future research may consider the 
potential implications of this critique and otherwise model to the 
thinking and practice of other physical therapies and healthcare 
approaches more broadly speaking. The use and further development of 
autoethnography in the present study similarly makes an original, 
methodological contribution to physiotherapy research that aligns with 
the growing number of qualitative research studies and approaches in 
the profession. Finally, the conjunction of autoethnography with 
fundamental ethics, philosophy as a way of life, Zen, Budo, and Shiatsu 
contributes to the debate and further development of autoethnography. 
 
The same conjunction has also presented the most significant 
challenges to the present study with implications for: the 
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epistemological project of scientific inquiry; the ontological and 
epistemological theories and practices of the self specific to 
autoethnography; and the ethics of research findings, contributions, 
and their significance for others. Following a strict reading, these 
implications undermine the production and promotion of any 
substantive content of research findings as significant and ethical. That 
is, they inevitably delimit the other’s otherness via their posturing as 
meaningful for all, or even just some others.  
 
The seemingly paradoxical implication of this is that the study 
nonetheless makes original contributions to physiotherapy and 
autoethnography alike, curiously aligned with its substantive findings. 
Following this, otherwise reading, the principal contribution of this 
study is not the content of its words and findings, but the fact that it is a 
saying infinitely open to the other, a writing that invites and provides 
physical support and company for the other and the other’s otherness. 
Especially in the inconclusive closing of my saying taken as said, it is in 
this sense that I hope that my study exemplifies a however modest 
physical therapy of passivity and accompaniment. If, as Levinas argued, 
the ‘essence of language is friendship and hospitality’, then it would 
mean the utmost if I could present this study ‘as a sign given to the 
other’, a service, or gift in support of plurality and motion within and 
outside of you (Levinas, 1969, p. 305; 1998b, pp. 149, 151). Whether or 
not I have achieved this at least to some extent, never was or is for me 
to decide, and so I eagerly await your response, if you wish to offer it.  
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